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Abstract  
This thesis examines the causal factors behind the persistence of opposition fragmentation after 
the toppling of Mubarak and the collapse of the regime’s throbbing heart, the security apparatus. 
This is due to the importance of opposition unification not only in the toppling of autocrats but 
also in the success of any transition towards democracy. More urgency is brought to the puzzle 
due to the specific nature of the transitional period that was more in favor of different political 
forces compared to previous periods. This argues that three causal factors were behind the re-
fragmentation of the opposition post-Mubarak: the continuation of regime manipulation by the 
SCAF, the failure of cooperation between youth movements and political parties, and the 
polarization between Islamists and Secularists.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Acknowledgments 
My gratitude goes first to my family without whom, I would not be in such position or reached 
this stage in my life. Thanks to my mother who taught me how to be an independent and 
responsible woman who always seek to do the best she can. Thanks to my father who has been a 
role model for a hard-worker, dedicated and cooperative professor to his students and who 
always encouraged me to work and improve myself. Thanks as well to my teachers at school and 
my professors at university whether in the bachelor degree or the master’s degree who 
contributed to my personality and my knowledge by their continuous help and advice. However, 
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Kevin Koehler who was a role model for a 
dedicated and cooperative professor to his students. Thanks for your patience throughout the way 
and for your continuous support and guidance which added a lot to my mentality and research 
capabilities. I would also like to give special thanks to Dr. Oliver Schlumberger and Dr. Nadine 
Sika for accepting to be my readers and for their helpful comments on the thesis; to Dr. Holger 
Albrecht for guiding me to find the theme of the thesis, for his comments on earlier drafts and for 
everything I learnt from him and widened my knowledge; and to Dr. Ahmed Abd Rabou for his 
continuous support and guidance and for being a model to the researcher who stick to the ethics 
of research away from any personal views or affiliations. Lastly, thanks to my sisters and my 
friends who supported me throughout the way and who believed in me whenever I doubt it.  
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter One 
 In early 2011, the fall of Ben Ali’s regime spelled tremendous change not only for 
Tunisia, but for the Middle East as a whole. Following the Tunisian uprising, uprisings took 
place in different countries such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Despite the various 
paths these uprisings took, their unexpected occurrence raised scholars’ expectations who 
thought that the “third wave of democratization” had finally knocked at the door of the Middle 
East
1
. Unfortunately these expectations were unfounded. Some authoritarian regimes succeeded 
to resist the wave of change (i.e. Syria and Bahrain), while the uprisings in other countries have 
either led to the failure of the state itself (i.e. Libya and Yemen), or to another form of 
authoritarian regime (i.e. Egypt). Of the six Arab Spring cases, only Tunisia seems to hold some 
potential of completing a democratic transition. 
These different outcomes revived the scholarly debate about the factors that influence 
authoritarian regime stability in time of crises and hence their prospects of survival or 
breakdown. It has been argued by most transitologists that divisions within the ruling elite are a 
“prior condition for political liberalization”2. However, the democratization trend that swept 
Latin America, South and East European countries in the 1970-1980s proved to scholars that 
opposition can play a role in overthrowing regimes. Hence, scholars started to focus on 
opposition under authoritarianism. Among those scholars is Przeworski who says: “imagine that 
the authoritarian regime suffers a loss of legitimacy but no alternative regime is accessible, that 
                                                          
1
 Thomas Carother, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy 33, no. 1 (2002): 5  
2
 Dina S. Shehata, “Islamists and non-Islamists in the Egyptian opposition: Patterns of conflict and cooperation”, 
(PhD, Georgetown University, 2007), Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304877799?accountid=8423 
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is, no coherent alternative is politically organized. What would happen? Nothing much”3. 
Accordingly, he argues that a regime will not collapse “until an alternative is organized in such a 
way as to present a real choice for isolated individuals”. For this reason, Cavatorta and 
Haugbølle argued that autocrats tend to fuel ideological and personal conflicts between 
opposition forces to keep them divided and thus, to maintain their stability
4
. Besides, autocrats 
use other tactics such as repression, co-optation, etc. to ensure the absence of any alternative. 
Despite that, Lust argued that “when political circumstances change, opposition elites are more 
likely to put aside personal conflicts, recognizing that while mutual cooperation may succeed, 
independent actions surely will not”5. The unification of opposition forces is not only crucial 
with regard to the toppling of authoritarian incumbents, but also with regard to the success of a 
transition towards democracy. According to Przeworski, anti-authoritarian forces must unite to 
bring down the regime but they must compete against each other under democracy
6
. However, if 
they divide too early, the result will be another form of authoritarianism. While if they did not 
divide at all, the new regime will be a mirror image of the old one: neither representative nor 
competitive
7
.   
Based on these considerations, I examine the fragmentation of the Egyptian opposition 
after Mubarak. When the opportunity arose in 2011, the opposition disregarded their differences 
and got united in opposition to Mubarak. After his fall, however, cleavages started to re-emerge 
and gradually led to their re-fragmentation. This observation is counterintuitive because 
                                                          
3
 Adam Przeworski, “Some problems in the study of the transition to democracy”. In Guillermo O 'Donnell, Philippe 
C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from authoritarian rule: Comparative Perspectives. 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 52.  
4
 Ellen Lust-Okar, “Opposition cooperation and uprisings in the Arab World”, British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 38, no. 3(1986): 426. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2011.621704  
5
 Ibid, pp. 426 
6
 Adam Przeworski, “Democracy and the market: Political and economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America”, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 67.  
7
 Ibid, pp. 88-89.  
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“transitions in the Arab world took place at a time when political actors are due to rebuild 
political systems” after years of de-politicization8. Some scholars such as Lust and Albrecht, 
among others, would argue that opposition re-fragmentation is due to regime strategies that 
attempted to divide the opposition
9
. In other words, as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF)--which is perceived as a major component of the former regime--was in charge of 
transition, which cannot be considered a neutral force, the regime was likely to adopt the same 
strategies as Mubarak to keep the opposition fragmented and consolidate its power
10
. Even if this 
is partially true, transitions are “very specific moments” because they lead to a “major watershed 
in political life that opens up various trails and to a moment of great uncertainty” that is different 
from the authoritarian context
11
. Hence, whatever the military’s institutional weight, the huge 
political void left by the collapse of Mubarak’s regime cannot be entirely filled by the military12. 
As a result, opposition fragmentation cannot be explained entirely by regime strategies, requiring 
a look at opposition deficiencies as well.   
Based on what was mentioned previously, this paper will try to solve this puzzle by 
answering the following question:   
In the light of the space that was open in 2011 for the opposition to organize, what are the 
causal factors that contributed to the persistence of fragmentation among the opposition? 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Philippe Droz-Vincent, “Prospects for democratic control of the armed forces: Comparative insights and lessons 
for the Arab world in transition”, Armed forces and society 40, no. 4 (2013), 704 
9
 For further information, see; Lust, Ellen. 2005. Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, 
and Institutions. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, United Kingdom; Albrecht, Holger. 2013. Raging against 
the machine: Political opposition under authoritarianism in Egypt. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press; Stacher, 
Joshua A. November 2004. Parties over: The Demise of Egypt’s Opposition Parties. British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 3(2). Pp. 215-233 
10
 Atef Said, “The paradox of transition to democracy under military rule”, Social research 79, no. 2 (2012), 397. 
11
 Droz-Vincent, Philippe. Op.Cit. Pp. 704 
12
 Ibid, pp. 704.  
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 Literature review:  
 As I am interested in studying the causal factors that impeded the Egyptian opposition 
from unification despite the relative absence of regime repression after Mubarak and the 
increasing opportunity for cooperation at that time, it is necessary not only to look at what was 
written on Egyptian opposition fragmentation after the uprising  but also at opposition 
fragmentation in the larger context. Thus, this literature review will be divided into two sections: 
the first will revolve around scholars’ attempts to study opposition fragmentation while the 
second will be concerned with how scholars studied the Egyptian opposition after the uprising . 
Further, scholars concerned with the first issue can be divided into two groups: one that tries to 
answer the question of ‘when does opposition unite?’ and another group that is concerned with 
answering the question of ‘why does opposition fail to unite?’  
 Section One: Opposition fragmentation under authoritarianism: 
a) When does opposition unite under authoritarianism?  
 By the early 1990s, most one-party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East 
(ME) had witnessed a liberalizing trend by initiating legislative elections and opening the space 
for civil society. Accordingly, it was logical that many scholars would focus on pre-electoral 
alliances as a manifestation of opposition unification. For instance, Posusney argues that radical 
Islamists are not the only threat faced by authoritarian regimes in the ME but also secularists and 
moderate Islamists can challenge these regimes through elections
13i
. Accordingly, she found that 
most Arab elites “preferred winner takes all voting which proved beneficial for regimes 
pluralizing from a single-party situation”14. Nevertheless, Posusney argued that the fragmented 
opposition may unite within the presence of a hegemonic ruling party and may either adopt a 
                                                          
13
 Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering and Oppositional 
Strategies”, Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 4 (2002), 36.  
14
 Ibid, pp. 37.  
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participation or exit strategy
ii
 to “diminish the regime’s hegemony over the electoral system”15. 
Unlike Posusney, Kraetzschmar studied electoral alliances by examining the reasons behind the 
failure of the United National Front for Change (UNFC) in Egypt in 2005 within the context of 
other successful experiences that took place in Egyptian legislative elections of 1984 and 1987. 
He argues that the failure of the UNFC was due to its own deficiencies such as the timing of its 
formation, the absence of interparty cooperation between its candidates, and the exclusion of a 
potent rival, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
16
. He suggests that for any future alliance to be 
effective, three conditions must be fulfilled: leadership commitment to the project, preparedness 
of the campaign and MB inclusion
17. Similarly, van de Walle studied the “circumstances that 
influence the degree of opposition cohesion in electoral autocracies and its relation with electoral 
outcomes” by focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa18. He claims that opposition cohesion is not a 
cause for transition but is a consequence of the increasing probability of opposition victory in 
elections
19
.  
 Other scholars tended to focus on opposition alliances that were forged in contexts that 
may include electoral processes but are not limited to them. Clark is among those scholars who 
studied the factors that influence the success or failure of cross-ideological alliances by 
examining three successful alliances and one failed coalition
iii
 that were forged in Jordan 
between 2003 and 2006
20
. She found that cross-ideological alliances are initiated under external 
                                                          
15
 Ibid, pp. 37.  
16
 Hendrik Kraetzschmar, “Opposition Alliances under Electoral Authoritarianism: The United National Front for 
Change in Egypt’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections”, In Holger Albrecht (Ed.), Contentious Politics in the Middle 
East: Political Opposition under Authoritarianism, (United States of America: University Press of Florida, 2010), 
111.   
17
 Ibid, pp. 112.  
18
 Nicolas Van De Walle, “Tipping Games: When do opposition parties coalesce?” In Andreas Schedler (Ed.), 
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of unfree competition, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 78.  
19
 Ibid, pp. 78.  
20
 Janine A. Clark, “Threats, Structures, and Resources: Cross-Ideological Coalition Building in Jordan”, 
Comparative Politics 43, no. 1 (2010), 101. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25741389   
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threats not in the context of political opportunities
21
. These external threats may include regime 
policies that directly influence the political arena an actor is working in
22
. Similar to Clark, Ryan 
focused on Jordan but instead on the evolution of reform alliances from leftist parties and 
Islamist movements starting from 1989 to grass root alliances, youth movements and social 
media activism after Arab uprisings
23
. The successful attempts by the opposition to form reform 
alliances that expanded from 1989 till now is due to two reasons: first, opposition found it much 
easier to cooperate on foreign issues than domestic ones but such cooperation has paved the way 
for cooperation on domestic issues later on
24
. The second reason is their ability to coalesce 
different societal segments such as Jordanians and Palestinians as well as different political and 
social forces that include youth movements, grass root alliances, etc. This shows why alliances 
that exclude important political or social forces were never sustained in Egypt or elsewhere.  
 Finally, as Lust was writing the concluding chapter for ‘the dynamics of opposition 
cooperation in the Arab World: contentious politics in times of change’25, she noted that scholars 
did not reach to a single reason behind opposition unification, but that it rather depended on the 
context
iv
. Thus, more research is required to understand the reasons behind these different 
outcomes and when alliances succeed or fail. Further, she criticized the dichotomy of 
‘successful’ and ‘failed’ cooperation common in the literature because the formation of alliances 
is a dynamic process and thus, the impact of opposition efforts over long periods must be 
considered
26
.  Last but not least, Lust argued that opposition has cooperated to topple 
                                                          
21
 Ibid, pp. 101.  
22
 Ibid, pp. 115.  
23
 Curtis R. Ryan, “Political opposition and reform alliances in Jordan”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
38, no. 3 (2011), 367. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2011.621699 
24
 Ibid. Pp. 378.  
25
 Hendrik Jan Kraetzschmar (Ed.), “The dynamics of opposition cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious 
politics in times of change”, (New York/London: Routledge, 2013)  
26
 Ellen Lust-Okar, “Opposition Cooperation and Uprisings in the Arab World”, British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 38, no. 3 (2011): 432. 
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authoritarian regimes in 2011 but most importantly, “what should we expect of opposition 
alliances when the dust begins to settle?”27 Although she kept the question open, she argued that 
two variables may influence opposition behavior. First, the youth has a more active political role 
after the uprisings which will not only lead to the establishment of new movements and parties 
but will also force old elites to restructure their organizations to include new entrants
28
. Second, 
the fall of autocrats may undermine the regime’s constraints on opposition coordination but at 
the same time, the nature of the transition period “raises the stakes, making it difficult for the 
opposition to coordinate” as the Egyptian case clearly illustrates.  
b. Why do opposition fail to unite?  
 Trying to answer this question, we can find that scholars can be divided into two schools 
of thought: the first argues that regime strategies are responsible for keeping the opposition 
fragmented; thus they tend to adopt a top-down approach. The second group argues that 
opposition fragmentation is due to the deficiencies of the opposition itself, thus adopting a 
bottom-up approach.  
Top-down approach:  
 There are many mechanics through which authoritarian regimes can maintain opposition 
fragmentation other than repression. Albrecht argues that regime repression and co-optation has 
maintained such fragmentation so that opposition will not be able to challenge the regime. As 
political parties are only utilized to give the impression of a multi-party system, the electoral 
system does not function as an arena for political struggle but as arena for clientelist co-optation 
and recruitment into the political realm
29
. In other words, political parties are given access to 
                                                          
27
 Ibid, pp. 433. 
28
 Ibid, pp. 433.  
29
 Holger Albrecht, “How opposition can support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, Democratization 12, no. 3 
(2005), 384 
14 
 
state resources along with other privileges in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. In that 
sense, Albrecht categorized the opposition in authoritarian regimes into three groups: loyal, 
tolerated, and anti-system opposition. The loyal opposition are those that accept the legal 
framework established by authoritarian regimes and hence, they only criticize the rules and 
procedures that will restrict their activities such as electoral rules
30
. By that they indirectly 
maintain regime stability.  
 Unlike Albrecht, Lust is arguing that scholars failed to explain the reasons that would 
make political opponents unwilling to challenge the regime even if they are capable of doing so 
especially during times of regime crisis
31. She explained how incumbents use ‘structures of 
contestation’ (SoCs) to manipulate the opposition. Some incumbents may allow some groups to 
participate in the formal political system while excluding others, creating by that a “divided 
structure of contestation,” whilst other incumbents may choose to include all opposition groups 
in the system, creating a “unified structure of contestation”32. Lust found that in ‘unified SoC’, 
when the regime gets weaker and the economic crisis continues, the moderate and radical groups 
are more likely to neglect their ideological affiliations and collaborate to challenge the regime
33
. 
While in divided SoCs that were established in Morocco under King Hassan II and in Egypt 
under Mubarak, moderates will exploit the economic crisis to call for demands but as the crisis 
continues, they are no longer willing to challenge the regime because if they mobilized the public 
and failed to control them, or if the radical opponents joined their demonstrations, they will be 
harshly repressed by the regime
34
.  
                                                          
30
 Holger Albrecht, “Raging against the machine: Political opposition under authoritarianism in Egypt”, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2013), 9-10.   
31
 Ellen Lust-Okar, “Structuring conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions”, (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-4 
32
 Ibid, pp. 1-2 
33
 Ibid, pp. 96 & 125.  
34
 Ibid, pp. 126 & 151.  
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 Other scholars such as Brown have focused on how autocrats use elections to maintain 
the weakness and fragmentation of opposition. Historically, they used elections to signal new 
ideological directions and to construct and maintain patronage networks, but with the rise of 
semi-authoritarian regimes, they realized that elections can be used as mechanisms to regulate 
their relation with the opposition
35
. Accordingly, he argues that elections can be used to govern 
opposition in three ways; first, elections can be a mechanism to monitor opposition and it allows 
regimes to differentiate between threatening and taming opposition
36
. Second, elections can be 
used to co-opt opposition where some opposition groups are given access to state resources in 
exchange for their support to the regime
37
. Finally, elections can be a mechanism to divide the 
opposition
v
.  
 Bottom-up approach:  
 Scholars who adopt this approach argue that the deficiencies of the opposition are as 
important as regime strategies in maintaining opposition fragmentation. Among these is 
Cavatorta who attempted to explain why the MENA region deviates from the expected behavior 
of alliance-building
vi
 common in transitology literature. Studying the cross-ideological conflict 
between the Moroccan Islamists and secularists, he argues that the problem is not in the absence 
of such alliances but in their ad hoc nature as opposition manage to form alliances to exert 
pressure on the regime on a specific issue but these attempts never developed wide-range 
programs of change and thus, they become ineffective vis-à-vis the regime
38
. According to him, 
the main reason for this phenomenon is the ideological differences between Islamists and 
                                                          
35
 Nathan J. Brown, “Running to lose? Elections, authoritarianism and Islamist movements”, In When victory is not 
an option: Islamist movements in Arab politics, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell university press: 2012), 21-22.   
36
 Ibid, pp. 22. 
37
 Ibid, pp. 22.  
38
 Francesco Cavatorta, “Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail: Opposition Politics in Morocco”. Democratization 
16, no. 1 (2009), 140-141, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340802575882.  
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secularists. Most importantly, what makes the opposition in the MENA more fragmented than 
their counterparts in other transitional countries is the conflicting belief systems of the two 
spectrums and the major role of religion in politics
39
.  
 Just as Cavatorta, Shehata questioned the common wisdom in the literature that attributes 
authoritarian resilience to cohesion of ruling elite and regimes’ strategies of co-optation and 
repression by asking “why democratic mobilization has remained weak even during moments of 
regime crisis/breakdown?”40. She argues that “while divisions within the ruling coalition might 
be a necessary pre-condition” for regime breakdown, transition will never take place if the 
opposition remained fragmented even in times of regime crisis
41
. Accordingly, she examined 
how ideological polarization, mobilizational asymmetries and unfavorable political opportunity 
structures have impeded the formation of sustainable alliances between Islamists and secularists 
in Egypt even in time of regime crisis (1980s and 2000-2005) where their alliances proved to be 
temporal and unable to challenge the regime
42
. With regard to ideological polarization, it seems 
that she agrees with most transitologists that prior consensus by different opposition actors over 
decisive issues is required for a transition to succeed. As Cavatorta, Shehata argues that 
cooperation between Islamists and secularist will be difficult to achieve when ideological 
polarization is combined with mobilizational asymmetries between moderates and radicals
43
. 
Hence, moderates will favor the authoritarian status quo rather than being ruled by radicals who 
will win in fair and free elections. Lastly, with regard to political opportunity structure, she 
referred to the selective inclusion/exclusion strategy adopted by authoritarian regimes to divide 
                                                          
39
 Ibid, pp. 142 
40
 Shehata, Islamists and non-Islamists in the Egyptian opposition: Patterns of conflict and cooperation, 2-3  
41
 Ibid, pp. 3 
42
 Ibid, pp. 4 
43
 Ibid, pp. 22 
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the opposition and hence to create different incentive structures that inhibit the cooperation 
between the included and excluded forces
44
.  
 Moving to the context of the Arab uprisings, Haugbølle and Cavatorta argue that the 
absence of opposition political parties at the helm of the 2011 uprising in Tunisia is due to the 
frequent failures of such parties to coordinate during Ben Ali’s reign to challenge his rule45. 
Thus, they opened the way to informal groups such as social media activists to take the lead. 
According to them, Ben Ali’s tactics of co-optation and repression only proved effective in 
curbing any efforts of cross-party coordination due to three factors related to the opposition 
itself: ideological rivalries within the opposition, personal rivalries, and opposition inability to 
unify their position vis-à-vis the regime
46. Even after Ben Ali’s withdrawal, the most challenging 
factor to the success of transition is the divisions among opposition and the legacy of 
coordination failures which may prevent them from uniting behind a joint program of 
institutional renewal
47
.  
 Second section: Egyptian opposition after Mubarak:  
 After looking on the literature of opposition fragmentation, in this section I will briefly 
go over what was written on opposition fragmentation after Mubarak’s withdrawal to find out the 
theoretical and empirical gaps this study will try to fill.  
 To begin with, Mazen Hassan focused on studying the transformation of parties from 
restricted multi-party system to a fragile fragmented party system after 2011. As in other 
transitional countries, Egypt witnessed a high proliferation of new political parties that reached 
                                                          
 
45 Rikke Hostrup Hangbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, “Will the real Tunisian opposition please stand up? 
Opposition coordination failures under authoritarian constraints”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38, no.  
3 (2011), 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2011.621696  
 
47
 Ibid, 42 & 56-57.  
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around 70 parties
48
. Hassan, as other scholars, is questioning if this phenomenon will increase 
the prospects of democratic transition or will be one of the challenges facing transition
49
. He put 
the spot light on ten main problems that keep political parties weak and fragmented. One of these 
problems is the weakness of institutional structures of most parties which refers to the hegemonic 
role of the party leader and his exclusion of other members, non-democratic mechanism of 
decision-making, etc. enhancing by that party weakness and in extreme cases, leading to internal 
splits
50
. With the exception of a few parties, such as Justice and Liberty, Justice, El-Masreen El-
Ahrar, etc., there is an overlap between the names and programs of most parties which makes it 
difficult to differentiate between them
51
. This raises a question that I will try to answer: why did 
parties fail to coordinate and form alliances despite the absence of acute ideological differences 
between them? In this sense, Hassan argues that the absence of real coalition between parties is 
one of the main problems of political parties.  
 Unlike Hassan who adopted an institutional perspective by focusing only on political 
parties, other scholars tried to understand the fragmentation of opposition and obstacles facing 
transition by looking at the interaction between all political forces including parties or by 
focusing on the deficiencies of a single actor. For instance, Mai Mogib has divided political 
forces in the transition period into four: the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), 
Islamists, secularists, and the youth. She argues that each actor enjoyed some sort of legitimacy 
but since no actor enjoyed full legitimacy, each found it necessary to build a coalition with 
                                                          
48
 Yosri El-Azabawi & Mazen Hassan. “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising : From restricted plurality to party 
fragmentation”, Strategic Papers, no. 234(2012), 16 
49
 Ibid, 30.   
50
 Ibid, 28-36.  
51
 Ibid, 30-31  
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another actor while excluding others enhancing by that polarization between actors
52
. And with 
the exception of youth, the position of all other actors was not constant throughout the period
53
. 
Further, the fragmentation of political forces whether in the sense of internal splits or divisions 
among opposition was the main factor that enhanced the weakness of these actors.  
 Another contribution was made by Abd El-Fatah Mady who tried to explain the reasons 
behind the failure of democratic transition in Egypt and the escalation of violence since 2011 till 
now. His analysis can be summarized into three factors: the SCAF’s attitude during the transition 
period, the attitude of MB after reaching power, and the attitude of other political forces prior 
and after Morsi’s assumption of power. After Mubarak’s fall, most political parties assumed that 
it is time for political competition and campaigning for their programs instead of coming 
together to set the new rules of the game
54
. As a result, zero-sum game became the logic of most 
forces where each is trying to totally exclude its opponent
55
. Another problem is that political 
forces did not resort to dialogue to reach a compromise over general rules, but instead they 
resorted to electoral campaigning and demonstrations which enhanced polarization and brought 
elite conflicts into the streets
56
. The second factor refers to the SCAF’s view of the period and its 
role. On one hand, the SCAF viewed itself as the guardian of the state and the uprising and thus 
claimed the supreme authority to take decisions
57
. Most importantly, the attitude of parties 
strengthened this perception because they used to view the SCAF as a mediator between 
opposing actors in the aftermath of the uprising. Further, secular parties viewed the SCAF as a 
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protector against Islamists which is why they called for the military to intervene to overthrow 
Morsi
58
. In addition, the SCAF did not manage this period as a post-uprising ary one that 
requires the establishment of new rules and institutions and applying transitional justice
59
. 
Hence, the SCAF tried to limit the repercussions of the uprising to the change of the ruler while 
adopting nominal changes under the pressure of mass demonstrations
60
. The last factor is the 
attitude of the MB, especially after assuming power. In the aftermath of the uprising, the MB 
adopted a reformist not a revolutionary program which brought its view closer to the SCAF than 
to that of the revolutionary forces, enhancing by that the mistrust between the MB and other 
opposition forces
61
.  
 Lastly, Shehata tried to analyze the evolution of youth movements since early 2000s until 
they took the lead of demonstrations in 2011. Moreover, she drew a map of the protest 
movements that paved the way to 2011 uprisings, including the Popular Campaign for the 
support of El-Baradei, April 6, We are all Khaled Said, etc. She then explained the alliances that 
were formed during the uprising such as the 25 January Revolution Youth Coalition and their 
role in the aftermath of Mubarak’s withdrawal. Most importantly, she focuses on the 
characteristics of these movements which would help us understand why these movements 
disintegrated after Mubarak. For example, being internally diverse and inclusive of all 
ideological orientations helped these movements in overthrowing Mubarak but they soon 
disintegrated after his fall because active members of these movements dropped out to establish 
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their own parties
62
. Moreover, the polarization between Islamists and Secularists over the 
sequence of transition and between liberals and leftists over social and economic policies have 
further weakened the leverage of youth and has enabled the SCAF to successfully play off the 
different groups against one-another
63
.  
 By going over the literature on the Egyptian opposition after Mubarak’s fall, we can find 
some issues that were overlooked by the literature and hence, further research is required. On 
one hand, most of the literature written on this period is descriptive in nature with some few 
exceptions that tried to analyze the nature of interactions between different political forces and 
the reasons behind the attitude of each. However, they almost completely neglected the shifts in 
views and positions of actors from one instance to another since 2011 till now and hence, they 
did not study any significant events beyond elections. Similarly, when looking at opposition 
alliances, most scholars paid attention to pre-electoral alliances neglecting by that all alliances 
that were forged to call for specific demands as the call for parliamentary elections in 2011. In 
other words, scholars focused mainly on alliances between formal institutions such as parties 
while neglecting alliances either between parties and informal groups such as youth movements, 
or between youth movements. Moreover, scholars who focused on youth movements tend to 
focus on their role during the uprising or in the early days after Mubarak but they neglected their 
role hereafter. Finally, when studying Islamists, more attention was paid to the MB rather than 
Salafis or MB youth despite their significant role in the post-Mubarak era.  
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 Theoretical Framework:  
 Despite some similarities between the 2011 Arab uprisings and the democratization trend 
that swept Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1970-190s, there is a critical 
difference between the two trends with respect to the role of the military in transition. In some 
Latin American countries such as Brazil, the “military was trying to extricate itself from power” 
while in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, “its neutrality was necessary for the transition to 
proceed further and enfeeble communist regimes”64. Within the context of the Arab uprisings, 
the military decided to back the revolts in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia and to repress the 
demonstrations in Syria and Bahrain while in the case of Yemen and Libya, it was split into 
factions
65
. This phenomenon urged scholars as Albrecht, Ohl, Barany and Koehler to ask why 
the military took different positions in all these cases and how this would influence the path of 
transition in case of regime breakdown.  
In Egypt Mubarak was forced to hand over power however, since the military had been a 
major component of the political apparatus of the former regime, it was far from being a neutral 
body to run the transitional period (Fitra Intiqaliya)
66
. Taking this into consideration along with 
the SCAF’s frequent emphasis on its willingness to turn power over, it is expected that it would 
prefer minimal reforms while keeping the fundamental rules of the regime untouched
67
. If this is 
the case then it is important to examine the relationship between the SCAF and different political 
forces throughout the transition period as well as the political impacts of the decrees issued by 
the SCAF especially the ones related to the party system and elections in order to test the validity 
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of the assumption –mentioned before- that opposition fragmentation is a result of regime 
manipulation and hence, to find the elements of continuity with Mubarak’s regime.  
 Even if we assumed that regime manipulation was still a factor after Mubarak, the 
political void left by the collapse of his regime cannot be entirely filled by the military as 
mentioned before which leaves a space for the opposition to maneuver particularly when the 
SCAF was facing a legitimacy crisis. The SCAF derived its legitimacy from its support to the 
uprising and it presented itself as a protector of the uprising in all public statements
68
. Then by 
the ratification of the constitutional amendments that took place in March 2011, the SCAF has 
ensured its constitutional legitimacy
69
. However, it started to lose this legitimacy when it started 
to repress demonstrations which it perceived as a challenge to its rule
70. Based on Shehata’s 
argument, this period can be regarded as a time of regime crisis. This lends more urgency to the 
question of why the opposition failed to organize and unite to put an end to the military rule. For 
all these reasons, it is pivotal to look at the other side of the coin and examine the deficiencies of 
the opposition that inhibited it from unification.   
  Based on the above considerations, I argue that there are three alternative hypotheses 
which could explain the failure of the opposition to unite and whose validity I will test in this 
thesis:  
1. Since the military was in charge of the transitional process, opposition fragmentation can 
be explained by continued regime manipulation.  
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2. The failure of political parties to form alliances with youth movements has enhanced the 
fragmentation of opposition and weakened them vis-à-vis remnants of authoritarian 
regime.  
3. The polarization of ideological differences and personal conflicts between Islamists and 
Secularists with the absence of sustained dialogue and mobilization asymmetry between 
the two has prevented them from reaching a compromise over the rules of the new 
political order. 
 Conceptual Framework:  
 
1) What is meant by ‘Opposition’? 
 The term ‘opposition’ is a dependent concept which is tied to the concept of 
‘government/authority/rule’71. Government can be understood as: a ‘process’ where it is 
“required to be ballistic and aggregative”, an ‘authority’ since it is professional and 
representative of its citizens, and an ‘output’ where it is a problem-solving and responsive to 
citizens’ demands72. In contrast, opposition is supposed to provide an alternation to the 
government with its various aspects in front of people
73
. Any political system is indeed 
composed of two complementary units: the government and the opposition. Further, opposition 
is dependent on the government in the sense that its character is tied to that of the government
74
. 
In liberal political systems, for instance, institutions and social cleavages have a major impact on 
the character of opposition
75
. If social cleavages are sharp, opposition is more likely to be 
represented in “communal groups or in parties being mere epiphenomena” whilst, opposition can 
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be exclusive to parties or can be a mixture of parties and social movements where the impact of 
social cleavages is minimal
76
. On the other hand, the forms of opposition vary on the extent of 
autocrats’ tolerance. Some authoritarian regimes are brutal while others may allow some groups 
to participate in the political life and exclude others
77
. Accordingly, tolerated opposition are 
given some space to perform whilst, real opposition are forced to function from underground
78
.  
 However, this is not to overlook the variations in types and strength of the opposition. 
The strength of the opposition refers to the competitiveness of the opposition which is partly 
influenced by its cohesiveness
79
. However, this point will be discussed below in details. Further, 
the categorization of the opposition depends on the variance between the goals of the opposition 
and that of the government. As stated by Blondel, some actors may disagree with the government 
over minor issues or over general policy matters while remain ‘pro-system’80. In contrast, other 
actors may oppose the regime or the structure of the political system as a whole and hence, are 
regarded as ‘anti-system’81. With relevance to Egypt under Mubarak, Albrecht argued that 
opposition can be divided under authoritarianism into: loyal, tolerated, and anti-system 
opposition. Loyal opposition include parties such as: El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, El-Nasri, etc. that 
have implicitly accepted the legal framework established by the regime while their dissent was 
directed toward specific policies
82
. While tolerated opposition are the protest movements as 
Kefaya and the network of human rights activists who emerged from within the society and 
independently from the state
83. Mubarak’s regime has provided some space for these groups to 
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maneuver although, they were challenging the regime on its repressive mechanisms
84
. Lastly, 
Islamists composed of MB and small groups with either moderate or militia agenda were 
regarded as ‘anti-system opposition’85. This is not due to the ideological difference between them 
and the regime but because they were representing an alternate project to organize the society 
and were enjoying a wide social support specifically, in the case of the MB
86
. Based on 
Albrecht’s classification, the term ‘opposition’ used in this paper refer to the forces who got 
united during the 18 days of 2011 uprising in opposition to Mubarak then re-fragmented after his 
toppling. To be specific, ‘anti-Mubarak’ opposition were mainly composed of the tolerated 
opposition and MB as part of the anti-system opposition and to a lesser extent, the loyal 
opposition whose participation remained minimal during the 18 days.  
2) What is meant by ‘Opposition Fragmentation’?  
 
 Most of the literature overlooked the definition of ‘fragmentation’ while focusing more 
on its manifestations and its various impacts which range between performance of ruling 
incumbents or governments, prospects of regime change, effectiveness of political parties 
especially opposition, probabilities of civil war onset, etc. Nonetheless, authors like Gandhi and 
Reuter unintentionally explained ‘fragmentation’ by explaining its antithesis, cooperation87. By 
which, they argued that coordination between opposition parties may take place in different 
forms during elections such as joint electoral lists, joint statements, and pre-electoral alliances
88
. 
They argued that coordination refers only to cooperation between political actors but does not 
necessarily mean cohesion (i.e. ideological proximity), especially in developing countries where 
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ideological differences are not genuine among political actors
89
. Similarly, Ko Maeda argues that 
high a level of opposition fragmentation implies a lack of coordination between them, while a 
unified opposition would have a more general stance aiming at a wide range of citizens
90
. In 
other words, a fragmented opposition will be unable to present itself as “coherent and visible 
alternative to the regime” whilst a unified opposition will attract citizens who are unsatisfied 
with the current regime
91
. Consequently, Ko Maeda emphasizes that a large number of 
opposition parties may allow the incumbent to lose some votes in favor of the opposition 
however, an “anti-incumbent swing” (i.e. regime change) will not take place unless the 
opposition is united
92
. In another context, Ko Maeda has pointed to the manifestations of 
opposition fragmentation or unification. When the opposition is moving towards unification, 
multiple parties will merge together and larger parties will get larger whilst smaller ones will 
either get smaller or totally disappear
93
. On the other hand, if the opposition is becoming more 
fragmented, we are likely to see that the size of opposition parties become more balanced, an 
existing party splits, or a new party enters into the electoral competition
94
.    
 From the above, we can realize that there are different degrees of fragmentation which 
differentiates one political system from another. Accordingly, authors like Anderson and 
Bengtsson attempted to measure fragmentation by using the “effective number of parties (ENP) 
in the legislature” which implies “available alternatives” if the ENP is large95. In other words, 
they focused on the degree of party fragmentation in the whole legislature rather than the 
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fragmentation of opposition only. However, Ko Maeda criticizes their attempt because a large 
ENP value does not necessarily mean the availability of alternatives as it measures the number of 
parties in the whole legislature including both ruling and opposition parties
96
. Instead, he initiates 
a new variable called “effective number of opposition parties (ENOP) which applies Laakso and 
Taagepera's method of calculating the effective number of parties to the number of seats of all 
opposition parties”97. Hence, the larger this value, the more parties of similar size exist; if there 
is only one opposition party, the ENOP will be equal to one
98
. Nonetheless, this does not imply 
the preference of one variable over another, they are just different concepts: the ENP 
concentrates on the number and size of all parties to capture the fragmentation of the party 
system while the ENOP focuses on the number and size of opposition parties to measure the 
fragmentation of the opposition. And since opposition is a subset of the whole party system, it is 
more likely that the degree of their fragmentation is correlated with the degree of overall party 
system fragmentation in most countries
99
. For instance, in a country with two parties, the number 
of opposition parties should be one and so on
100
. Otherwise, the determinants of opposition 
fragmentation are most likely different than that of party system fragmentation which would 
require more investigation
101
.   
 From the above, we can conclude that scholars focused on fragmentation of either the 
whole party system or opposition parties. However, they totally neglected the fragmentation of 
informal groups such as social movements that can play the same role as the formal opposition. 
Conversely, scholars who attempted to study the reasons behind the eruption of civil wars 
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focused on such type of fragmentation since it is crucial to the understanding of civil wars. As 
defined by Cunningham, opposition movements are a “set of non-state actors that are engaged in 
dissent” related to the government or territory under dispute102. Accordingly, a fragmented 
opposition comprises of multiple organizations or factions that are operating at the same time to 
pursue the same goals on behalf of the same population
103
. This definition then excludes multiple 
oppositions who are pursuing different goals or representing different populations, even if they 
are operating at the same time and on the same territory as others
104
.  
 Similarly, Bakke et al. focused on “intra-movement dynamics” or interaction between 
organizations that are mobilized around a collective identity to achieve specific goals
105
. This 
also includes “movements composed of organizations that are mobilizing on the basis of ethnic, 
tribal, clan, linguistic or national identities”106. But unlike most of the literature that tended to 
define fragmentation by its antithesis (i.e. cohesion, coordination or cooperation) or by 
explaining one of its aspects, Bakke along with others introduced a multidimensional concept of 
fragmentation. They argue that three dimensions can differentiate between cohesive or 
fragmented movements: the number of organizations in a movement, the degree of 
institutionalization across these organizations, and the distribution of power among them
107
. The 
first dimension refers not only to the number of organizations operating under the broader 
movement but also to their adherence to the collective goals of the movement even if these 
organizations have their own leadership and organizational structure
108
. The second dimension 
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which is ‘institutions’ is fundamental in differentiating between cohesive or fragmented 
movements. Institutions refer to the formal and informal rules that coordinate between the 
organizations functioning under the broader movement
109
. Thus, for a movement to be cohesive, 
it must be strongly institutionalized which entails a broad membership and effective monitoring 
mechanisms to constrain its members’ autonomy110. Fragmented movements are composed only 
of a “narrow sub-set of organizations in the movement and lack rules and mechanisms to monitor 
and constrain their members”111. Hence, it is more likely to find a high degree of cooperation 
between organizations in highly institutionalized movements than in weakly institutionalized 
ones
112. The third and final dimension is the ‘distribution of power’ among organizations within 
a movement. Thus, a movement will be fragmented if the power is divided across multiple 
organizations, while power will be concentrated in one organization in cohesive movements
113
. 
This is due to the fact that prospects of division are less likely since weak organizations will not 
have the abilities to influence other organizations or even the larger dispute
114
. 
 Based on the three dimensions mentioned above, Bakke et al. have introduced a “three-
dimensional concept of fragmentation” (in the appendix) where the first points to highly 
fragmented movements whilst, the second refers to ultimate cohesive ones
115
. By that they argue 
that fragmentation is a “concept that changes over time due to frequent shift in the degree and 
type of fragmentation” due to changes in the political spectrum116.   
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 Research design:  
1. Case selection: Egypt (11 February 2011- 30 June 2013):  
 Why am I focusing on Egypt on this time period:  
  At the time of writing this paper, Egypt stands at a crossroads. It is neither progressing 
towards democracy as is Tunisia, nor has it reached the stage of a failed state such as Libya, Syria 
and Yemen. Authoritarianism is still resilient in Egypt. And despite the fact that much of the 
literature of authoritarian resilience has focused on the strategies adopted by Mubarak to fragment 
the opposition, Mubarak’s fall has not changed Egypt’s fate. Thus, it is crucial to understand this 
phenomenon at the time when the political environment was in favor of different political forces 
compared to previous periods. In other words, the political space was relatively open since 
Mubarak stepped down on 11
th
 February 2011 until Morsi’s overthrow by the military on June 30, 
2013, at least compared to Mubarak era and post-Morsi period. Hence, there was still a space for 
opposition to maneuver, express their views freely, and work on ground but they failed to 
organize themselves and remained fragmented.  
 Why am I not comparing Egypt with other Arab spring cases? 
   With regard to the topic under study, Egypt can be perceived as a unique case compared 
to other Arab spring countries because of several reasons. On one hand, Tunisia is unlike Egypt in 
many aspects which include: the major political role played by Tunisian Labor Union (UGTT), 
the small Tunisian military that has been out of politics for ages, the rate of literacy, etc. which 
made the circumstances in Tunisia more favorable for democratic transition than in Egypt. Also, 
unlike other Arab countries where cboundaries are in dispute as the case of Yemen or where their 
societies are extremely divided based on sectarian or ideological affiliations as in the case of 
Libya and Syria, Egypt’s boundaries are stable for centuries and its society is to a great extent 
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homogeneous. For these reasons, it is illogical to compare Egypt with other Arab Spring countries 
at least with regard to the topic under study.  
2. Variable operationalization:  
   As indicated above, the dependent variable of this study is the persistence of 
fragmentation. In order to uncover the causal factors behind this phenomenon I have chosen the 
most important factors that are more likely to influence my dependent variable. These factors can 
be divided into two categories;  
1) Regime strategies that include manipulation and divide-and-rule 
2) Deficiencies of the opposition which refers to three main problems: 
(a) Misperception by all opposition forces toward the transitional period  
(b) Conflict between Islamists and secularists  
(c) Tension between political parties and youth movements  
   Further, as I am interested in understanding the factors that led to the persistence of 
fragmentation, I will be looking on two types of fragmentation: 1. Non-cooperation between 
Islamists and secularists and 2. Non-cooperation between political parties and youth movements 
   Thus, I am not focusing on the individual problems of each actor as much as I am 
focusing on the inter-relational problems between them. However, individual problems as internal 
splits will be taken into consideration when necessary.   
3. Measurement of indicators:   
As mentioned in the previous section, my independent variables can be divided into two 
categories: 
1) Manipulation and divide-and-rule strategies used by SCAF:  
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To study the political impact of SCAF strategies on opposition fragmentation, I will focus on the 
following: 
1. SCAF strategy during transition with specific attention to the political impacts of El-Bashri’s 
constitutional committee and March Referendum  
2. The influence of the legal framework of 2011/2012 parliamentary elections on opposition 
unification or fragmentation   
3. The attitude of SCAF and political actors toward the protests against military rule.  
These will be studied by using secondary resources from newspapers and books in order to 
examine if SCAF adopted a divide-and-rule strategy or not.  
2) Deficiencies of the opposition:  
(a) Cooperation between Islamist and secularist parties:  
To examine if such form of cooperation did exist or was totally absent, I will mainly focus on the 
following:  
1. Pre-electoral alliances formed before 2011 parliamentary and Shoura elections 
2. The debate over writing the constitution and how Islamists and Secularists dealt with their 
disputes with regard to the first and second constitutional committees.  
3. Why polarization between Islamists and Secularists reached its peak under Morsi? 
These will be studied by using secondary resources from newspapers and books in order to examine 
the changing nature of these alliances and how it influenced opposition fragmentation.  
(b) Cooperation between political parties and social movements:  
To examine if such form of cooperation did exist or was totally absent, I will mainly focus on the 
following:  
1. Cross-ideological alliances formed post-uprising  and their relation with political parties  
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2. Ideological alliances formed post-uprising  and their relation with political parties 
3. How political parties responded to the demands raised by youth movements and the protests 
they called for post-uprising   
These will be studied by using secondary resources from newspapers and books in order to examine 
the nature of relation between these alliances and political parties and to what extent, it influenced 
opposition fragmentation.  
Chapter Two 
Man on horseback
117
: The relation between SCAF and political opposition post-Mubarak 
 Democratization and authoritarian regime durability were not the only themes that were 
brought to the forefront due to the Arab Spring but most importantly, civil-military relations 
under dictatorships moved to the top research list of many scholars. This is due to the fact that 
the military has always been a major political actor, especially in Egypt and Syria prior to the 
uprising. Hence it is unsurprising that its position toward the mass demonstrations was a decisive 
factor with regard to regime survival or breakdown. The military’s importance also lies in the 
fact that “it is the most consequential actor in post-authoritarian transitions and the success or 
failure of these processes to a large extent hinges on its political behavior”118. This is most 
apparent in cases where the military was in charge of transition as the case of Egypt where 
Mubarak was forced to hand over power to the military. Consequently, it is intuitive that SCAF’s 
behavior will have great implications on the path of transition
119
. To be more specific, some 
scholars such as Lust and Albrecht, among others would argue that the re-fragmentation of 
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opposition is due to regime strategies that attempt to divide the opposition
120
. As SCAF was a 
major component of Mubarak’s regime, it is less likely to be a neutral force and would probably 
adopt the same strategies as Mubarak to keep the opposition fragmented
121
. Accordingly, this 
chapter will test the validity of this assumption: Since the military was in charge of the 
transitional process, opposition fragmentation can be explained by continued regime 
manipulation. 
 The chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will examine the 
military’s position under Mubarak, how it reacted to 2011 uprising, and why it defected from 
Mubarak. The second section will focus on SCAF’s role at critical stages during the transitional 
period and how it dealt with different political actors in an attempt to test the validity of my 
assumption.   
Section One  
The military under Mubarak: Most privileged or main victim?   
 “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times”vii, that is how Kandil characterized 
Mubarak’s era122, reflecting by that a debate between two camps: the first to whom Kandil and 
Albrecht belong, argue that the military’s prerogatives declined under Mubarak compared to his 
predecessors while the second camp to whom Sayigh and Bou Nassif belong, argue that the 
military’s privileges were vast under Mubarak. In the following lines, I will briefly present the 
different dimensions of this debate followed by how the military responded to the 2011 uprising. 
I conclude by discussing why the military turned against Mubarak and sided with the protestors.  
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 The military’s position under Mubarak:  
 According to Bou Nassif, what Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak have in common is that they 
promoted the interests of the military elite to ensure the military’s loyalty. However, they all 
differed in the mechanism
123
. When Mubarak came to power, the military was tamed after the 
purges that extended from the 1950s till the 1970s
124
 which enabled him to adopt a less complex 
control system than that of his predecessors
125. Rather than following Nasser’s ideational ties 
with the military or Sadat’s reshuffling mechanism, Mubarak depended on material privileges126. 
Those privileges can be presented in the form of officers’ appointment to civilian positions and 
expansion of military’s economy.  
1. Officers’ appointments: 
 After 1991, Mubarak’s control system depended on the promise of “a loyalty allowance” 
that senior officers would receive upon retirement in the form of post-retirement careers that 
would offer them opportunities to generate extra income or accumulate their assets
127
. To get 
promoted, middle-rank officers must tolerate their low wages
viii
 during service and must show 
their loyalty and political abstention
128
. Officers who fulfill these conditions are more likely to 
get promoted to the rank of general before retirement
129
 since Mubarak did not appoint any 
officer to a governorship beyond this rank
130
. In addition, he institutionalized placement patterns 
“with certain positions within the military leading to specific posts in the bureaucratic 
                                                          
123
 Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt’s Military Elite, 
1981-2011”, The Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (2013), 510-511 
124
 Kandil, “Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”, 176.  
125
 Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak”, 515.  
126
 Ibid, 511.  
127 Yezid Sayigh, “Above the state: The officer’s republic in Egypt”, (Beirut: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2012), 4, Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/officers_republic1.pdf  
128
 Ibid, 5 
129
 Ibid, 5 
130
 Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak”, 517-518 
37 
 
apparatus”131. To be specific, 4 of the 7 commanders of the Republican Guard and 11 of the 21 
commanders of the Second and Third Field Army under Mubarak were appointed governors 
while the last three commanders of the navy have occupied leadership positions in the Suez 
Canal or the National Navigation Company
132ix
. In total, 63 out of 156 governors during 
Mubarak’s reign have a military background while almost 2,000 have occupied positions as 
deputy governors, heads of cities, etc.
133
  
 Furthermore, Mubarak specified a certain percentage of the total budget since 1991 for 
“disaster management, emergency response, and other security-related activities”134. However, 
he assigned a portion of it to officers at the rank of marshal, lieutenant general, and general in the 
form of cash installments known as loyalty allowance which may be later distributed among 
some major and brigadier generals
135
. Besides, senior officers who are involved in the arms trade 
receive commissions to favor some companies over others
136
.  
 Despite those privileges, Albrecht argues that the “path dependent career patterns” 
implied that Mubarak’s personal involvement was not strong, widening the personal gap between 
him and SCAF senior officers who were younger than him by 20 years with the exception of 
Tantawi
137
. What made matters worse was the rise of Gamal Mubarak who failed to build any 
connections with them since he presented himself as the first civilian potential president and 
invited a group of business men to the political life, threatening by that military’s old interests 
and its position as part of the ruling elite
138
.  
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2. Military’s economic empire:   
 Although the re-direction of the military to economic development projects was 
introduced by Sadat post-1973 war, the expansion and institutionalization of the military’s 
economy took place under Mubarak. After coming to power, Mubarak and his minister of 
defense, Abu Ghazala, agreed on the establishment of an economic empire over which the 
military would have autonomous control
139
. Accordingly, military bodies such as the ministry of 
military production, the Arab Industrial Organization (AIO), and the National Service Projects 
Organization (NSPO)
140
 were founded to run the military’s economic activities that include: 
construction, land reclamation, agriculture
141
 along with 35 factories that produce civilian goods 
and weapons
142x
. Despite the rationality of these claims, Sayigh highlighted the main problem 
behind the expansion of the military’s economy. Whereas the military’s power under Nasser was 
wielded through its direct domination of the cabinet, its power under Mubarak was wielded 
through “indirect domination of the civil sphere to an extent that it deemed normal not only by 
others but also, by its members”143.  
 After successfully sidelining the military which was only kept as the “last resort for 
regime maintenance”144, Mubarak heavily depended on the police for protection and everyday 
control
145
. This is apparent in the percentage of each in the total GDP. Whereas defense 
expenditures have fallen from 19.5% in 1980 to 2.2% in 2010, “reaching its lowest level in 
Egypt’s modern history”146, the Interior Ministry expenditures rose up from 3.5% in 1988 to 6% 
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in 2002
147. According to Sayigh, “the Interior Ministry’s budget rose at three times the rate of 
increase of the defense budget”148. Further, by the last decade of Mubarak’s era, Egypt had 
almost 2 million security men compared to only 460,000 in the army
149
 which means that the 
former size was about 1.5 times the latter
150
. As a result, the military were not only in 
competition with the police, but its position was also threatened by Gamal Mubarak and his 
associates’ economic policy. Starting from 2004, the interests of the military collided with that of 
Gamal and the emerging political elite associated with him
151
. This is due to the fact that Gamal 
and his men adopted a free economy model whilst the military still believed in Nasser’s etatist 
model
152
. Indeed, they competed with each other in industries such as steel while the military 
obstructed some projects such as the privatization of banks and public companies
153. Mubarak’s 
new economic policy also hit the core of the 1952 regime which “had taken power in the name of 
the people and pursued social and economic policies” that favor the middle and lower-middle 
classes “from which military officers had originated”  is now obliged to protect a regime that 
identified itself with “upper- and upper-middle-classes”154xi.  
 Military’s reaction to 2011 mass demonstrations:  
 Although the military’s direct political influence declined under Mubarak, the army has 
remained an indispensable part of the regime and has benefited from the patronage system as 
shown. Nonetheless, the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his associates who have adopted a free 
economic model and the attempts made to install Gamal as a successor to his father have 
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“challenged the army’s role as a kingmaker”155 and have shaken the socio-economic core of 
1952 regime in the long run. “The January 25 uprising took everyone by surprise including the 
military”156 which explains why the military was confused on how to deal with the 
demonstrations. Accordingly, the military’s intervention starting from 28th January onwards is 
best seen as a “gradual process”157. The withdrawal of the police after being overpowered in 
street battles and the torching of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)’s headquarter left 
the regime barred, forcing the military to deploy its troops around government buildings on 28
th
 
January
158
. Being aware of the grievances within officers toward the regime, Mubarak tried to 
secure the military’s loyalty by offering Tantawi the position of Prime Minister then that of Vice 
President however, he rejected the two offers
159
. Hence, he appointed General Ahmed Shafiq, a 
military figure, as Prime Minister and excluded from the new government those figures who 
were associated with Gamal
160
. The real intentions of the military were not clear at the moment 
until it stated its first statement on 31
st
 of January where it declared that people’s demands are 
legitimate and that it would not use force against protestors
161
. Whereas this statement reflected a 
kind of independence as it was issued without Mubarak’s consultation162, the military was 
reluctant to overthrow Mubarak “until doing so became its only option”163. For this reason, the 
military met without the president only on 10
th
 of February
164
 when it declared its first 
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communiqué in which it “acknowledged the legitimacy of people’s demands”165 and declared 
that SCAF will be in “continuous session to monitor the situation”166. On the following day, 
“Mubarak was forced to resign and SCAF took over power”167, moving by that from a “mere 
passenger” to the main political actor168. From now on till the election of a president in June 
2012, Egypt would be run by a “Junta regime institutionalized in SCAF” that is composed of 19 
members, among which: “Sami Annan, chief of staff and SCAF’s strongman behind Tantawi; 
Mamdouh Shahin; and Mohsen al-Fanagry who served as the military’s unofficial liaison 
officers in communicating with civil society and political parties”169.  
 Why the military defected from Mubarak:  
  Whereas scholars such as: Albrecht, Kandil, and Koehler along others have introduced 
different explanations to military’s behavior toward 2011 uprising as will be shown, they all 
agreed that the military intervened at a moment of opportunity rather than disposition based on 
Finer’s analysis. According to Finer, the former refers to “certain situations that make the civil 
power abnormally dependent on the military or those that enhance military’s popularity” at the 
expense of the civilian incumbent while the latter refers to military’s “conscious motive and 
desire” to intervene170. Accordingly, the military was “forced to take a stance by the unfolding 
events” and at the same time, the uprising was an opportunity to retain its position as a 
kingmaker
171
 and to preserve its economic interests
172
 after being sidelined by the political and 
security apparatuses
173
. 
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  To start with, the most prevalent argument in the literature explains the military’s 
behavior with the incumbent’s personal ties to the military. Comparing Egypt with Syria, 
Albrecht argues that both Mubarak and Bashar adopted the same coup-proofing methods such as: 
officer appointments, economic coup-proofing and officers’ social composition174. Whereas 
Bashar adopted these strategies in a way that got the higher officers close to the “power center”, 
Mubarak did it in order to distance the military from himself and his ruling elite
175
. In other 
words, Mubarak succeeded to “keep the military out of politics” while allowing them to expand 
their economy, “enhancing by that their autonomy vis-à-vis the political incumbent”176. Thus if 
these strategies can work in times of stability, they will not work at times of crisis because the 
military’s economic autonomy will not encourage it to bear the costs of repressing the uprising 
and only the personal relationships between the incumbent and the military that would maintain 
regime survival
177
.  
 Although no one can deny the importance of partimonalism in the Middle East, Koehler 
emphasizes that it has neither prevented “individual high-level defections in Syria” nor the 
fracturing of the army in Libya and Yemen
178
. Accordingly, the long-term development of 
military politicization can best explain military’s behavior at times of endgame scenariosxii, 
rather than the structural or organizational factors behind coups and the dynamics of 
patrimonalism
179
. In cases where the military was involved in regime foundation, they are more 
likely to remain a dominant political actor, revealing a military-dominant pattern of political-
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military relations
180
. Instead of relying solely on the military, authoritarian regimes may create 
alternative organizations, reducing the military’s direct political influence in favor of civilians181. 
By time, such strategies of institutional balancing lead to competition between the military and 
the alternative institutions, leading to a divided pattern of political–military relations182. This can 
be apparent in the case of Egypt where the modern state was established by 1952 coup led by 
Nasser and since then, the military developed into a politicized institution, leading to a military-
dominated pattern
183
. However, Sadat post-1973 followed by Mubarak have reduced military’s 
political influence by heavily depending on police which resulted in a divided-pattern
184
. By the 
last decade of Mubarak’s reign, the military’s interests clashed with both: the economic interests 
of Gamal Mubarak and his men, and with the security forces that became the regime’s main 
supporter and hence, the military “was less willing to bear the costs of repressing the uprising” 
which they exploited to improve their position
185
. As a result, militaries that face competition 
from rival regime institutions are more likely to defect from incumbents in the face of 
uprisings
186
.  
  Lastly, Kandil argues that “the military accepted de-politicization post-1973 war as a step 
toward proper professionalization” after analysts blamed Egypt’s shortcomings in war to 
officers’ politicization187. Nonetheless, it soon realized that authoritarianism has limited its 
fighting capabilities in three ways
188
. First, regime corruption has produced a “dysfunctional 
education system that could hardly provide the military with the required manpower” while not 
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allowing university graduates from receiving adequate military training and thus, “the military 
was stuck with illiterate peasant conscripts”189. Second, autocrats cannot tolerate popular officers 
who are “born in battles” and hence, they “centralized war making in the hands of trusted 
generals” rather than relying on “war of movement” strategy that depends on maneuvers, 
requiring by that “middle-ranking officers who can improvise in battle without prior orders”190. 
Finally, the military were made dependent on the U.S. which was “sworn not only to preserve 
their key rival’s superiority” but was also “informing Israel about Egypt’s weapons portfolio and 
training” which made the military “exposed”191. Accordingly, the military has suffered from 
“rank disequilibrium” which means “a psychological dissonance” that members of an institution 
suffer from once their current tasks contradict their original duties
192
. In other words, “even if a 
few members of an institution are corrupt, the critical mass within it lean toward fulfilling”193 
their main duty which is “war and combat readiness”194 rather than economic projects. As a 
result, high officers have defected from Mubarak because repressing the uprising may lead to the 
fracture of corps whom were supportive of the uprising since day one
195
.  
Section Two  
The role of SCAF during transition and its relation with different political actors  
  At Tahrir square and other squares all over Egypt, “anger was mixed with hope” 
throughout the 18 days until Mubarak stepped down
196
. Eighteen months later, such hope was 
replaced by frustration, anger, or at least precaution hope because translating people’s hopes into 
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reality is not just difficult but “is conditioned by the actors involved in the process of change and 
their relative power”197. On one hand, the military found itself in the situation of “governing by 
default”198 where it took the center stage in politics after being sidelined for years under 
Mubarak. Having no prior intentions for assuming power
199
 along with the lack of political 
experience for most SCAF members with the exception of Mohsen al-Fanagry, Mukhtar al-
Mullah, Mohamed al-Assar and Mamdouh Shahin
200
 meant that SCAF had no clear idea for 
managing the transition
201
 and had to undergo a learning process
202
. What makes matter worse is 
that if a transition to democracy is to succeed, a general consensus among political elites on the 
rules of transition is required because otherwise, “spoilers would cover the landscape”203. The 
same actors who succeeded to unite against Mubarak, failed to agree on the course of change or 
on what should be changed post-Mubarak which allowed SCAF to set the rules on its own
204
. In 
other words, the military as an institution that historically perceives itself as a “protector of 
stability and the national interest” was obliged to operate in “an entirely new, unpredictable and 
fluid arena in which a new generation of politicized activists demands a say and in which no 
single player can predict what others are planning”205. Accordingly, SCAF was keen to introduce 
as little change as possible
206
 while maintaining the main pillars of 1952 regime
207
 and ensuring 
that its interests would be preserved once it turns over power
208
. Trying to balance between those 
contradicting intentions, SCAF strategy during transition was characterized by inconsistency, 
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hesitancy and confusion, leading to transition prolongation in which each step has ended up with 
“opposing segments of Egyptian society driven farther apart”209. Hence, it magnified issues of 
conflict rather than managing or resolving them. In the following lines, I will examine the role of 
SCAF at some of the pivotal stages of transition and how it dealt with different actors in an 
attempt to check if it “played the political forces off against each other” leading to their 
fragmentation or not.  
 El-Bashri’s constitutional committee and March referendum:  
 Mubarak has not only turned over power to SCAF in violation of the 1971 constitution -
which states that power is transferred to the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court in case the 
president stepped down permanently and there is no head for the People’s Assembly (PA) at the 
time
210
- but also, SCAF assumed the sole right to issue decrees during transition
211
. Thus, it 
issued its first constitutional deceleration on 13
th
 of February, 2011 which stated that it would 
run the country within a period of six month or till the election of PA and a new president, 
suspended the 1971 constitution and dissolved the parliament
212
. Then in an attempt to 
“legitimize its hold on power”213, SCAF issued a decree on 15th of February to form a committee 
of eight experts that would be charged of amending nine articles of the suspended constitution to 
regulate the parliamentary and presidential elections
214
. The committee was headed by Tareq El-
Bashri, the deputy head of the Council of State and an Islamist political thinker along other 
experts that included Sobhi Saleh, a former MB candidate in the parliament which raised some 
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actor’s skepticism toward the committee’s affiliations215. Nonetheless, El-Bashri argued that the 
committee was selected by the ministry of Justice and that they met with SCAF for the first time 
after the release of the latter’s decree216. The amendments made by the committee have stated 
that the parliamentary and presidential elections will take place respectively followed by electing 
a constitutional committee of 100 by PA and Shoura members to write a new constitution
217
. 
Worth mentioning, the amendments were not exclusive on the articles mentioned in SCAF 
deceleration but it included ten other articles such as: amending article (148) to restrict the 
president’s power in announcing the case of emergencyxiii and article (189) that aimed to set a 
time plan for writing the constitution
xiv218
.  
 After the committee announced its results, SCAF called for a public referendum on 19
th
 
of March where voters were asked to vote for ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the amendments as a whole219. 
The Egyptian experience has proved the validity of the argument that successful transitions do 
not turn to people after few weeks of overthrowing the old regime
220
 as uprising ary forces 
“began to find themselves torn asunder due to this very first balloting”221. SCAF, MB222, NDP 
(which was not dissolved yet) and some small parties embraced the referendum
223
 while it was 
rejected by Revolution Youth Coalition, 6 April, National Association for Change and secularist 
parties such as: El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, El-Nasri, etc
224
. In general, supporters argued that 
approving the amendments would ensure a speedy power transition to an elected president and 
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parliament that would be charged with electing a constitutional committee
225
 while opponents 
were worried that the president or the parliament would interfere in the committee’s work since 
the president’s authorities were not amended and Islamists were expected to gain a majority in 
the parliament if elections took place that early
226
. These doubts were confirmed when the 
amendments got approved by 77.2% revealing the organizational capabilities of Islamists in 
comparison to the opposing actors who failed to achieve a majority in any governorate
227
. The 
conflict between the two camps got intensified by the rise of a debate that became known as 
‘constitution first’ or ‘elections first’ post-referendum where the MB adopted the ‘elections first’ 
path and argued that postponing the elections would be a betrayal to the majority who approved 
the amendments, whilst secularists who adopted a ‘constitution first’ position argued that this 
path would only be in favor of the MB who most probably would gain the majority in the coming 
elections
228
. 
 On 30
th
 of March, the SCAF’s second constitutional declaration came as a surprise for all 
actors, rendering the referendum and the intense debates irrelevant. On one hand, the 
amendments made by El-Bashri’s committee implied that the 1971 constitution would be re-
activated after including their revisions and would be regarded as the legal framework for the 
transition
229
. This would be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections, then the 
election of a constitutional committee in which SCAF would have no role
230
. However, the 
SCAF’s 2nd deceleration replaced the 1971 Constitution and acted as an interim legal framework 
because otherwise the SCAF would lose its legitimacy and would be obliged to hand over power 
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to the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court till the presidential elections take place within 
60 days according to 1971 constitution
231
. On the other hand, SCAF not only borrowed 
selectively some articles from the 1971 constitution that were neither reviewed by the committee 
nor put to people in the referendum
232
 but also, amended article (189) after being approved in the 
referendum. SCAF amendments gave it the right to call the elected members of the PA and the 
Shoura Council for electing a constitutional committee instead of giving it to the president after 
the approval of the council of ministers or half of the members of the PA and the Shoura 
Council
233
. Besides, it excluded the part of the president’s right to call people for a referendum 
on the new constitution and left it open without deciding who is responsible for such decision
234
.  
The release of the deceleration in such form “revealed that the military has its own 
preferences…and that it is ready to take legal measures to ensure that these preferences are 
materialized”235. Accordingly, most actors that had organized the January uprising went back to 
the streets redirecting their anger from the old regime to SCAF as we will see below
236
. In 
contrast, the Islamists accepted the declaration and agreed to push for elections, hoping to 
sideline the military by the establishment of democratic institutions
237
.  
 The legal framework of 2011/2012 parliamentary elections: 
  The process of designing a new electoral system is one of the main critical decisions to be 
taken during transition due to its high influence on setting the rules of the game
238
 as well as the 
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potential outcomes of transition. Accordingly, studying the positives and negatives of the 
electoral system adopted at the first parliamentary elections after Mubarak is crucial to 
understand its implications on the path of transition in general and on opposition fragmentation 
in specific.  
  According to the SCAF’s second constitutional declaration, the People’s Assembly (PA) 
became the sole legislative body
239
 after SCAF kept the Shoura Council while canceling its 
restricted legislative role that it was given to after 2007 amendments to the 1971 constitution
240
. 
Later, SCAF issued number of decrees of the law on the Regulation of the Exercise of Political 
Rights (LEPR), of PA law, and of Shoura Council Law that specified the nature of the electoral 
system and the technical issues associated with the electoral process
241
.   
  Under Mubarak’s reign, “Egypt has been applying a majoritarian run-off electoral system 
where candidates used to compete in 222 two-member constituencies and had to obtain 50% of 
the votes to win” while, opposition demands for a more proportional system have always been 
met by deaf ears
242
. The fall of Mubarak indeed brought the debate over the shape of the 
electoral system back to the forefront where Uprising ary forces along others have called for 
eliminating the Majoritarian system and “instituting a Proportional Representation (PR) system 
based on a single national district”243. However, a PR system was opposed by the constitutional 
experts whom SCAF selected to help it out with issuing a new electoral law as they argued that 
such “system would favor party members at the expense of independents”, violating by that the 
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“principle of equality of political opportunity enshrined in the constitutional declaration”244. To 
satisfy both sides, SCAF introduced the first draft of PA law on 30
th
 of May, 2011 which stated 
that “one-third of seats be elected through a closed-list PR system” and the remaining two-third 
be elected using a majoritarian system with two-member constituencies
245
. In June and July, 
several dialogues were held with political parties that resulted in changing the proportion of seats 
to 50:50 by July 19, 2011
246
. On 25
th
 of September
247
, SCAF however, returned back to one-third 
of seats to be contested by a majoritarian run-off system in 83 two-member constituencies and 
the remaining two-third to be contested by a PR system in 46 constituencies
248
. According to 
such system, each voter had to cast three votes; two votes for two majoritarian candidates and 
one for a party list
249
. Similarly, SCAF’s second declaration stated that one-third of Shoura 
Council seats would be appointed by the president while the two-thirds would be elected
250
, out 
of which two-thirds would be contested in a PR system and one-third would be contested in a 
majoritarian system
251
.  
  The most debatable part of this law lies in whether to allow party candidates to run on 
both closed party lists and majoritarian seats or not
252
. Initially, the decree proposed by SCAF on 
26
th
 September had “reserved the majoritarian seats exclusively for non-party candidates”253. But 
“under popular pressure”254, SCAF amended the decree on 8th of October allowing party 
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members to contest over majoritarian seats
255
. Further, SCAF has preserved the occupational 
quota which was inherited from Nasser henceforth, requiring 50% of MPs be either workers or 
farmers
256. This means that in majoritarian districts, “if neither of the two candidates that won 
the majority belonged to workers/farmers category, then the candidate with the highest number 
of votes among the two will retain his or her seat, and the top worker/peasant candidate 
competing in the same constituency will gain the other seat”257. Similarly, in PR districts, 
“whenever a list gains only one seat and the candidate who tops this list does not belong to 
peasants or workers, he/she will be replaced by the first worker/peasant candidate on the same 
list to ensure that the occupational quota is upheld”258. Indeed, this reflects inequality of political 
opportunity between candidates who are running as workers/peasants and those who are running 
under the other ‘professional’ category.  
  Based on this electoral system, each of the PA and Shoura Council elections took place in 
three rounds where the former was held from 28
th 
of November, 2011 till 10
th
 of January, 2012 
while the latter was held from 29
th
 of January, 2012 till 11
th
 of March, 2012
259
. The reason 
behind “conducting the elections over three stages and stretching it to over two months,”260 is 
that a supra-constitutional committee composed only of judges has been charged of the whole 
election process
261
 including: “being physically present in each polling station during voting 
                                                          
255
 “Elections in Egypt: The electoral framework…”, 4 
256
 Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly”, 371 
257
 Ibid  
258
 Ibid  
259
 Ahmed Abd Rabou, “Egyptian Parties and Elections of Egyptian Parliament 2011/2012” (El-Ahzab El-Masria we 
Intkabat El-Parlman El-Masri), Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, (Doha, Qatar: 2011), 2. 
http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/e7a331ed-4f67-485b-8d72-5fde1828a653  
260
 Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly”, 371  
261
 El-Din Helal,“Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 131  
53 
 
hours”262. And since the number of judges can only cover one third of the polling stations at 
once, the elections were held on three stages
263
.  
  Despite the fact that the whole process of elections has been administered by a judiciary 
committee and the success to meet the minimal international standards for a fair and free 
elections, no one can deny the various impacts of the electoral system selected by SCAF. To be 
more specific, I will examine whether the electoral system has enhanced opposition 
fragmentation or not by looking at: 1. SCAF promptness of making decisions, 2. Mixed vs. 
Parallel PR systems, 3. The relation between electoral system and party system, 4. How the way 
of designing districts influenced voter threshold.  
  Throughout the transition period, SCAF seemed to be reluctant in taking decisions unless 
there is popular pressure that urge it to take a final decision which is usually opaque and beyond 
expectations. This is apparent, for example, in deciding the proportion of seats to be contested 
under PR and majoritarian systems and the right of party candidates to contest over individual 
seats as mentioned previously. Initially, SCAF restricted party candidates from competing over 
individual seats then under popular pressure, it “backed down”264. Nonetheless, this same 
decision led to the dissolution of the parliament by the Supreme Constitutional Court “only few 
days before president Morsi sworn in”, on 14th of June, 2012 since it argued that not allowing 
independent candidates from competing over PR lists while permitting party candidates from 
competing over PR lists and individual seats have violated the equality of political 
opportunity
265
. On the following day, SCAF issued a decree to dissolve the parliament
266
. 
Regardless of whether this dissolution was politically and legally justified or not, the intense 
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clashes it led to especially between SCAF and Morsi after coming to power has reflected the 
“institutional competition that has characterized much of Egypt’s legal reform process”267.  
Further, SCAF kept on postponing political powers’ demands of issuing a political isolation law 
to former NDP members until it issued one that came beyond their expectations
268
. The law 
applies on any employee, minister, MP, member of local council, or anyone who was involved in 
civil service and has exploited his position to attain personal interests or was charged of any type 
of corruption
269
. However, the law insisted that the judiciary was the only body responsible for 
condemning those accused, who would be later banned from participating in political life for 5 
years
270
. What made matters worse is that the law was issued on 11
th
 of November, 2011, after 
already closing the door for candidacy
271
. Hence, many NDP members have run the elections 
whether on individual seats or under well-known parties
272
.  
  Although the use of a PR system is regarded as a democratic progress, the adoption of a 
parallel system rather than a mixed one has excluded some of the advantages that would be 
associated with the latter. In mixed systems, “the PR seats are used to compensate for 
inequalities in seat distribution for the parties”273. In parallel systems, by contrast, “the two sets 
of legislators are elected independently of one another”, but unlike mixed systems, “the PR 
component does not compensate for any disproportionality within the majority districts”274. 
Whereas it is not clear why SCAF has chosen a parallel rather than a mixed system, Faris argues 
that such a system was “a genuine attempt to undermine the local-level cronyism of the NDP era 
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and to meet the demands of activists without completely forsaking the opportunity to manipulate 
matters in individual districts”275.  
  Even if some scholars argue that the relation between the party system and the electoral 
system is circular, most believe that the electoral system is one of the main factors that shapes or 
maintains the structure of the party system
276
. Indeed, Duverger’s law represents a main principle 
in political science, maintaining that majoritarian systems lead to two-party system while PR 
systems tend to produce a multi-party system
277
. This is due to two reasons: the first is small 
parties’ inability to gain the majority in majoritarian districts, making it difficult to penetrate the 
party system, and the second reason is that small parties’ supporters abandon them as they 
believe that their potential to win is minimal and hence, they disappear from the political scene 
over time
278
. In addition, it was frequently found that in mixed systems, parties that run more 
candidates in majoritarian districts are the ones who perform better on PR lists which results in 
the “contamination effect” where the majoritarian tier “contaminates” the PR tier279. In parallel 
systems, however, there is no compensation for disproportionality so “voters will tend to vote 
strategically and ignore smaller parties in the majoritarian tier”280. Accordingly, neither the 
majoritarian system adopted by Mubarak nor the parallel system adopted by SCAF were in favor 
of small parties. In addition to that, multi-party systems are not alike so some electoral systems 
may lead to a more fragmented system than others. Indeed, Hassan measured the degree of party 
fragmentation based on the effective number of parliamentary parties. Out of 32 new 
democracies, Egypt lies in the eleventh rank, revealing an intermediate electoral system that is 
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neither highly fragmented nor highly concentrated
281
. Majoritarian systems usually lead to a 
party system with high concentration however, this was eliminated by allowing only one-third of 
the seats to be contested over this system
282
. Also, allowing two thirds of the seats to be 
contested through a PR system has prevented more fragmentation that was likely to occur if it 
was applied on all the seats
283
. These findings are reflected in the election results where only 16 
parties out of 40 were represented in parliament. The Democratic Coalition which included the 
FJP was represented by 47.2%, while the Islamic Coalition which was formed by El-Nour was 
represented by 24.7%284. This was followed by El-Wafd, the ‘Egyptian Bloc’ coalition, and the 
‘The Revolution Continues’ coalition that were represented by 7.6%, 6.8% and 1.4%, 
respectively285
xv
.  
  Lastly, SCAF has ignored the demand of most of the political opposition by selecting a 
regional PR system with 46 districts, rather than a national PR system
286
. Under this system, the 
legal threshold differs from one constituency to another which affects election results
287
. This 
means that the “higher the number of seats in a constituency, the lower the number of votes 
required to gain a seat” and vice versa288. For example: 10% of the votes can be enough to gain a 
seat in a constituency of 10 seats while in a constituency of 4 seats, 25% of the votes is 
required
289
. Compared to new democracies, Egypt lies on the middle of the scale with an average 
of 7.2 while the average of seats per constituency were 7, 8, 6.7 seats in the three stages of 
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elections, respectively
290
. However, the problem with this system lies in the fact that the 
difference between thresholds of constituencies affect the party based on the geographical 
distribution of its supporters.  If the supporters of a party are concentrated in a constituency that 
requires high number of votes to gain a seat while its supporters are few in one that requires less 
number of votes then this system work against the party and vice versa
291
. In addition, as 
articulated by Willy Jou, “Small parties are disadvantaged by the use of regional blocs rather 
than a nationwide constituency as the unit of PR seat distribution”292. This is exemplified in the 
Egyptian case because the low value of district magnitude, which is on average 7.2 seats in each 
PR constituency, made it difficult for small parties to gain a seat
293
. For instance, the ‘Uprising  
Continues’ coalition along with other fourteen parties such as Justice, El-Gad, El-Gabha, 
Egyptian Socialist Democratic, etc. have failed to reach the threshold, preventing them from 
being represented in the Shoura Council
294
.  
  To summarize, SCAF tended to take decisions slowly unless there was popular pressure 
that urged it to take a stance. Such redundancy has contaminated the path of transition in 
different ways. To begin with, it increased the vagueness associated with transition and confused 
actors who had to change their strategies constantly in short time intervals. For example: SCAF 
has amended the article related to the right of party candidates to contest majoritarian seats only 
a month prior to the elections. Moreover, SCAF members were poor explainers of their decision 
making process
295
 and their motives and hence their decisions usually did not meet expectations. 
                                                          
290
 Ibid, 5  
291
 Ibid, 26 
292
 M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 150. Note: This quote was tackled by Faris but the original work is (Willy 
Jou, “Electoral Reform and Party System Development in Japan and Taiwan: A Comparative Study,” 
Asian Survey 49, no. 5 (2009): 759-785). 
293
 Hassan, “Political Implications”, 18.  
294
 Mohamed El-Sanhouri, “Al-Masry Al-Youm announce with names the results of Shoura elections”, Al-Masry Al-
Youm, 25 February 2012, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/154502 
295
 M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 144 
58 
 
Even though they responded to political actors’ demand to adopt a more proportional system, 
they adopted it in a way that limited many of the systems’ advantages. This is apparent in 
adopting a parallel rather than a mixed PR system and in applying regional PR blocs instead of a 
national PR system, both factors limiting the usefulness of PR for small parties. Putting this into 
consideration along with the dissolution of the ruling NDP and the absence of a majority party 
that could have represented uprising ary demands, Egypt was stuck with the most organized 
actors and the ones with the longest experience. This applied to the MB’s FJP, followed by El-
Nour Salafi party. Hence, Faris argues that “no matter what electoral system is put into place, the 
FJP is going to serve as the core party for some time”296. Even if this assumption is correct, it is 
difficult to ignore the fact that the electoral system adopted by SCAF has made this outcome 
inevitable, making it more difficult for small parties to penetrate the party system. In a best case 
scenario, SCAF was attempting to limit party fragmentation -which they perceived as equivalent 
to multi-partism- and which they regarded as a threat to national unity. In a worst case scenario, 
the electoral system adopted was in favor of more organized actors compared to small parties, 
allowing Islamists to gain a majority in both the PA and Shoura Council which has increased the 
tension and conflict between them and other actors.  
 Protests against military rule:  
 The military succeeded to maintain a positive reputation among Egyptians because it 
successfully portrayed itself as the victorious force in the 1973 war with Israel and its indirect 
role during Mubarak’s reign kept it away from popular criticism297. This image was assured 
when the military abandoned Mubarak and sided with people. However, its reluctance to achieve 
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the uprising s’ demands298 along with its opaque and inconsistent strategy during transition as 
shown above, has gradually caused the military’s credibility to decrease. Indeed, it turned from 
being a guardian of the uprising to a counter-uprising agent
299, replacing the slogan of ‘the 
people and the army are one hand’ raised after overthrowing Mubarak by ‘down with military 
rule’ in the last quarter of 2011300. Soon after the March referendum and the release of SCAF’s 
second deceleration, protestors realized that SCAF would not take any reforms seriously except 
under pressure so they went back to streets almost every Friday. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the protests that took place starting from April until September have focused on 
hastening Mubarak’s trial and reforming the security apparatus, along other demands that aimed 
to rectify the track of transition. This led to increasing tensions between the SCAF and uprising 
ary forces
301
. But starting from Masspero massacre on 9
th
 of October, 2011, this tension turned to 
a violent clash between the two that escalated gradually till it reached a turning point by the 
Council of ministers demonstrations on 16
th
 of December, 2011.  
The Maspero incident was triggered by sectarian tensions. In a town at Aswan 
governorate, Muslim residents smashed part of an old church and set it on fire in order to protest 
the governor’s decision to re-build the ramshackle church302. This urged a group of Christians to 
protest in front of the High Court on 4
th
 of October, 2011 then to organize a sit-in by the state 
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broadcasting headquarters, known as Masspero, until the government would respond to their 
demands of re-building the church
303
 and prosecuting perpetrators
304
. Unfortunately, the military 
police attempted to break the sit-in resulting in 75 casualties, among which one was harshly 
beaten by the forces which raised Christians’ anger and urged them to organize a march to 
Masspero on 9
th
 of October
305
. After the police failed to disperse the demonstrators
306
 by 
shooting in the air and using electric sticks against them, the protestors threw stones on the 
troops and set fire to one of the tanks, provoking the military police officers to use tear gas and 
bullets against them
307
. Things get worse when some civilians with weapons joined the military 
troops and the clashes between the two extended till evening resulting in arresting some
308
 and in 
around 200 casualties and 23 martyrs, out of which 14 were smashed under armors and 9 were 
shot
309
. The importance of this massacre lies in the fact that it was the first time for military 
police to violently repress a protest post-Mubarak, challenging the military’s positive image 
among the public.  
 With the rise of the debate over ‘constitution first vs. elections first’310 and the fear of 
some actors of the domination of a single actor in the coming parliamentary elections
311
, the idea 
of issuing ‘supra-constitutional principles’ arose where all actors would agree on the main 
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principles that the constitutional committee could not exceed
312. Indeed, the ‘Democratic 
Coalition for Egypt’ that included the FJP and El-Wafd, along with other parties, released a 
proposal of supra-constitutional principles in late June 2011
313
. This was followed by ten other 
proposals that were published
314
 such as: the Al-Azhar document, the El-Baradei document for 
human rights, etc
315
. In an attempt to reach consensus among political actors, El-Fangary 
announced a communiqué on 12
th
 of July that called actors to meet for discussion
316
. A round of 
discussions from 8
th
 to 25
th
 of August took place with 34 parties and a number of syndicates and 
movements, resulting in the release of a document named after Ali El-Selmi, deputy prime 
minister in November
317
. As was the case with SCAF’s 2nd declaration, political actors were 
surprised by some articles in the final draft that they had not discussed before such as the 
requirements upon which a constitutional committee would be elected
318
 and the intention to 
release such a document in a declaration in order to be binding for all actors
319
. What made 
matters worse is article nine and ten
xvi
 which were criticized by most actors due to the 
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overwhelming rights it gave to the military
320
. Accordingly, Islamists, especially the MB who 
had abstained from participating in previous demonstrations, called for the ‘One Demand or 
Transition of Power’ protest on 18th of November to oppose El-Selmi’s document321. The 
Uprising  Youth Coalition, 6 April, Kefaya, El-Tayyar El-Masry, El-Gabha, and founders of 
‘Second Anger Friday’ FB page joined the Islamists on this day,322 while the National 
Association for Change and secularist parties such as El-Wafd and El-Tagammu abstained
323
. 
The massive participation on this day and the coherence of the demands raised by Islamists and 
youth alliances returned the image of Tahrir Square during the 18 days. However, a dramatic 
shift took place by the end of the day. As suggested by the MB, most forces withdrew at the end 
of the day in order not to impede the parliamentary elections that were scheduled to take place in 
the coming week. Some revolutionary forces, however, along with the families of the uprising’s 
martyrs decided to continue a sit-in until the SCAF would respond to their demands
324
. On the 
following day, security forces used violence to break up the sit-in, forcing protestors to flee to 
side streets such as Mohamed Mahmoud
325
. After the military police succeeded to occupy Tahrir 
Square and its exits, many protestors went to Tahrir to support their companions, forcing the 
police to retreat to Mohamed Mahmoud
326
. The police later attacked Tahrir and used tear gas, 
rubber bullets and cartouches against protestors, leaving around 1700 casualties and 10 
martyrs
327
. The excessive violence used against protestors raised their anger and encouraged 
others to join, resulting in six days of street war between military police and protestors that 
                                                          
320
 Ibid 
321
 Ibid  
322
 Al-Sherif, “Position of revolutionary forces towards Mohamed Mahmoud events and its memorial”  
323
 Sadaka & Ta’lab, “Boycotted Parties Describe the Million as Kandahar Friday and Accuse Islamists for Seeking 
to Take over Power”  
324
 El-Kholi, “Mohamed Mahmoud: Memorial of resistance, blood and betrayal”.  
325
 Rabei El- Sa’adani, “7 days created the myth of Mohamed Mahmoud”  
326
 Ibid 
327 “Mohamed Mahmoud…the events that accelerated the date of power transition”, Al-Masry Al-Youm, 18 
November 2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/245777 
63 
 
became known as the battle of ‘Mohamed Mahmoud’328, leaving around 50 martyrs and 
hundreds of wounded, where 60 lost their eyes along with 383 detainees
329
. On 22
nd
 of 
November, Tantawi announced his acceptance of prime minister Sharaf’s resignation and 
asserted that the parliamentary elections would be held on time while the presidential elections 
would take place maximum by June 2012
330
 in response to the ‘National Salvation’ 
demonstration that was organized by 38 parties and movements
331
 including 6 April, the Sabahi 
presidential campaign
332
, El-Gabha El-Salafia
333
, El-Tahalouf El-Eshtraki
334
, etc. with the 
absence of the MB that declared its abstention in order not to give a chance to those who were 
attempting to lure protestors to violence
335. Nonetheless, Tantawi’s speech came beyond most 
actors’ expectations and seemed irrelevant after the revival of clashes. Accordingly, the ‘Rescue 
Egypt’ initiative that included the Egyptian Social Democratic party, the Socialist Popular 
Coalition, the Egyptian Communists, El-Tagammu El-Watani El-Taqadomi El-Wahdawi, and 
Justice Parties along with the National Association for Change, the Egyptian Association for 
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Social Participation, etc. called for a ‘Last Opportunity’ protest on 25th of November336. 6 April, 
the Revolution Youth Coalition, El-Tayyar El-Masry, Kefaya, the Union of Youth Rebels, etc. 
declared their participation as well
337
. As had been the case with the ‘National Salvation’ 
protests, the MB announced that it would not participate so as to pacify the situation and let the 
transition of power go through elections as planned
338
. Along with the demands raised earlier, 
actors called on the SCAF to hand over power to a national salvation government that would  
have all the powers to run the transition period until the parliamentary and presidential elections, 
to reform the Interior Ministry, to prosecute those involved with shooting protestors, etc
339
. The 
selection of Kamal El-Ganzouri, “a Mubarak-era prime minister”340, as the new prime minister 
raised the anger of some forces who decided to sit-in in front of the Council of Minister’s 
headquarter, leading to a new massacre as we will see
341
.  Mohamed Mahmoud was critical with 
respect to the relation between SCAF and political forces from two aspects. First, the support of 
Islamists, particularly the MB, to the ‘One Demand’ protest on 18th of November was the “first 
public break with SCAF”342 since they abstained from participating in previous demonstrations 
and kept themselves away from criticizing its performance since Mubarak’s overthrow. 
However, the MB’s abstention from participating in the events later can be seen as an attempt to 
show their mobilization power without triggering SCAF’s anger at the time of parliamentary 
elections that they were certain to win. Second, the events have challenged SCAF’s rule after 
protestors explicitly raised slogans such as: “Down with the Field Marshal,”  “the People will 
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prosecute Tantawi,” etc. for the first time, forcing SCAF to hasten the transition of power. 
Indeed, the military turned from being a guardian to a counter-revolutionary actor, revealing a 
critical break between them and some political forces, specifically revolutionary forces.  
 Over the next two weeks, protestors continued their sit-in in front of the Prime Minister’s 
office to protest the appointment of El-Ganzouri and to pressure SCAF to respond to the other 
demands raised earlier. On 16
th
 of December, a protestor falsely “kicked a football into the 
gardens of Parliament and climbed over the gate to fetch it. After being detained by military 
police for several hours, he was returned to the protesters bruised and beaten” which raised their 
anger
343
. Indeed, protestors on one side and uniformed soldiers and men in civilian cloth on the 
other side kept on throwing rocks at each other, leading to a round of clashes between the two for 
five days
344
. SCAF issued a communiqué claiming that protestors have attacked a soldier who 
was securing the Parliament, raising the anger of his companions who intervened to break the sit-
it while El-Ganzouri argued that there were anonymous actors who were intentionally preventing 
the security situation from improving
345
. However, some videos have revealed that some soldiers 
and men with civil clothes were throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails upon the protestors’ heads 
from the roofs of nearby buildings, along with using snipers to shoot on protestors
346
, resulting in 
18 martyrs and 1917 casualties over the five days
347. What mostly triggered people’s anger is the 
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scene of brutally stomping a women and stripping her cloth
348. Under the title of “Egypt’s 
Freewomen...Rad El-Sharaf”, 16 parties and alliances349 which included El-Wasat, El-Masryeen 
El-Ahrar, El-Tayyar El-Masry, Egyptian Democratic, Uprising  Youth Coalition, Union of Youth 
Rebels, 6 April, National Association for Change, etc. protested the brutality of military officers 
against protestors and the shame of assaulting women under the slogan of ‘Egyptian women are 
red line’350. They called for resignation of El-Ganzouri, the prosecution of those who killed 
protestors, setting political detainees free, and hastening the transition of power
351
. As had been 
the case with Mohamed Mahmoud, Islamists, including the MB, El-Gama’a El-Islamiyah, El-
Asalah boycotted the protest
352
, with the MB arguing that it did not want to escalate the situation 
and that the only way to pacify it was to prosecute those involved in the shooting of protestors 
and to accelerate the democratic transition of power to civilian bodies
353
. While El-Nour Party 
declared that it would symbolically participate in a march from Al-Azhar to Tahrir under the 
slogan of “Free Egyptian Women,” but would not partake in a protest against SCAF under the 
slogan of “Rad El-Sharaf”354. Accordingly, this event resembled a breaking point between the 
military and uprising ary forces where the military became impatient toward frequent criticisms 
of its performance especially when they challenged its rule and it “moved from praising the 
uprising ary youth as heroes to labeling them as destructive agents”355. While Egyptians were 
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astonished by the brutal behavior of military soldiers which did not differ from that of police
356
, 
hitting to the core of the military’s legitimacy and credibility especially after assaulting women. 
Not only this, the events intensified the mistrust between the uprising ary forces and Islamists 
who turned their back to their companions once they achieved a tremendous victory in PA 
elections despite the fact that their companions’ demands were related to women’s rights.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter started by the military’s position under Mubarak who adopted a less 
complex control system than his predecessors. After the military had already been tamed, 
Mubarak depended on material privileges to secure its loyalty. Hence, he offered officers post-
retirement positions in the bureaucracy which allowed them to generate more income and he 
institutionalized their economic empire which preserved the military’s economic autonomy vis-
à-vis the regime. Taking everyone by surprise, the military intervened gradually in the 2011 mass 
demonstrations and was reluctant to topple Mubarak until this became the only option. Trying to 
explain the military’s behavior, Albrecht argued that Mubarak and his son failed to build 
personal connections with the military which did not encourage it to bear the costs of repressing 
the uprising especially if we took into consideration its economic independence. While Kandil 
claimed that officers were suffering from rank disequilibrium under Mubarak and hence, were 
supportive of the uprising forcing SCAF to defect from Mubarak in order to maintain military’s 
coherence. Further, Koehler argued that militaries which face competition from rival regime 
institutions as resembled in Gamal’s economic policy and police hegemony will defect from 
incumbents in the face of uprisings. Whereas it is difficult to point to a single reason behind 
military’s intervention, no one can deny that it was an opportunity for the military to return its 
role as a king maker and to preserve its interests.  
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Trying to balance between those interests and those of different political actors in a new 
volatile environment along with “military’s own characteristics that prefers stability, tends 
toward secrecy and is hostile to dissent”357; SCAF’s strategy was inconsistent which further 
contaminated the path of transition as shown in section two. Based on Lust’s theoretical 
framework that examined the dynamics of government-opposition relations through Structures of 
Contestation (SoC) established by incumbents, SCAF adopted a divided SoC
xvii
 as Mubarak even 
if it seems the opposite (i.e. unified SoC)
xviii
. Being forced to govern in an open environment 
where each actor demands a say, SCAF had no other option but to “manage such political 
expansion except by including moderate groups”358. Worth mentioning, radicals are those actors 
who prefer policies far from the status quo while moderates are the ones who seek less reform
359
. 
Indeed, SCAF’s interests coincided more with that of Islamists than that of uprising ary forces 
since the latter sought uprising ary demands that would challenge the authoritarian pillars of the 
1952 regime, while the former were known for their reformist discourse and preferred to 
preserve the state especially given that they were likely to win political power. Taking this into 
consideration, along with Islamists’ strong organization and mobilization capabilities, the SCAF 
made sure to gain them as allies against the revolutionary forces
360
. But unlike Mubarak who 
allowed some political parties -whom Albrecht referred to as a loyal opposition- to join the 
formal political sphere while excluding the MB who was only allowed to perform 
underground
361
, SCAF was aware –intentionally or accidentally- that “incumbents can determine 
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which opposition groups exist or disappear and can influence their incentives to unite or split by 
the rules they make and the institutions they establish”362. 
 In less than a month after Mubarak, Egyptians found themselves in front of ballot boxes 
to vote on the amendments that were made by a constitutional committee appointed by SCAF. 
The composition of the committee which lacked representation of different political spectrums 
with the exception of Islamists and the very first balloting have “opened the first rift between the 
revolutionary forces, who demanded a new constitution and the Islamists, who supported 
SCAF’s gradual approach of amending the 1971 constitution”363. The release of the SCAF’s 
declaration two weeks after the referendum opened the door for an intensive debate between 
Islamists who adopted an ‘election first’ path and uprising ary forces along with secularists who 
adopted a ‘constitution first’ approach. The declaration came as a surprise for all because it did 
not only adopt the elections first path as advocated by the Islamists, but also secured the SCAF’s 
role in writing the coming constitution. Further, the SCAF adopted a parallel rather than a mixed 
PR system as well as regional PR blocs instead of a national PR system in 2011/2012 
parliamentary elections, making it difficult for post-uprising ary small parties to penetrate the 
party system while making the victory of Islamists inevitable if we take into consideration the 
capabilities of both. Hence, the election results have escalated conflict between Islamists and 
uprising ary forces instead of encouraging cooperation within parliament. Moving to the last part 
of section two, SCAF described the revolutionary youth as heroes and has grudgingly accepted 
the frequent protests until it lost its patience and “reacted defensively once protestors’ demands 
challenged its status”364 when they called for power transmission at the Mohamed Mahmoud and 
Council of Ministers events. In addition, the MB’s abstention from joining other forces in 
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protests against the SCAF with very few exceptions cannot solely be explained by its incentives, 
but also by examining the nature of an actor’s relation with the incumbent. As Lust argued, 
moderate opposition in divided SoC will be less willing to mobilize because “they prefer to 
maintain the status quo to either losing the privileges they have achieved if they exploited 
discontent to cause serious regime instability”365. Accordingly, the MB may have feared that if 
they allied with other forces against the SCAF, they would lose the privileges they had achieved 
in the parliament and were likely to obtain if they won the presidency, in addition to their 
influence on writing the coming constitution. Not to mention that if they challenged the military 
with other forces, they feared to be the main victims if we took into consideration the historical 
conflict between them and former regimes especially under Nasser. As a result, my assumption 
seems valid where SCAF has used rules and institutions that widened the gap between Islamists 
and uprising ary forces and impeded them from cooperation. At the same time, its divided SoC 
has influenced the MB’s strategy in a way that intensified the historical mistrust between them 
and other forces.  
Chapter Three 
Youth movements and alliances and their relation with political parties  
prior and after 25
th
 January uprising  
 The Arab Spring has astonished the world not only due to its success in toppling 
longstanding dictators such as Ben Ali and Mubarak, but also due to the rise of new agents 
whose role was pivotal in changing the path of events. In the Egyptian case, for instance, the 
youth took the initiative by calling for protests and taking the risk of going to the streets, 
encouraging others to follow. And despite attempts made by traditional political forces, youth 
movements and alliances refused any type of negotiation with the regime until Mubarak would 
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step down, which contributed to his overthrow. Some scholars were astounded by this experience 
and hence they dealt with youth as if they were new political actors that entered the political 
scene. Accordingly, they focused on the role played by the youth during the days of protest while 
they left questions open for what role youth could play during the transition period. Conversely, 
other scholars argued that this new generation did not get politicized during the days of protest 
but that there were many precedents in the 2000s that provided this generation with an 
opportunity for politicization and for gaining some political space, paving by that the way to the 
uprising.  
 Despite the major role played by youth prior to the 25
th
 January uprising and after, this 
did not change Egypt’s fate. The unification of the opposition during the 18 days did not last for 
long and the anti-Mubarak coalition re-fragmented soon after the toppling of Mubarak. 
Accordingly, this chapter will test the validity of one of the causal factors that I argue was behind 
the failure of the opposition to unite and organize itself especially in a political context that was 
in their favor compared to previous periods: 
The failure of political parties to form alliances with youth movements has enhanced the 
fragmentation of opposition and weakened them vis-à-vis remnants of the authoritarian regime 
 This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will focus on youth 
movements that were formed prior to the uprising. The second section will be concerned with 
post-uprising youth alliances and movements whether those formed during the 18 days of protest 
or after the toppling of Mubarak and their relation with political parties post-Mubarak onwards.  
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Section One 
Youth movements prior to the 25
th
 January uprising  
 Due to Mubarak’s de-politicization policies in the 1990s, all forms of political activism 
seemed to be entirely absent. However, the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 broke the silence 
and led to the rise of social movements that swept the political spectrum. As El-Mahdi
366
 and 
Shehata
367
 along with others articulated, the 2000s can be divided into different phases: protest 
movements such as the Popular Committee to Support the Intifada that emerged from 2000 until 
2003 were concerned with regional issues such as the Palestinian Intifada, the American invasion 
of Iraq, etc.; prodemocracy movements such as Kefaya and Youth for Change that were active 
from 2004 until the 2005 parliamentary elections; labor strikes that started in Mahalla in 2006 
and the rise of 6
th
 April movement
xix
; youth movements or mass media groups such as the 
Popular Campaign to support El-Baradei and We are All Khaled Said that proved effective since 
2009 until the uprising . Despite these precedents, some authors were surprised by the uprising 
and would refer to it as a ‘sudden’ occasion. On the other hand, Albrecht368 and El-Mahdi369 
along with others argue that all these movements helped in politicizing a new generation and in 
creating the fertile conditions for the uprising370. Accordingly, this section will elaborate how 
these movements paved the way to the uprising and played a role in calling for protests.  
1.The Egyptian movement for change/Kefaya movement: 
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 Although, the Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC), or Kefaya (Enough), was only 
formed in September 2004, it had been in the making since the mid-1990s371. This is due to the 
fact that its founders were involved in the 1970s student movement that swept Egyptian 
universities. But unlike older generations, they realized that “the ideologically based mistrust and 
animosity among Egypt’s older generation of political elites only serves to strengthen the ruling 
party’s ability to maintain its monopoly of power”372. Accordingly, they organized informal 
national dialogues throughout the 1990s
xx
 in an attempt to build bridges between political actors 
from different spectrums373. Such efforts ended up with a document by twenty-three activist that 
would represent the foundation for their mutual political action. The document was then open for 
signatures by public figures until it reached three hundred and Kefaya was announced by 
September 2005374. Taking into consideration the political background of its founders, it is 
unsurprising that Kefaya’s founders came from the far left to the far right to include Nasserists 
(El-Karama), Marxist-Socialists (The Revolutionary Socialist Organization), liberals (Al-Ghad), 
Islamists (Al-Wasat and the Egyptian Islamic Labor)375 and some independent figures as George 
Ishaq, Bahaa’ Taher, Alaa’ El-Aswani, Abdul Mone’m Abul-Fotoh, Hamdeen Sabahy, etc376. 
Worth mentioning, the movement was not a coalition of political parties due to two main 
reasons: first, public figures joined Kefaya on an individual basis independent of their parties377; 
second, all parties mentioned above were not yet legalized with the exception of Al-Ghad378.  
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 A few months after its first demonstration, Kefaya attracted young people for whom the 
movement was an alternative opposition channel to the mistrusted parties379. Not only this, 
Kefaya represented a new phenomenon in Egyptian politics. According to Albrecht, Kefaya 
reflected a change in the red lines set by Mubarak since its demonstrations were not repressed by 
security despite their strong presence380. El-Mahdi also argues that it was “the first time in fifty 
years that political liberalization” rather than economic or regional issues “would be the sole 
cause for mobilization”381. In this regard, many critics argue what makes Kefaya demands 
different from those raised by other political actors382. However, as Shorbagy emphasized it 
would be over-simplistic if we said that Kefaya was just targeting Mubarak because it rejected 
the rules of the game as a whole383. In other words, Kefaya did not wait to take the government’s 
permission to go to streets, but instead created a new political space for itself away from the 
political parties that it considered as part of the regime, bypassing by that the legal framework 
that was set by the regime to maintain its monopoly over power384.  
 Unfortunately, Kefaya started to fade away by 2006 due to several reasons, one of which 
is that the very characteristics that made Kefaya a unique phenomenon are the ones that 
threatened its sustainability. Although it was a cross-ideological movement, its “lack of 
programmatic coherence and common interest” among its ideologically diversified members 
made it difficult to keep them together “beyond the very term that united them”385. Most 
importantly, depending on protests was important in the early stages of Kefaya, but maintaining 
it for an extended period of time has limited the movement’s ability to establish new forms of 
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activism beyond the stage of breaking taboos386
xxi
. Further, the lack of organizational form 
created a conflict over decision-making especially between old and new generations, resulting in 
the emergence of dissent sub-movements such as Youth for Change387.  
 Youth for Change:  
 Youth for change was established in February 2005 by a group of youth activists who were 
mainly students, unemployed graduates, and young professionals388. Although, it “elected its own 
coordination committee and organized separate activities”; it still operated under Kefaya and 
assisted in organizing its events389. Nonetheless, what differentiated Youth for Change from 
Kefaya was that the former ensured to include youth demands that were neglected by Kefaya 
such as restoring democracy inside universities, guaranteeing equality of opportunity, and access 
to education, health care, housing and employment390. Besides, what made the movement 
different from any former movement was that it was the first time that people organized 
themselves on an age basis rather than class, ideology, or geographic location as the only criteria 
for joining the movement was to be under thirty391. Youth for Change did not only resemble the 
emergence of generational politics but also represented a new era where internet played a major 
role in building connections between activists since it depended on blogging to spread its latest 
news392. Unfortunately, this unique experience did not last for an extended period. After the 2005 
parliamentary elections, the conflict between Kefaya and Youth for Change escalated due to their 
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conflicting views toward the regime and the former’s willingness to interfere in the latter’s 
affairs, leading to the latter’s disintegration393. 
2. 6 April movement: 
 After the 2005 parliamentary elections, Mubarak’s regime adopted restrictive laws in an 
attempt to close the public space in front of opponents. Instead, the new generation of activists 
succeeded to bypass those restrictions by regrouping in social media394 and adopting a cross-
ideological discourse that allowed ideologically diversified activists to work together395.  
 In December 2006, the workers at the biggest weaving and spinning factory in Egypt in 
El-Mahalla city declared a strike to protest not receiving the bonus payment promised by Nazif’s 
government396. This was followed by a wave of labor protests and strikes in other industries that 
swept Egypt till 2009397.  
 On 23
rd
 of March 2008, Al-Ghad party activist, Israa Abd El-Fattah established a FB 
group in coordination with Ahmed Maher
xxii
 in order not only to support the El-Mahalla labor 
strike that was expected to take place on 6
th
 of April but also to call for a general strike all over 
Egypt398. Besides Israa and Maher, the other twenty founders were associated with the Popular 
Movement for Supporting the Palestinian Intifada, Youth for Change, Al-Ghad and Labor Parties 
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along with some independent youth399. On 28
th
 of June, they declared the establishment of 6 
April Movement and re-named the FB group formed earlier by Israa400.   
 Introducing itself as an exclusive youth movement, 6 April had around 2000 active 
members in twelve governorates by 2009, according to Maher401. After the expansion of its social 
base, 6 April broadened its goals so they no longer focused exclusively on labor strikes nor were 
they only focusing on Mubarak. Rather they sought to change the regime as a whole (i.e. rules of 
the game)402. To achieve this goal, 6 April found it necessary to raise people’s awareness of the 
Mubarak regime’s corruption. In its annual ‘Minority Conference’ which took place in parallel to 
the NDP annual conference, 6
 April addressed “the NDP reports with real numbers and facts that 
scrutinize[d] the deteriorating socio-economic conditions”403. Besides, it arranged protests on 6th 
of April of each year, initiated the ‘Your voice is your demand’ campaign, and joined a number 
of events with other movements404. But unlike previous movements, 6
 
April depended heavily on 
social media to mobilize people405.  
 Despite its initial success, conflicts started to emerge between its members leading to the 
movement’s first division in 2009. First, disputes arose over the movements’ priorities. While a 
group of Pan-Arabists argued that it should focus on Arab causes, other activists maintained that 
the priority was to topple the regime and to adopt dramatic changes in the economy, health and 
education406. Second, contention escalated when 6 April received an invitation from the 
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Department of State407 to participate in the Freedom House conference408. Since its foundation, 6
 
April had refused any foreign intervention and hence its members voted for rejecting the 
invitation. However, two of its members insisted on accepting it409. The Pan-Arab group declared 
a new movement called ‘You will not Pass’ to prevent these members from traveling to USA and 
to reject Obama’s visit to Cairo. Maher tried to maintain 6 April cohesiveness by dismissing 
them and declaring that this movement was not related to the mother one.  
 After 2009 the movement succeeded to reconstruct itself and expand its support base by 
forming student groups in twelve governorates by January 2010 to train them on “means of non-
violent peaceful change, campaigning and mobilization, organizing protest, marshes, 
demonstrations and strikes”410. In the same year, 6 April successfully associated itself with the 
Presidential Campaign of El-Baradei where it used its FB page to collect signatures on El-
Baradei’s call ‘Together We Will Change’ and to announce the campaign’s events411.  
 Unfortunately, the uprising catalyzed the internal disputes between 6 April members 
leading to its split into 6 April movement headed by Maher and the Democratic Front headed by 
Tarek El-Kholi412. Prior to the uprising, some members were dissatisfied by the way the 
movement was operated
xxiii
 and they argued that institutionalizing the movement was the only 
solution. Post-Mubarak, the dissenting members renewed their call for institutionalism along 
with holding new elections, deciding on new procedures for membership, and rules of labor 
division413. The political office emphasized that 6 April became one of the most influential actors 
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on the political arena and hence, any internal changes in the movement’s structure might lead to 
its destabilization414. Besides that, the office favored postponing the acceptance of new members 
because it did not have time to filter the applicants -to exclude members who may be working 
with security or intelligence apparatuses- while responding to the changing environment post-
uprising 415.  
3. Popular Campaign to Support El-Baradei/National Association for Change:  
 With the 2011 presidential elections approaching, activists seeking change started to 
suggest some names that could have been an alternative to Mubarak such as El-Baradei. Thus, in 
December 2009, El-Baradei announced that he was willing to run for elections if the constitution 
was amended to ensure fair and free elections. His call was met by about 45 FB groups to 
support him but the most important one was that established by Abd El-Rahman Youssef
xxiv
. 
This group attracted around 250,000 participants in the subsequent months and became later the 
official group for Baradei’s presidential campaign. 
 After his arrival in February 2010, El-Baradei met around 30 activists including Abu El-
Ghar, El-Aswani, Ishaq, etc. along with leaders of El-Ghad, El-Gabhah, El-Karama, El-Wasat 
parties and the MB to announce the foundation of the ‘National Association for Change’. After 
its foundation, El-Baradei met with FB activists along with 6 April, Calling for my Rights and 9 
March movements. All these meetings resulted in a ‘statement for change’ that included 
demands to ensure fair and free elections asking citizens to approve and sign. The National 
Association, with the support of the Popular Campaign and 6 April, organized a number of 
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events to introduce El-Baradei to the public and to convince them to sign the statement. Prior to 
the uprising, the number of signatures reached 800,000416.   
4. ‘We are All Khaled Said’ Facebook Group: 
 By 2010, political activism had become clearly anti-regime whether in terms of how 
groups identified themselves or in the demands they raised417. Yet, the rise of ‘We are All Khaled 
Said,’ a group that never identified itself as political, represented a major challenge to the 
regime418. According to El-Mahdi, its focus on quality of life issues rather than ideology, 
geography, or class, hit the core of the regime419.  
 Although the brutal murdering of Khaled Said by police officers was not the first incident 
of police brutality against civilians, it was the snowball that galvanized public dissent against 
Mubarak’s police state. Torturing Said to death because he posted videos on FB that scrutinized 
the illegal practices of a police officer was unacceptable to the youth420. Accordingly, two 
anonymous activists, Wael Ghoneim and Abdel Rahman Mansour421 -who would only be known 
post-uprising  and who were members of the El-Baradei campaign422- founded a FB group called 
‘We are All Khaled Said’ on July 10th, 2010423. Although they never identified themselves as a 
political group, their attempt to mobilize mainstream support around Said’s case and later to 
scrutinize police practices was “in every sense political”424. Under the hashtag ‘He could have 
been your brother’425, the page succeeded to attract around 300,000 followers in a few months, 
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becoming by that the largest FB page426
xxv
. The group “held several demonstrations and 
campaigns
xxvi
 to protest against human rights violations and to call for punishing Said’s 
culprits”427. 
 The fraudulent 2010 parliamentary elections, the church bombing in Alexandria on 
Christmas night, and the torture of Sayyed Belal to death by police officers, urged the page 
founders to call for protests on 25
th
 January 2011, national police day. The call was attended by 
27,000 on ‘We are all Khaled Said’ only, but in collaboration with other pages as that of 6 
April’s ‘My name is Khaled Said’, the call reached a half million on FB428. The pages set five 
demands for 25
th
 January: “raising minimum wages, improving health and education services, 
abolishing the emergency law, firing Minister of Interior Habib el-Adly, and placing two term 
limit on the presidency”429. These were the initial demands raised by protestors; however, the 
success of the Tunisian uprising along other factors encouraged them to call for Mubarak to step 
down.  
Section Two 
Post-uprising Youth Alliances and their relation with political parties  
 If it is easy to count and identify the social movements that existed before 25
th
 January 
uprising, it is almost impossible to do the same in the post-uprising period. The success of 
protestors’ sit-in at Tahrir Square for continuous 18 days broke all the red lines set by Mubarak 
and allowed protestors to conquer the public space that was once restricted. Further, the political 
void left by toppling Mubarak and the protestors’ high expectations and enthusiasm led to the 
establishment of around 135 youth alliances during the 18 days and post-Mubarak that were all 
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claiming to be representative of the rebels430. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify all these 
alliances and hence, I will mainly focus on the most prominent ones. These alliances can be 
categorized into two categories: cross-ideological reform alliances and ideological reform 
alliances. The reason behind choosing this dichotomy (cross-ideological vs. ideological) is that 
most youth alliances are almost identical with respect to their names and demands. Thus, what 
differentiates them from one another is the political background of their founders. While the term 
‘reform alliances’ is introduced by Kraetzschmar as one type of joint opposition actions that 
were prevalent in the Middle East. Reform alliances “seek to tackle a whole range of policy areas 
usually packaged in a common program of reform demands towards the authoritarian 
incumbent” while single-issue alliances are often “time-bound to a specific event or policy”431. 
Accordingly, post-uprising youth alliances are close to reform alliances in the sense that they do 
not restrict themselves to political demands but also raise economic, social and constitutional 
demands. Besides, they were not bounded to a specific event as the uprising rather they were 
politically active at least in the first phase of the transition period since they were seeking a 
radical change of the regime.  
1. Cross-ideological reform alliances:  
 At Tahrir and other squares, Egyptians from far right to far left succeeded to unite against 
Mubarak. Even after his resignation, they succeeded in sustaining their unity for a short period of 
time in the form of cross-ideological alliances which they formed during the 18 days onwards. 
These alliances included the Revolution Youth Coalition, the Union of Youth Rebels, the 
Council of Revolution Trustees, the Front for Supporting the Revolution, and the Organizational 
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Committee of 25
th
 January Masses. In the following lines, I will compare these alliances with 
respect to the time of their foundation, their purpose, and the political background of their 
founders.   
 Although the Revolution Youth Coalition or Coalition of 25
th
 January Revolution (I’tlaf 
Shabab El-Thawra) was officially founded on 6
th
 of February, 2011, it was established two 
weeks prior to 25
th
 January by political actors who called for and participated in the uprising432. 
Indeed, it is not surprising that it would be the major youth coalition post-uprising, since it 
included nationalist, socialist, Islamist, and liberal youth433. The idea of the coalition arose when 
some actors such as the MB, Al-Wafd, El-Tagammu and those who formed the committee of 
Wise Men
xxvii
 agreed to enter into negotiations with the newly appointed vice president, Omar 
Soleiman434. Accordingly, the founders thought of the importance of uniting the rebels under one 
entity and unifying their demands specifically, their insistence on not negotiating with the regime 
until Mubarak would step down435. Post-Mubarak, their focus shifted to observing the 
achievement of uprising ary goals and exerting pressure on incumbents to achieve the goals that 
weren’t achieved yet436.  
On 30
th
 of January, the Union of Youth Rebels (Ethad Shabab El-Thawra) was founded 
by a group of independents and youth from different political parties. What makes it different 
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from the former coalition is that the majority of its members belonged to the nationalist and 
leftist spectrums437. Nonetheless, their goals were almost identical in that they sought to maintain 
the uprising’s gains and to follow the achievement of its demands438. Two days after toppling 
Mubarak, the Front for Supporting the Revolution (Gabhat Da’am El-Thawra) was founded to 
unite all political actors who supported the uprising but what differentiated it from the other 
groups was that it regarded itself as a mediator between political actors and incumbents439. 
Beside these alliances, some had more logistical than a political nature. At Tahrir, there were 
three main powers who tried to inspire and influence the protestors through their broadcasts: one 
for Uprising Youth, other for the MB, and another for Free Egypt Coalition440. In an attempt to 
coordinate between them, the Organizational Committee for 25
th
 January Masses (El-Lagna El-
Tansyqia L’Jamaher El-Thawra) was established by the five main alliances founded during the 
18 days and later expanded to include other alliances and independents441. The organizational 
committee played a vital role during the transition in planning for the subsequent 
demonstrations442, coordinating between the alliances to unite their actions and demands, and 
organizing for these demonstrations logistically443. Another coalition known as the Council of 
Revolution Trustees (Majles Omna’a El-Thawra) was formed during the 18 days but it became 
more prominent post-purging Friday on 25
th
 February, when it declared that it would not 
participate in this demonstration because it argued that Egyptians must give a chance to Sharaf 
government and the SCAF to achieve uprising’s demands.  
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 As we will see in the next section, youth alliances are not only identical with regard to 
their founding purpose, but also with regard to the demands they raised. Worth mentioning, 
Revolution Youth Coalition is the only coalition that succeeded to attach itself to the uprising’s 
demands and to be the most representative of the political discourse adopted by youth rebels till 
its dissolution in July 2012444.   
 With respect to the alliances’ founders and their backgrounds, all alliances were a 
combination of independent youth, public figures, parties and social movements but what might 
differentiate these alliances from each other is who is the hegemonic party. Accordingly, the 
previously mentioned alliances can be divided into three categories: youth-hegemonic alliances, 
public figures-hegemonic alliances and mixed alliances.  
 Among the five alliances, ‘Revolution Youth Coalition’ is the only one that represents 
youth-hegemonic alliances. It succeeded to keep a distance from political parties even if it 
included youth from El-Ghad, El-Tagammu, El-Gabha, El-Karama, and El-Wafd445. It also 
included youth from the MB, Freedom and Justice Movement, 6 April, Popular Campaign to 
Support El-Baradei, Together We Will Change, and National Association for Change. For such 
reason, it succeeded to gain people’s support446. Its executive office included ten youth who 
would represent the coalition and be responsible for coordinating with parties. These members 
were Islam Lotfy and Mohamed El-Qasas (MB), Mostafa Shawki and Khaled El-Sayed (Justice 
and Development), Amr Ezz and Tarek El-Kholi (6 April), Zyad El-Elaimy and Bassem Kamel 
(Popular Campaign), Khaled Talimah (El-Tagammu), Hossam Mo’nis (El-Wafd), Amr Salah 
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and Ahmed Abd Rabou (El-Gabha), Nasr Abd El-Hamid (National Association for change)447 
along with, some independents as Abd El-Rahman Faris and Sally Tomah448.  
 In contrast, public figures-hegemonic alliances such as the ‘Front for Supporting the 
Revolution’ and the ‘Council of Revolution Trustees’ included members who belonged to older 
generations. The former was composed of figures such as Abou El-Fotouh, El-Baradei, El-
Baltagi, Ayman Nour, George Ishaq, Hamdeen Sabahy, etc449. Whilst, the latter’s board of 
trustees had a good representation of MB as it included El-Baltagi, Sobhi Saleh, Khaled Oda and 
Safwat Hegzay in addition to eighteen members from different political backgrounds such as El-
Aswani, Belal Fadl, etc450. Besides, the front was composed of National Association for Change, 
Popular Parliament, and Egyptian Association for 25
th
 January rebels451 along with youth figures 
as: El-Elaimy, Shady El-Gazali, Maher, Islam Lotfy, Sally Tomah, Abd El-Rahman Faris, etc.452. 
On the other hand, the council’s board of trustees was composed of thousands youth who have 
been members of the administrative councils at Tahrir Square while its executive office was 
headed by 3 youth: Ahmed Naguib, Sayed Abou El-Ala, and Hamza Abou A’isha453.  
 Lastly, mixed alliances such as the ‘Union of Youth Rebels’ and the ‘Organizational 
Committee of 25
th
 January masses’ were composed of both political parties and social 
movements. The former has included parties who mostly belong to the leftist and nationalist 
spectrum as El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, El-Arabi El-Nasri, El-Gabha, Reform and Development, 
                                                          
447
 Uprising  Youth Coalition official page on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/Uprising 
.coalition/info/?entry_point=page_nav_about_item&tab=page_info 
For political affiliations, check Ahmed Fathy, Mohamed El-Fiky & Ahmed Eiwas, “The uprising  that produced 6 
alliances in 18 days” or Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising ”, 2011 
448
 Ibid  
449
 Naglaa Shawki, “Politicians and activists establish a front to support the Egyptian uprising ”, Harmess Press, 10 
February 2011, http://harmees.com/articles/view/5659.html 
450
 Mohamed Ismail & Aya Nabil, “Launch of Council of uprising  trustees with the participation of MB” 
451
 El-Azabawy, “The youth from 25th January to 30th June”. 
452
 Naglaa Shawki, “Politicians and activists establish a front to support the Egyptian uprising ” 
453
 Samir El-Sayed, “Council of trustees of January uprising  include Belal, Zakaria, El-Asha’al, Sa’ad, Safwat, and 
Mona Makram”, Al-Ahram gate, 16 February 2011, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/40657.aspx 
87 
 
Egyptian Communist, El-Ghad, El-Islah, New Leftist, and Masr parties454. Some movements also 
joined the union such as the Free Front, Revolution of Egyptian Youth, Renaissance of Egyptian 
Youth, 9 March, 11 February, Youth for Change, People’s Crowds, and Raheel455. While the 
organizational committee was initially formed by the five main alliances at Tahrir Square: Union 
of youth rebels, Free Egypt coalition, Coalition of Egypt’s rebels, Revolution of Youth Coalition, 
and Coalition of uprising  trustees456. Then it expanded to include other alliances and movements 
as MB, Independent academics, Council of revolution trustees, Union of youth of faculty staff at 
public universities, 25
th
 January youth movement, Voice of revolution coalition, Association of 
protecting national unity, and Free Egypt’s Copts457.  
If it is reasonable that Kefaya, 6 April, National Association for Change, etc. have 
represented an alternative opposition channel to the mistrusted parties for youth prior to the 
uprising, it is surprising that they organized themselves under informal entities as cross-
ideological alliances rather than political parties post-uprising. In other words, the legacy of 
mistrust between youth and parties resulted in the phenomenon of cross-ideological youth 
alliances that reached its peak during the 18 days of protest and the very few months after 
Mubarak until it faded away by 2012, when polarization between different actors swept political 
life. As shown, mixed alliances have opened the door for traditional parties and for pre-uprising 
movements who regarded these alliances as a good opportunity to re-participate in the political 
life and re-gain people’s trust. Instead of reforming their organizations to attract the new 
generation of activists, parties preferred to join the already established youth alliances, reflecting 
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by that the validity of my assumption. Further, the inclusion of parties have threatened the 
sustainability of these alliances because they are more likely to defect once an opportunity 
emerges especially that their different political backgrounds and their contradicting interests 
would make them not committed to the alliances’ purposes. In contrast, ‘Uprising  Youth 
Coalition’ maintained its sustainability since it neither disintegrated nor disappeared as other 
youth alliances but it dissolved itself once the SCAF transferred power to the elected president. 
This is due to the fact that it succeeded to keep itself away from traditional parties and older 
generation, making it an exclusive youth coalition. Accordingly, my assumption seems valid in 
the sense that parties failed to reform their organizations to include youth activists on one hand 
and they enhanced opposition fragmentation on the other hand when they joined youth alliances 
while not being committed to their goals. 
Nonetheless, my assumption has overlooked the reason behind the failure of youth 
alliances to unite under one entity, given that their goal and demands are almost identical. 
Looking at the membership of these alliances can provide us with a partial answer. As shown 
previously, the National Association for Change was present in three alliances at a time: the 
Revolution Youth Coalition, the Front for Supporting the Revolution, and the Organizational 
Committee of Revolution Masses. Also, parties such as El-Ghad, El-Tagammu, El-Wafd, and El-
Gabha were represented in the Revolution Youth Coalition and the Union of Youth Rebels. 
Further, youth figures such as Islam Lotfy, Khaled El-Sayed, Amr Ezz, Zyad El-Elaimy, Amr 
Salah, Nasr Abd El-Hamid, Sally Tomah and Abd El-Rahman Faris were members in the 
Revolution Youth Coalition and the Front of Supporting the Revolution. Such overlap in the 
membership of the alliances has led to the rise of conflict among and between these alliances, 
weakening them vis-à-vis traditional actors such as the SCAF and the MB and hence preventing 
89 
 
them from achieving their main goal which was to pressure for and follow up the achievement of 
uprising ary goals. 
2. Ideological reform alliances: 
a) MB Youth:  
 After Mubarak stepped down, Egyptian society witnessed a kind of generational conflict 
with the rise of a new generation of youth who sought to change the status quo in a way that 
differed from older generations458. Such conflict did not only rise between youth activists and 
older political figures, but also emerged within political entities themselves. Even if it is a very 
well organized movement, MB was not an exception and the opening space accompanied by the 
uprising gave a chance to all dissatisfied members -mostly youth- to call for institutional reform. 
Adding to that, the frustrating performance of the MB post-uprising gave an additional incentive 
for those members to complain and then defect when they realized that their reform demands hit 
a dead end. It is worth mentioning that MB youth are neither an independent entity of the MB 
nor a homogenous generational unit459. Rather, they are a diversified category with respect to 
their religious thoughts, their commitment and views toward the MB, and their relation with 
other actors such as liberals and leftists460.  
 Unlike older generations, the MB youth showed more flexibility with liberal, leftist and 
national youth. Since the early 2000, the MB youth created their blogs and participated in 
different forms of youth activism starting from Kefaya, 6 April, We are All Khaled Said, 
National Association for Change, etc461. Hence, it is unsurprising that the MB youth has 
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participated since day one in the uprising and were one of the groups that joined the first youth 
coalition, Revolution Youth Coalition462. This was their stance despite the fact that the MB 
officially announced its participation only on 28
th
 January463 as leaders were not yet convinced 
that these demonstrations would led to real change and hence, they agreed to negotiate with 
Omar Soleiman464. Nonetheless, the MB youth who participated in the uprising cannot be 
regarded as one homogenous category. Instead, they can be divided into three spectrums: the left 
wing which is composed of mostly youth who later joined Abou El-Fottouh’s presidential 
campaign such as Mohamed El-Gabha, Mohamed El-Shahawy, Mohamed Heikel
xxviii
; the 
centrist group which is composed of Islam Lotfy, Mohamed El-Qasas, Ahmed El-Nazari, etc.; 
and the right wing which includes Hassan Ezz El-Din, Mostafa El-Wahsh, Hossam Badawi, 
etc.
xxix465. According to El-Azabawy, the left wing is considered the most significant group out of 
MB youth as they joined other youth since day one of the demonstrations466. The center group 
participated starting from 24
th
 January while the right wing joined only by 28
th
 January467.  
 Since they were both struggling against Mubarak, the conflict between MB and its youth 
did not come to the surface except after Mubarak stepped down and specifically when the MB 
announced on 21
st
 of February that it would establish its own party which would be later known 
as the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The creation of the party itself was a natural political 
development for the MB post-uprising but many MB youth were against FJP simply because 
there was no independence between the party and the movement468. Despite various assurances 
made by the MB leadership, the selection of the party leadership by the MB Shoura Council 
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instead of the party’s founders was just one indicator of the dependency of the two which 
increased the frustration of the MB youth along with old figures such as Abou El-Fotouh and El-
Zafarani469. Adding to that, all attempts made by the MB youth to convince their leaders of 
reforming the method of party leadership selection or reforming the movement was met with 
deaf ears470. After losing hope of any kind of reform within the MB, some youth, such as Moa’az 
Abdul Karim, Mohamed El-Qasas, Islam Lotfy, Moas’ab El-Gammal, Mohamed Abbas and 
others announced the establishment of Al-Tayyar Al-Masry Party in May 2011 which they 
perceived as a different political project that sought to overcome ideological polarization by 
resembling the mainstream of Egyptian society471. Its founders also insisted to include youth 
from different political spectrums as Abd El-Rahman Faris (Kefaya) and Asmaa Mahfouz (6 
April)472. Few days after firing Abou El-Fottouh who announced that he would run for the 
presidency despite the MB leadership’s decision of not nominating any of its members473, the 
Guidance office fired all members who joined Al-Tayyar Al-Masry on 14
th
 July, 2011 and 
declared that it would not allow any of its members to join any party other than FJP474.  
2) Union of Socialist Youth/ Ethad El-Shabab El-Eshtraki:  
 According to Ahmed Belal, founder of the Union of Socialist Youth and a member of El-
Tagammu, the idea of the union was present during the uprising but it was only founded on 16
th
 
March, 2011 after the security break-up of Tahrir on 9
th
 March475. In its founding statement, the 
union asserted that the unification of Socialist youth is a necessity to confront the remnants of 
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Mubarak’s regime who were struggling to not change the regime after Mubarak’s overthrow and 
to confront any political actors, especially Islamists, who were trying to influence the public 
through media, money, etc476.  
 Despite the uprising phase Egypt was passing through, the leftists were getting more 
fragmented than before due to the elitist character of their parties and the inflexibility of their 
leaders. Those leaders were not only acting paternalistically vis-à-vis youth within their parties 
and prohibiting them from reaching leadership roles, but were also engaging them into their 
personal conflicts with other parties477. Hence, the coalition was an attempt to unite all Socialist 
youth away from the control of their party leaders and the restrictions set by traditional 
organizations such as parties478. The coalition had almost 1200 members, some of which 
belonged to El-Nasri, El-Tagammu, El-Karama and Egyptian Communist Parties479.  
3) Salafyo Costa:  
 Salafyo Costa is a social movement that was founded by a group of Salafis after the 
March referendum in an attempt to end the polarization and skepticism between Islamists and 
Secularists480 and to break up the typical image of the Salafis in Egyptian society481. In other 
words, its founders attempted to establish a movement that would include ideologically 
diversified members to create a suitable environment to get to know the ‘other’ and to respect 
differences. For this reason, the movement has set a quota for Christians (25%) and Salafis 
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(35%)482. The inclusion of Christians, liberals, socialists and even communists was not the only 
reason that differentiated the movement from other Islamist movements, but also their inclusion 
of women and their political positions which were mostly against those of Islamists483
xxx
. In 
addition, Salafyo Costa adopted a different discourse than the typical Salafi one as it accepted 
different manifestations of modernity as its name indicates and believed in the modern state that 
is based on citizenship while limiting the role of the religion to the individual’s personal life484. 
Based on this, it is not surprising that its founder, Salama, was El-Nour party’s (Salafi) media 
representative before he resigned on 18
th
 of August, 2011 to work with El-Baradei, Ahmed 
Harrara and George Ishaq in establishing El-Dostour Party (liberal)485.  
 Although ideological reform alliances are different from each other in many aspects, they 
are all regarded as a kind of resistance by youth in opposition to their mother organizations. They 
were attempts by such youth to reject their leaders’ paternalism and the restrictions imposed by 
traditional organizations such as the MB, parties, and Salafi movements which hindered any type 
of cooperation with their political opponents. In other words, those youth realized that their 
mother organizations insisted on engaging them in their ideological and personal conflicts with 
their opponents while the prospects of cooperation between youth from different political 
spectrums proved to be high after they succeeded to cooperate together starting from early 2000s 
onwards. Accordingly, the foundation of their own organizations is just an indicator for the 
failure of leaders to co-opt youth within their organizations and to reform such organizations in 
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order to cope with their high expectations and the demands of the exceptional period in Egypt’s 
history. In addition, it proves that youth has more flexibility to deal and cooperate with their 
opponents than older generations. Based on this, my assumption which links the fragmentation 
of opposition to the failure of parties to co-opt youth seems valid.    
  As shown, organizing themselves under cross-ideological alliances rather than parties 
and forming their own organizations as represented in ideological alliances strengthened the 
plausibility of my assumption to a great extent. Thus, I will further test my assumption’s validity 
by looking at the demands raised by youth alliances in the different demonstrations that took 
place post-Mubarak and how parties responded to their demands. Due to the large number of 
these demonstrations which took place almost every Friday during 2011, after which their rate 
declined in 2012 and 2013 although they never completely stopped, I will focus only on some of 
the most significant demonstrations that reflect the nature of relation between youth alliances and 
parties.   
 Two months after the toppling of Mubarak, uprising activists became skeptical of the 
SCAF’s real intentions as Mubarak’s family and his ruling elite had not been accused yet of any 
political or criminal wrongdoing, the SCAF’s 2nd constitutional declaration had contradicted the 
March Referendum, and a government draft intended to prohibit factional strikes486. Indeed, 
uprising ary groups went back to the streets on the 1
st
 of April protesting under the title of 
‘Rescuing the Revolution’ and on the 8th of April under the title of ‘Purging and Judgment’. The 
demands raised in the two demonstrations were almost the same: fast and just trials to Mubarak, 
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Zakaria Azmy
xxxi
, Fathy Sorrour and Safwat El-Sherif
xxxii487; effective and fast procedures to 
return embezzled public money from abroad; sending those responsible for repressing protestors 
during the 18 days to trial; dissolution of the NDP and the local councils; firing of Yehia El-
Gamal and Abd El-Magid Mahmoud
xxxiii488; reformation of police; sending civilian detainees to 
civil, not military courts; and engaging all political actors in drafting the laws for parliamentary 
and presidential elections, etc.489. Despite the homogeneity of demands, the ‘Organizational 
Committee of 25
th
 January Masses’ which included the MB and the Council of Revolution 
Trustees participated only at ‘Purging and Judgment’490. According to the MB youth, they 
informed their leaders of the necessity of joining other forces in the ‘Rescuing the Revolution’ 
protest, especially after the SCAF had been given enough time to respond to activists’ 
demands491. The MB refused to participate, claiming the short notice of its youth however, they 
insisted on participation as members of Revolution Youth Coalition492. Others argued that the 
MB only participated in the second protest after the success of the first493 but the MB claimed 
that it participated as being a part of the Organizational Committee which called for this protest 
along others494. Nonetheless, the MB refused the sit-in adopted by some actors claiming that the 
Organizational Committee did not agree on this issue495. It is worth mentioning that the ‘Uprising  
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Youth Coalition’ which includes the MB Youth, 6 April, National Association for Change along 
others have called for the two protests496 while Kefaya, Hashd and El-Eshtrakeen El-Thawreen 
have participated only in the first497.  
 These two Fridays were followed by another protest that widened the gap between 
secularists and youth alliances on one hand and Islamists, specifically the MB, on the other hand. 
It took place on 27
th
 of May under the title of ‘Second Anger Friday’ by Uprising  Youth 
Coalition, Union of Youth Rebels, 6 April, Popular Campaign to Support El-Baradei, Kefaya, 
Popular Coalition498, National Association for Change, MB Youth, El-Jihad El-Islami Youth 
along with liberal and leftist parties such as: El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, El-Gabha499, El-Karama, El-
Nasri, Socialist Egyptian Democrat, Masr El-Horrya, and El-Tagammu500. The ‘Organizational 
Committee of 25
th
 January Masses’ which included the MB gave its participants the right to 
decide what each perceives appropriate for its organization501. The demands they raised included 
a stop of military trials to civilians, the hastening of trials for Mubarak and his ruling elite, firing 
of El-Gamal and ministers belonging to the former regime, determining the roles of National 
Security, drafting a law to ban former regime elite from participation in political life for a certain 
period, etc.502. Most importantly, the protestors sought to amend the road map set by the SCAF 
after the March Referendum where 6 April and most liberal parties called for electing a 
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constitutional committee before parliamentary elections503. According to Hamzawi, liberal 
parties were calling for postponing the parliamentary elections for few months due to security 
circumstances and to give more time for public debate over ‘practicing of political rights’ and 
‘political parties’ laws504. Further, Shadi El-Ghazali Harb, a member of Revolution Youth, said 
that the coalition would suggest an initiative for electing a constitutional committee followed by 
presidential and parliamentary elections respectively505. Since the MB and other Islamists as El-
Gama’a El-Islamiyah were calling for approving the March referendum, it is unsurprising that 
they rejected this call. According to the March referendum and the SCAF’s 2nd constitutional 
declaration, the writing of a new constitution would take place after the parliamentary elections. 
However, secular parties and youth alliances were against this road map as shown because it 
would only be in favor of the MB506. Indeed, the MB did not only oppose ‘Second Anger Friday’ 
but also, they regarded it as a ‘revolution against the public or its majority’, seeking to drive a 
wedge between the military and the people507. According to Sobhy Saleh, a member of the MB 
and of the constitutional committee that had been appointed by the SCAF, the MB still supported 
the uprising ’s demands but it was neither against the SCAF nor against the Sharaf government 
and hence would not participate in a protest that would raise a conflict with them508. MB non-
participation did not only raise conflict with other actors but also with its youth, especially with 
those who were part of Revolution Youth Coalition where they agreed after ‘rescuing the 
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revolution’ protest that the MB would not declare its non-participation in any demonstration 
while giving the right to its members who are part of other alliances to participate as members of 
these alliances509. Although the MB youth tried to convince their leaders of the necessity of MB 
participation after they successfully convinced other actors to stick to common demands and 
neglect the controversial ones, they were surprised by the MB decision not to participate and its 
insistence on issuing a statement despite their previous agreement510. What made matter worse is 
that the Secretary General of the MB declared on 28
th
 May that the MB does not have any 
representatives at Revolution Youth Coalition511.     
 After several events, ‘One Demand or Transition of Power’ demonstration on 18th of 
November 2011 resembled a breaking point between youth alliances and Islamists, especially the 
MB. After many incidents that raised people’s skepticism towards the SCAF, the issuing of 
‘Supra-Constitutional Principles’ by PM deputy, Ali El-Selmi with its ninth and tenth 
controversial articles that would give the military exceptional powers in the new constitution, 
resembled a snowball512. Indeed, it gave an incentive for political forces to unite to oppose El-
Selmi’s statement and to call on the SCAF to transfer power to an elected president no later than 
in April 2012513. Although the Islamists including the MB514, El-Gabha El-Salafya515, Hazmoun, 
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El-Nour, El-Asalah, Coalition of Egypt’s Islamist Youth516, El-Wasat517, etc. heavily participated 
on this day, the participation of ideological diversified forces have returned us back to the 18 
days of the uprising  when all actors were unified against Mubarak. Revolution Youth Coalition, 
6 April, Kefaya, El-Tayyar El-Masry, El-Gabha, and founders of ‘Second Anger Friday’ FB 
page called for the protest and joined Islamists on this day518. This was the first time that youth 
alliances agreed with the Islamists on the same demands with a prevalent absence for secular 
parties as El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, Egyptian Citizen, and Popular Coalition that rejected the 
demonstration and claimed that it was just a show of power by Islamists519. As much as the ‘One 
demand’ protest was an occasion for unifying political forces, it became a reason for driving a 
wedge between youth alliances and Islamists, specifically the MB. This is because the MB has 
convinced most political forces to withdraw in order not to impede the parliamentary elections 
that would take place in the coming week, while uprising ary forces and families of uprising’s 
martyrs decided to stage a sit-in until the SCAF would respond to their demands520. Due to 
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security forces’ attempt to break up the sit-in by using violence521, many joined their companions 
which resulted in six days of street war between the military police and protestors that became 
known as ‘Mohamed Mahmoud’522. The escalation of events urged most political forces to call 
for the ‘National Salvation’ protest on 22nd November to call for replacing the Sharaf 
government with a national salvation government that would run the transition instead of the 
SCAF523. On the 23
rd
 of November, Field Marshal Tantawi gave a speech to announce his 
acceptance of Sharaf’s resignation and to insist on SCAF’s commitment to the running of 
parliamentary elections in its time while the presidential elections would take place before June 
2012524. However, Tantawi’s speech did not meet protestors’ expectations so they continued their 
sit-in and political forces called for the ‘Last Opportunity’ protest on 25th November to call 
SCAF to hand over power to a national salvation government that would have all the powers to 
run the transition period till the parliamentary and presidential elections525. As mentioned, 
‘Mohamed Mahmoud events’ drove a wedge between secularists and youth alliances on one 
hand and Islamists, especially MB, on the other hand. This is because El-Tayyar El-Masry, 
Uprising  Youth Coalition (which both include MB Youth), 6 April, Kefaya, El-Tagammu, El 
Wasat, El-Gabha, Hazmoun526 heavily participated in the events while other secularist forces 
such as El-Baradei527, Sabahi’s presidential campaign528, etc. participated only in the two 
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protests. After its withdrawal post-one demand protest, the MB abstained from participating in 
the events and from joining most forces in the two demonstrations. Not only this, the MB 
focused on the parliamentary elections in its statements, which was perceived by protestors as a 
type of opportunism and non-commitment to the uprising and its martyrs. Prior to the ‘National 
Salvation’ protest, the MB announced that it would not participate in the protest because it 
believed that such violent events were planned by the Ministry of Interior and Mubarak regime 
remnants in order to spread chaos and to impede the elections529. Also, Mohamed Bade’i, the MB 
General Guide, said in a TV show that there were attempts to lure protestors to violence and to 
put the MB at the forefront against military and police530. Nonetheless, many MB and Salafi 
Youth opposed their leaders and joined their companions as Asmaa El-Baltagi and Asmaa Abd 
El-Aziz531. Besides some figures, mostly from the central spectrum of the MB and Salafis such as 
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El-Baltagi532, Hegazy, Abou Ismail, El-Ansari, etc. joined protestors despite their organization’s 
decision533.  
 As youth took the lead on 25
th
 of January, their post-revolution alliances were the main 
organizers for most demonstrations that took place during the transitional period. The 
participation of secularist parties remained at its minimal level while Islamists, especially the 
MB, abstained from participation in such protests with few exceptions. Hence, youth demands –
which were general demands not exclusive to youth- were either met by opposition or abstention 
from political parties in most cases, widening the gap between them and youth alliances. This 
reflects the validity of my assumption especially if we look at how the MB specifically 
responded to its opponents and its youth in Al-Tayyar or Revolution Youth once their demands 
clashed.   
Conclusion 
 The first section of the chapter focused mainly on the new forms of political activism as 
represented in Kefaya, Youth for Change, 6 April, National Association for Change, and We Are 
All Khaled Said. The importance of these movements lay in their attempt not only to break the 
silence and bypass regime restrictions to create their own public space but also to cross the red-
lines by explicitly attacking Mubarak and his family. Most importantly, they refused to identify 
themselves with ideology and they functioned outside traditional organizations such as parties 
and labor unions which were manipulated by the regime and mistrusted by the public. Indeed, 
they created new techniques such as blogging, social networking, and street protesting, attracting 
by that many youth without clear ideological affiliations. Although such movements failed to 
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achieve any of their grand objectives, they “reflected what Oberschall conceives as precondition 
of successful protest movements: developing a network of pre-existing associational ties and a 
segmented society”534. This means that “6 April founders experienced political activism through 
Kefaya, blogging and parties as Work, Front, Ghad and MB; while Khaled Said administrators 
were active in the El-Baradei presidential campaign that mobilized various activists from the 
National Movement of Change”535. Indeed, it is unsurprisingly that this new generation of 
activists would be the co-founders of post-revolution youth alliances. In other words, it is like a 
cumulative network of activists that has the flexibility and capacity to operate in different ways 
once the suitable environment exist. This leads us to the second section that focused on post-
Mubarak youth alliances and their relation with political parties. As shown, they were divided 
into cross-ideological and ideological reform alliances. Surprisingly, youth preferred to organize 
themselves in cross-ideological alliances rather than parties even if the restrictions imposed by 
Mubarak were gone. Instead, some parties found it an opportunity to re-participate in politics and 
re-gain people’s trust by joining these alliances. Hence, parties failed to reform their 
organizations to attract the new activists which prove my assumption. Further, the inclusion of 
parties has influenced these alliances’ sustainability because their non-commitment to the 
alliances’ purposes encouraged them to defect once a better opportunity emerged, enhancing by 
that opposition fragmentation. Ideological alliances resemble movements of the 2000s in that 
they “adopted a consensual approach by focusing on what unites Egyptians not on what divides 
them”536. Indeed, they bypassed the restrictions imposed by their mother organizations and 
avoided the paternity of their leaders who tried to engage them in their ideological and personal 
conflicts by forming their own organizations. In other words, the failure of the MB, Leftist 
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parties, and Salafi movements to reform their organizations to meet the expectations of their 
youth, urged them to withdraw and form their own organizations: Al-Tayyar Al-Masry, Union of 
Socialist Youth, and Salafyo Costa respectively. Accordingly, my assumption seems valid in the 
sense that parties or movements such as the MB failed to co-opt its youth and their reform 
demands hit a dead block which urged them to withdraw and form their own organizations.  
 Lastly, youth demands which were raised in the post-Mubarak demonstrations they called 
for were met by abstention or opposition from the side of parties which further support my 
assumption. As shown, Islamists, especially the MB, abstained from participation in most 
protests with few exceptions. Secularist parties were also absent in those demonstrations and 
they only participated in those that raised demands related to their interests. As we will see in a 
coming chapter, Islamists called for some demonstrations such as the ‘Coming Together’ 
protests on the 22nd of July 2011, but they were boycotted by youth alliances and secularist 
parties due to their focus on controversial issues. These controversial demands were not the only 
reason behind the clash between Islamists and youth alliances in particular but also the reformist 
discourse and pragmatic behavior they adopted. On one hand, the reformist discourse adopted by 
the MB was beyond the expectations of their youth which urged them to oppose their leaders and 
join their companions in some protests such as Mohamed Mahmoud. On the other hand, the 
MB’s pragmatic behavior was perceived by youth as a kind of opportunism and betrayal of the 
uprising. Accordingly, the MB did not only fail to include and meet the expectations of youth 
from other political spectrums but also its own youth whom opposition to the movements’ 
internal rules and behavior either faced deaf ears or firing.   
 Nonetheless, my assumption overlooked the fact that opposition fragmentation was not 
only due to the failure of parties to ally with youth alliances. Those alliances also have their own 
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problems that further weakened them vis-à-vis traditional forces. As with the movements of the 
2000s, their lack of institutionalization made youth alliances non-existent beyond the event. In 
other words, they were active during liberalization phases and were successful in organizing 
protests, but for them to maintain sustainability, institutionalization was inevitable. In addition, 
the cross-ideological nature of prior and post youth alliances was highly important in unifying 
them against Mubarak before his toppling or SCAF post-uprising  but the “lack of programmatic 
coherence and common interest” among its ideologically diverse members makes it difficult to 
keep them together “beyond the very term that united them”537. 
Chapter Four 
The impact of the conflict between Islamists and Secularists on opposition fragmentation 
 Mubarak inherited a restricted multi-party system that was initiated by Sadat in the 
second half of the 1970s after he broke up the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the former single 
party, into three platforms: Hizb al-Ahrar (right), Tagammu (left), and Masr El-Arabi El-Eshtraki 
(center)
538
. These platforms were later transformed into political parties followed by the 
establishment of the National Democratic Party (NDP) which would be the ruling party from 
then on
539
. In the first decade of his reign, Mubarak kept the legal and political restrictions on 
political parties and the parties just mentioned, along with the Socialist Labor Party, the new 
Wafd Party and Arab Democratic Nasserist Party were the only loyal opposition parties
540
. But 
since 2004, the regime decided to take a more liberal stance. The Political Parties Committee 
(PPC) legalized two new parties in less than a month: the Free Social Constitutional Party 
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(FSCP) and the Hizb al-Ghad (Tomorrow Party) led by Ayman Nour
541
. By the end of 
Mubarak’s era, there were 24 official parties in the political arena542. Nonetheless, all these 
parties were either politically marginalized or virtually defunct
543
. This is because parties were 
not initially created by social pressure but by an initiative from incumbents who intended to use 
them as an image for a multi-party system while in reality the party system was dominated by the 
NDP
544. Hence, they were referred to as ‘loyal opposition’ by Albrecht because they are only 
supposed to oppose specific policies or procedures while accepting the legal framework set by 
the regime
545
. Not to mention that they were prohibited to confront the incumbents or the regime 
in order to have access to clientelist regime arrangements. As argued by Lust, elections in liberal 
autocracies reflect a process of competitive clientelism where incumbents gave elites an 
opportunity to have access to state resources, which in turn prevents the opposition from exerting 
pressure on the regime to democratize
546
.     
 On the other end of the political spectrum were the Islamists which can be divided into 
“three forms of movement organizations” under Mubarak: the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which 
was a moderate movement based on strong popular backing, a number of clandestine groups and 
would-be parties that have been loosely associated with the MB, and radical groups that have 
engaged in militant activities between the mid-1970s and 1997
547
. Nonetheless, the MB was 
perceived by incumbents as well as secular forces as the most dangerous threat due to their wide 
social base
548. Accordingly, they were regarded as ‘anti-system opposition’ not on an ideological 
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basis but due to the fact that their alternative project and their popular support challenged the 
core of Mubarak’s regime549. However, Mubarak adopted a two-sided strategy with Islamists 
where the radical Jihad and Jama‘a Islamiya were put under heavy-handed pressure through the 
security apparatus while the MB was given some opportunity to become a player in the political 
institutions
550
. To be specific, the MB were not allowed to create their own party but were only 
allowed to act informally through running as independents in parliamentary elections
551
. 
Furthermore, any liaison between MB and other political forces was under suspicion by the 
security forces since 1980s
552
. Over time, an implicit agreement developed that the MB were not 
allowed to have a dialogue with official opposition forces including parties and NGOs
553
. At the 
same time, parties did not dare to contact the MB in order not to raise the regime’s anger. As we 
will see, this environment of skepticism and mistrust may have made it difficult for both to 
coordinate with each other after Mubarak’s fall.  
 Based on Lust’s theoretical framework that examined the dynamics of government-
opposition relations, Mubarak adopted a divided structure of contestation by allowing secular 
parties to act in the formal sphere while only allowing MB to perform from underground. 
Accordingly, this chapter will attempt to examine one of the factors that may have led to 
opposition fragmentation after Mubarak by looking at the nature of relation between Islamists 
and Secularists based on this assumption: The polarization of ideological differences between 
Islamists and Secularists, with the absence of sustained dialogue and the presence of 
mobilization asymmetry between the two prevented them from reaching a compromise over rules 
of a new political order.  
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 The chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will focus on the political 
landscape post-uprising. The second section will focus on some significant stages during the 
transitional period to examine how Islamists and other actors (who can be referred to as 
secularists despite the differences among them) managed their differences and whether this 
increased the tension between them leading to opposition fragmentation or not.  
 
Section One  
The Political Landscape after the Uprising  
 Although political parties neither played a role in calling for 25
th
 January 2011 uprising 
nor had an apparent presence during the 18 days revealing the extent of their isolation from the 
public, many became interested in political parties post-Mubarak and were motivated to join the 
emerging parties after years of reluctance
554
. Indeed, it is unsurprising that the transition period 
has witnessed an explosion in the number of parties which reached over 70 parties
555
 especially 
after issuing a new law for political parties by SCAF on 29
th
 of March, 2011
556
. Unlike the PPC 
that was composed of the president of the Shoura Council, the Ministers of Interior, Justice, and 
State for People’s Assembly and Shoura Affairs, three judges, and a number of public figures 
appointed by Mubarak, the new law stipulated that the committee would be exclusively 
composed of judges which ensured the separation between the executive and legislative 
authorities
557
. Besides, the law allowed the formation of parties by notifying the committee as 
long as it succeeded to get the official signature of 5,000 founders who must be from at least ten 
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governorates
558
. The committee was then obliged to investigate the party’s request within 15 
days and to hand it over to the Supreme Administrative Court in case of rejection, while the party 
became automatically legal if it did not hear back from the committee after a month
559
. Thus, the 
Parties law along with other political factors have led to the establishment of many new parties 
that can be divided into five categories based on their ideology:  
1) Islamic Parties: After Mubarak, many formal and informal Islamist movements declared their 
intention to establish their own parties. Most importantly, the MB was the first to announce this 
intention and it later formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)
560
. Defectors from the MB also 
established their own parties that included: El-Tayyar El-Masry, Masr El-Qawia, El-Reyada, 
etc
561
. Furthermore, Salafi movements that had boycotted politics prior to the uprising and had 
opposed many of the principles of the democratic system
562
, changed their mind post-uprising 
and established around 11 parties such as: El-Nour, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia (El-Gama’ah El-
Islamiyah), El-Asalah, El-Islah wel Nahda, etc
563
.  
2) Christian Parties: There were only 5 parties: El-Ommah El-Masria, Abna’a Masr, El-Ithad 
El-Masry, and Shabab El-Thawra
564
. However, those parties did not even attract Christians 
which resulted in their weakness and low popularity in contrast to Islamic parties
565
. 
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3) Liberal Parties: In response to the establishment of the FJP, a well-known businessman, 
Naguib Sawiris, established a liberal party known as El-Masryen El-Ahrar which would be one 
of the most prominent liberal parties
566
. Other parties were later founded such as: El-Dostour (El-
Barade’i), Masr El-Horia, El-Mostaqabel El-Gedid, etc567. In contrast to critique by Islamists, El-
Ahrar along others were calling for a civilian state that will not be antagonist to religion which is 
part of the Egyptian identity and culture and cannot be isolated from
568
.  
4) Leftist Parties: They included El-Tahalouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki, Communists, El-Eshtraki 
El-Masri, etc
569
. They criticized other actors for neglecting the socio-economic demands of the 
uprising and called for an increasing role for the state in the health and social insurance, for 
minimum and maximum wages, and for restoring the public companies that were privatized
570
.  
5) Mixed Parties: These were parties that combined liberalism and socialism such as: Social 
Democratic (El-Democratie El-Igtame’i), El-Salam El-Igtame’i, El-Tahrir El-Masry, El-Haq El-
Masry, Justice (El-A’dl), etc571. The Social Democratic Party, for example, included reformist 
left and liberals adopting free market economy which makes it closer to leftist democratic parties 
in Europe
572
. While, Thwar El-Tahrir party has adopted liberalism on the political and economic 
front and socialism on the social side
573
.      
Section Two  
The Relation between Islamists and Secularists Post-Mubarak 
 First: Pre-electoral alliances in 2011/2012 parliamentary elections:   
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 The People’s Assembly elections which took place in three rounds from 28th of 
November, 2011 till 19
th
 of January, 2012 were considered the first elections post-Mubarak and 
the first test for all political parties especially the new ones574. Not only this, these elections were 
important since  the People’s Assembly and Shoura members would be responsible for choosing 
the committee mandated to write the constitution575. Around 40 parties and 10,600 candidate ran 
for these elections in an environment characterized by more competitiveness compared to 
Mubarak’s era. 
 On 16
th 
of March, 2011 the MB held a conference titled “Together we will start building 
Egypt” that was attended by El-Wafd, El-Ghad, El-Tagammu, El-Nasri, El-A’mal, El-Ahrar, El-
Dostouri El-Hor Parties along with the National Association for Change
576
, Uprising  Youth 
Coalition, El-Eshtrakyen El-Thawreen, etc
577
. In an attempt to build consensus, the MB initiated 
the formation of a democratic coalition between different political actors
578
 through which they 
would agree on the main principles for a democratic system
579
. At the end of the conference, 
Wahid Abd El-Magid was selected to gather the ideas suggested by the participants in a 
document that would be amended frequently based on the meetings that would take place 
between political actors
580. Then he was later chosen as the coalition’s general coordinator upon 
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a suggestion from El-Wafd party
581
. The meetings extended for more than four months
582
 and 
attracted many old and new parties that reached more than 30 parties
583
. On 21
st
 of June, 2011 
the coalition delivered its first proclamation which stated that the participants agreed on releasing 
a consensual document over the principles of a democratic system and a draft of the electoral law 
that would ensure the representation of all actors in the coming parliament
584
. The proclamation 
was signed by 17 parties, including the FJP, El-Wafd, El-Ghad, El-Karama, El-Tagammu, El-
A’dl, El-Nour, etc585. On 29th of June, the electoral law proposal was handed to the SCAF and 
Council of Ministers while on 7
th
 of July, El-Wafd held a conference to declare that the 
consensual document was now open for signatures by parties
586
. The conference was attended by 
the FJP, El-Karama, Ghad El-Thawra, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia, El-Asalah, etc. while parties such 
as El-Wasat, El-A’dl, Masr El-Horrya, etc. refused to join the coalition despite their participation 
in previous meetings and debates
587
. After the release of the document, other parties joined such 
as Masr El-Hadetha, El-Sha’ab El-Democratie, etc588. As usual, El-Tagammu on 7th of August 
followed by El-Nour on 2
nd
 of September defected from the coalition
589
. With the approach of 
the parliamentary elections, the coalition thought of running the elections as one party list 
especially that the coalition represent different ideologies
590
. However, this decision deviated the 
coalition from its original purpose which was to achieve national consensus and turned to a pre-
                                                          
581
 Ibid.   
582
 Ibid. 
583
 Wahid Abd El-Magid, “MB without the Democratic Coalition…There is a difference”, Al-Ahram, 15 April 2012, 
http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/899/2012/05/15/4/149368.aspx  
584
 Abd El-Magid, “…Democratic Coalition….The journey of rise and disintegration”. 
585
 Ibid.  
586
 Ibid.  
587
 Ibid.  
588
 Ibid.  
589
 Ibid.  
590
 Abd El-Magid, “Democratic Coalition in Parliamentary Elections”.  
113 
 
electoral alliance that increased polarization instead
591
. On 5
th
 of October, the largest secular 
party in the coalition, El-Wafd Party, declared its withdrawal
592
 which represented a crack in the 
coalition leading to a cascade of defections. El-Wafd decided to run the elections independently 
because its view of the proportion of its candidates on the lists contradicted that of the MB that 
violated its original promise of running only on 30% of the seats
593
. This was followed by the 
defection of El-Arabi El-Nasri, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia594, El-Wasat along others as an objection 
of the proportion of their representation on the lists
595
 and the insistence of the MB to run over 
40-45% of the seats
596
. According to Abd El-Magid, the coalition had two options in order to 
deal with the high number of candidates that each party wanted to add to the lists compared to 
the required number set by the law
597
. The first option was to convince parties to decrease the 
proportion of their representation to give space for other parties to be represented while the 
second option was to increase the capacity of the lists by innovative solutions such as having two 
lists in one constituency
598. Since these two options were inapplicable from the parties’ 
perspective, some found that the only way out was to defect
599
. As a result, by the closure of the 
door to candidature in October, the FJP became the hegemonic party in the coalition, along with 
other nine small liberal and leftist parties such as El-Ghad El-Gedid, El-Karama, El-Ahrar, El-
Hadara, Egyptian Arab Socialist, El-A’mal, etc600.  
                                                          
591
 Abd El-Magid, “…Democratic Coalition….The journey of rise and disintegration”. 
592
 “Egyptian Uprising  Parliament Elections (2)”, Al-Jazeera Mubasher, 6 December 2015, 
http://mubasher.aljazeera.net/reports/2015/12/201512694950644840.htm  
593
 Abd El-Magid, “…Democratic Coalition….The journey of rise and disintegration”. 
594
 “Egyptian Revolution Parliament Elections (2)”.  
595
 Abd El-Magid, “Democratic Coalition in Parliamentary Elections”.  
596
 Azza Magazi, “Cairo Newspapers: SCAF Failed…Split of Democratic Coalition...El-Foloul threatens by Chaos”, 
Al-Masry Al-Youm, 9 October 2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/116588  
597
 Abd El-Magid, “Democratic Coalition in Parliamentary Elections”. 
598
 Ibid.  
599
 Ibid. 
600
 Yosri El-Azabawi & Mazen Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 19. 
114 
 
 The parties which had defected from the Democratic Coalition either formed another pre-
electoral alliance or ran in the elections independently. Besides the Democratic Coalition 
dominated by the FJP, the Islamic Coalition was founded on 29
th
 of July, 2011 by El-Nour Party 
after it withdrew from the Democratic Coalition. It was compromised of the Salafist El-Asalah 
Party and El-Bana’a wel Tanmia Party of the Gama’a El-Islamiyah, a former militant group601. 
Although El-Asalah and El-Bana’a wel Tanmia asserted that they were not antagonistic to other 
alliances
602
, they were actually the main competitors to the MB despite the fact that they became 
allies after they both won the elections.     
 On the other hand, the main secular alliance, the Egyptian Bloc was founded on 25
th
 of 
August
603
, 2011 by 16 liberal and leftist parties such as El-Masryen El-Ahrar, El-Democratie El-
Igtame’i El-Masry, El-Tagammu, El-Gabha, El-Tahrir (Islamist), Awareness, and Egyptian 
Communist party, etc604. However, disputes over the share of each party on the lists
605
 and the 
inclusion of some former NDP members to the lists led to the withdrawal of some parties such as 
El-Tahlouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki, Masr El-Horrya, El-Eshtraki El-Masry, El-Gabha, etc606.  By 
the time of the elections, the bloc was composed only of three parties: El-Masryen El-Ahrar, El-
Democratie El-Igtame’i El-Masry, and El-Tagammu where the first shared by 45%, the second 
by 40% and the last by 15%607.  
 The last main pre-electoral alliance was ‘The Revolution Continues,’ established in 
October 2011608 by an initiative from Uprising  Youth Coalition and Al-Tayyar El-Masry then it 
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later expanded to include the Populist Socialist Coalition, Masr El-Horrya, Equality and 
Development, and Egyptian Socialist parties609. The alliance run for 33 constituencies with 300 
candidates on party-lists and 50 as individual candidates610; out of which, 47 were women and 
100 under the age of 40611
xxxiv
. This shows that this alliance had a good representation of the two 
marginalized sectors: youth and women compared to other alliances. Not only that, this alliance 
was different from the previous alliances in two aspects: first, it was considered the only non-
partisan coalition that represented the revolution youth  612 and second, its founding purpose was 
to confront the polarization between Islamists and Secularists and hence, one of the criteria it set 
for approving a candidate on their lists is not to advocate polarization613.   
 Aside from these four pre-electoral alliances, other parties decided to run the elections 
individually. With the exception of El-Wasat, El-A’dl, El-Gabha and El-Wafd, all other parties 
suffered from a lack of popularity and would depend mostly on personal relations to gain votes 
over individual seats614. This raises a reasonable question of what are the reasons that prevented 
these parties from joining any of the above alliances and more specifically, why El-Wasat and 
El-A’dl Parties did not unite with Al-Tayyar Al-Masry, for example, if they were ideologically 
identical. According to Doha Samir, Al-Tayyar called for a dialogue between El-A’dl, 
Revolution Youth Coalition, El-Wasat, and El-Nahda along others to prepare for one strong 
electoral coalition615. However, the dialogue failed and most parties refused to join. El-Wasat 
argued that it would not join because the coalition included one liberal Party (Masr El-Horrya) 
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and another Leftist Party (Populist Socialist coalition) whilst, El-A’dl “justified its refusal by its 
strategy to nominate only young revolutionary politicians, not other parties’ calibers”616. On the 
other hand, Islam Lotfy, a candidate of ‘Uprising  Continues’ and a representative of Al-Tayyar 
said that after the results of the first round, there were attempts for coordination between the 
coalition and Egyptian Bloc however, it did not work617. This is because the former insisted on 
not joining any alliance unless it was committed to the criteria it set for its candidates which was 
not to advocate polarization, be part of Mubarak’s regime, or be responsible for any type of 
corruption during Mubarak’s era618. And since the Bloc included former members of the NDP, 
‘Revolution Continues’ refused to ally with it in order not to violate their principles and not to 
put their image at risk619. Besides, such alliance would enhance the idea of an Islamic vs. Secular 
pre-electoral alliance which they totally rejected and which was the reason behind their 
foundation620.   
 Out of the 40 parties that ran in the parliamentary elections, only 16 were represented in 
parliament. However, none of these parties succeeded to achieve the simple majority621. The FJP 
was the one with the highest proportion as it succeeded to gain 45% of the seats while the 
Democratic Coalition was represented by 47.2% in total622. El-Nour party came in the second 
rank, represented by 21.5%, whilst the Islamic Coalition was represented by 24.7%623. El-Wafd 
party which ran in the elections individually came in the third rank, representing 7.6%624. Out of 
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the four pre-electoral alliances, the ‘Egyptian Bloc’ was represented by 6.8% whilst, the 
‘Revolution Continues’ coalition gained 1.4% of the seats which is equal to seven seats 
only625
xxxv
.  
 Moving to the Shoura Council elections which started with its two rounds on 29
th
 of 
January and ended on 22
nd
 of February of 2012626, the representation of parties and pre-electoral 
alliances at the Shoura Council does not differ much from their representation at the People’s 
Assembly. Unlike the People’s Assembly, the FJP achieved majority in the Shoura where it 
gained 58.3% of the seats627. Similarly, El-Nour and El-Wafd came in the second and third ranks 
respectively where the former is represented by 25% and the latter is represented by 7.8%628. By 
that, FJP and El-Nour parties are represented by 83.3% combined. While the ‘Egyptian Bloc’ 
was only represented by 4.4%629. Unfortunately, ‘Revolution Continues’ along with other 
fourteen parties such as El-A’dl, El-Gad, El-Gabha, El-Democratie El-Igtame’i, etc. failed to 
gain any seats630. This is because they failed to reach the voter threshold which is 0.5% (≈ 32,233 
votes)631. 
 From the above, we can realize that political parties had the intention to reach consensus 
over the main principles for the potential democratic system and they succeeded to release a 
common document after four months of talks. However, disputes arose once they started to 
discuss the details by the closure of the parliamentary elections leading to their re-fragmentation. 
Among other factors, the withdrawal of many parties from the original democratic coalition was 
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due to the fact that the MB broke its original promises and other parties’ inflexibility with regard 
to their representation on the lists. Comparing the pre-electoral alliances of 2011/2012 elections 
with the general characteristics of pre-electoral alliances in the Arab region since 1980s based on 
Kraetzschmar’s study, they share in common the fleeting character where they even failed to 
survive in their original composition beyond this election
632
. Further, they tended to be limited in 
their numerical composition which proved valid in the Egyptian case such as the Egyptian Bloc 
which is composed only of three parties
633
. Whereas most pre-electoral alliances across the 
region straddled the ideological division, the pre-electoral alliances formed post-uprising were 
implicitly formed on ideological bases
634
. As shown, we had two Islamist alliances and one 
secular alliance while the only alliance that attempted to confront polarization (i.e. Revolution 
Continues) failed to achieve significant representation in the parliament.  
 Second: The debate over writing the constitution: 
1. First constitutional committee:   
 As shown in a previous chapter, the ad hoc constitutional committee appointed by the 
SCAF to amend the 1971 constitution instead of writing a new one raised the debate of 
‘constitution first or elections first’ between Islamists and Secularists635. Then the SCAF’s 
second constitutional deceleration just made matters worse with its controversial and vague 
article (60) which stated that the two houses of the parliament would jointly choose a 
constitutional committee of 100 who would write a new constitution within 6 months which 
would “go before the electorate for an up or down, simple-majority vote”636. Even if no one 
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realized that such procedures would be in favor of Islamists due to their electoral abilities
637
, the 
electoral system adopted by the SCAF made an Islamist victory nearly inevitable as explained 
earlier which further intensified the tension between them and secularists. As argued by Brown, 
this path may work well if there is deep consensus among political actors but it hardly produces 
consensus on its own or even give incentives to reach it
638
. Accordingly, the process of writing 
the constitution turned from being a matter of agreement where different societal segments 
would have a voice to a matter of conflict that was based on the “logic of the majority vs. the 
minority”639.  
 According to Abd El-Magid, the first joint meeting between the People’s Assembly and 
the Shoura on 3
rd
 of March was supposed to clarify the vagueness of article (60) by setting 
objective criteria for selecting the constitutional committee
640
. Unfortunately, the debate between 
deputies were misdirected toward discussing the proportion of their representation in the 
constitutional committee
641
. The recommendations have ranged between 70% as suggested by 
El-Bana’a wel Tanmia to 6% as recommended by El-Tahalouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki642. While 
other parties argued that the percentage of deputies inside the committee should be as following: 
El-Wafd (20-25%), El-Masri El-Democratie (25%), El-Islah wel Tanmia (20-40%), FJP (40%), 
El-Horrya and El-Salam El-Democratie (50%), and El-Nour (60%)
643
. Consequently, they failed 
to resolve the obscurity of article (60) by agreeing on electing 50% of the constitutional 
committee from the parliament, 25% from representatives of civil society and state 
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organizations, and 25% of public figures without determining specific criteria for these 
members
644
. On the day of selecting the committee, 24
th
 of March, secular parties were surprised 
by a list of 100 with a majority of Islamists that was prepared solely by the FJP and El-Nour 
without consulting other parties
645
. In an attempt to solve the dispute that arose, Ahmed Sa’ed 
(Head of El-Masryeen El-Ahrar) and Zeyad Baha’a El-Din (El-Masri El-Democratie) along 
others tried to postpone the elections to give more time for other parties to consult over 
candidates who reached two thousand but their attempts failed
646
. Accordingly, the elections 
resulted in a committee composed of 25 belonging to the FJP
647
, 11 from El-Nour, and 10 from 
other parties (3 of El-Wafd, 2 of El-Democratie El-Igtame’I, 1 from each El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, 
El-Wasat, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia, El-Karama, and El-Islah wel Tanmiah)648 and 4 
independents
649
. If we put into consideration that 25 of the members from outside the parliament 
had Islamic affiliations
650
 then Islamists reserved for themselves 65% of the committee
651
. 
Accordingly, 25 members resigned from the assembly, including representatives of El-Wafd, El-
Masri El-Democratie, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, El-Tahalouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki, and El-
Karama along with deputies and public figures such as Amr Hamzawy, Ahmed Hararra, Rabab 
El-Mahdi, Margret Azer, Ahmed El-Nagar, etc
652
. Besides, the resignation of representatives of 
El-Azhar, the Orthodox Church, lawyers syndicate, labor union along other syndicates and state 
organizations
653
 hit the legitimacy of the committee to the core. At the same time, some turned to 
                                                          
644
 Ibid 
645
 Ibid 
646
 Ibid  
647
 Ibid 
648
 Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 167-168. 
649
 Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle on the Constitutional Committee (1-2)”. 
650
 Ibid 
651
 Awad, “Breaking out of authoritarianism”, 286.  
652
 “El-Masryeen El-Ahrar Issues a Statement with the Names of Defectors from the Constitutional Assembly”, Al-
Nahar, 4 April 2012, http://www.alnaharegypt.com/t~67663  
653
 Ibid 
121 
 
the Supreme Administrative Court in order to suspend the committee
654
. After failing to postpone 
the committee’s first meeting, Abd El-Magid tried to convince its members of holding the 
committee’s work and negotiate with defectors because otherwise, the committee would lose its 
legitimacy
655
. Thus, a mediation committee headed by Sa’ad El-Katatni was formed which 
included Wahid Abd El-Magid, Nadia Mostafa, Mo’ataz Abd El-Fattah, Farouk Goweida, 
Tala’at Mazrzouq, Maged Shabeta, and Nader Bakar656. On 29th of March, the meeting between 
the SCAF and the heads of parties ended up with emphasizing the necessity of using El-Azhar’s 
supra-constitutional principles as a guideline and suggesting the replacement of Islamic members 
with others from various spectrums but without specifying their number
657
. Another meeting was 
held on 1
st
 of April between representatives of the mediation committee and the defectors where 
they agreed on re-electing the committee especially after it proved logistically difficult to replace 
some members with others
658
. The new committee would be elected on the same criteria but the 
representation of each actor would be decided beforehand
659
. However, this suggestion was 
refused by the FJP and El-Nour Parties and hence, Abd El-Magid suggested to gather the 
suggestions of all defectors in an attempt to reach a compromise
660
. Nonetheless, those attempts 
were put to an end after the Administrative Court disbanded the constitutional committee due to 
its illegality as deputies have selected themselves for membership in the committee
661
.  
2. The second constitutional committee:  
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 Although the decision of the Administrative Court found a way out of the stalemate 
between Islamists and Secularists by re-electing a new constitutional committee, it raised the 
expectations of political parties, opening the door for new debates and clashes. The attempts that 
were made earlier to mediate between the two spectrums continued and it took mediators such as 
Wahid Abd El-Magid, Hatem Azam (El-Hadara), Mohamed El-Baltagi (FJP), Ahmed Sa’ed (El-
Masryeen El-Ahrar), and El-Sayed Khalifa (El-Nour) around ten days to arrange a joint meeting 
between political forces
662
. For two months and a half, 10 meetings took place between parties’ 
deputies and 18 meetings between Islamic and Secular parties in an attempt to reach a 
compromise over standards for electing the new constitutional committee
663
. In the following 
lines, I will focus on some of the more significant meetings that led to the establishment of the 
committee at the end.  
 Upon a suggestion from Abd El-Magid, a meeting was held on 17
th
 of April, 2012 
between El-Badawi (El-Wafd), Mady (El-Wasat), El-Sawy (El-Hadara), and Samy (El-Karama) 
at El-Wafd headquarter since they usually play a vital role in mediating between opposing 
parties
664
. They suggested to divide the seats of the assembly among parties, syndicates, 
representatives of workers and peasants, judicial organizations, executive organizations, lawyers, 
and public figures
665. On the following day, they held a meeting with parties’ deputies who did 
not attend El-Wafd meeting and informed them with their recommendations
666
. They agreed that 
each would return back to their party to agree on the main points then all Islamic and Secular 
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parties would meet starting from 22
nd
 of April in a hotel away from the media to reach an 
agreement
667
.   
 For continuous six days at Sofitel Hotel, Abd El-Magid and Azzam moderated the 
discussion between Islamic and Secular parties in an environment of mistrust
668
. The meetings 
were attended by the FJP, El-Nour, El-Wafd, El-Masri El-Democratie, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, 
El-Wasat, Ghad El-Thawra, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia669 and El-Karama along with Abd El-Galil 
Mostafa from the National Association for Change and Sameh Ashour, head of lawyers 
syndicate
670
. Besides Abd El-Magid and Azzam, the participation of Sayed El-Badawi, Ayman 
Nour and Fouad Badrawi was significant in creating bonds between mistrustful political 
opponents
671
. Based on the suggestions at the El-Wafd meeting, they agreed on dividing the seats 
among different organizations and sectors and discussed the initial proportion of each while they 
disagreed over the parties’ proportion and the parties that should be represented672. Nonetheless, 
the main problem that the Sofitel talks could not reach an agreement over was the threshold for 
approving an article of the constitution
673
. El-Ahrar and El-Democratie insisted on 67% of the 
votes to approve an article while FJP and El-Nour asserted on 50% + 1
674
. As a way out, Ayman 
Nour suggested gradation in the voting process where the priority will be for agreement then a 
vote by 67% will take place
675
. If this threshold was not reached, they would negotiate over the 
disputed article and then a vote would take place by less than 60%
676
. However, FJP and El-Nour 
called for reducing the threshold in the second level by less than 60% while El-Ahrar and El-
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Democratie insisted either on obliging Islamists to have 50 seats only in the committee or voting 
by 67% which Islamists feared to be an imitation to the Lebanese experiment of  the ‘stumble 
third’677. The Sofitel talks were followed by a meeting with the SCAF on 28th of April where 
parties finally reached an agreement over the threshold on constitutional articles
678
. As suggested 
by Nour, they agreed to vote by 67% if agreement was not reached from the outset but if this 
threshold was not reached, they would vote by 57% after discussing the disputed article within 
24 hours
679
. As FJP and El-Nour showed flexibility in accepting 57% in the second level, El-
Ahrar and El-Democratie accepted to lower their expectations
680
.  
 For a month and a half, parties’ attention was diverted towards the protestors’ clashes 
with military in the area of Abassiya followed by rumors about SCAF’s intention to release a 
complementary constitutional deceleration to set the criteria for electing the assembly which 
urged them to discuss its contents in order not to let SCAF set the rules unilaterally -as was the 
case with 30
th
 March deceleration-
681
. However, they were surprised by the closeness of the 
presidential elections
682
 then by SCAF’s announcement that it would release a deceleration if 
they did not reach an agreement within 48 hours
683
. Hence, a meeting took place at El-Wafd 
headquarter on 6
th
 of June between 9 parties which included the FJP, El-Nour, Egyptian Bloc 
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parties along others
684
. They agreed on all criteria for electing the committee including the 
allotment of 39 seats to parties
685
.  Nonetheless, they failed to reach a compromise over the 
allocation of Islamic and Secular parties where Egyptian Bloc parties insisted on dividing the 
seats equally between Islamists and Secularists arguing that this would not intensify the 
ideological polarization since this is already a fact while the FJP and El-Nour asserted on having 
53% of the seats
686
. On the following day, the SCAF met with parties where they succeeded to 
reach an agreement over dividing the seats equally between Islamic and Secular parties due to 
El-Bana’a wel Tanmia initiative that relinquished its allocation in the Islamic bloc but instead 
would choose two candidates from other parties that would represent it
687
. Despite this, the non-
documentation of meeting results and the non-allocation of state organization seats (19 seats) in 
relation to parties’ seats led to a new clash between actors688. FJP, El-Nour, El-Wafd and Ghad 
El-Thawra argued that they were part of the 50 seats allocated for Islamists while others argued 
that they were not part of any bloc. This dispute was left unresolved because SCAF called the 
parliament to elect the constitutional committee on 12
th
 of June
689
.  
 With a voter turnout of 84.8%, the deputies of the People’s Assembly and Shoura 
Council elected the 100 member committee which included: 33 parties’ representatives, 29 
public figures and revolutionary youth, 9 law professors, 7 representatives of syndicates, 6 from 
judicial organizations, 5 representatives of El-Azhar, 4 representatives of the three churches, 4 
representatives of labor and peasants, 3 representatives of the military, the police, and the 
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government
690
. But as had been the case with the first constitutional committee, Islamic parties 
broke the previous commitments including 50-50% and prepared a list that gained the majority 
of seats
691
. As an objection, 60 deputies withdrew from the joint meeting of the two houses of the 
parliament
692
 and they included representatives of El-Wafd, El-Democratie El-Igtama’ei, El-
Ahrar, El-Tahalouf, El-Tagammu, El-Karama, Masr El-Arabi, El-A’dl, Masr El-Hadetha, El-
Salam El-Democratie, El-Ithad El-Masri along with 13 public figures such as Amr Hamzawi, 
Mostafa El-Gendy, Amr El-Shobaki, Mohamed Abu Hamid, etc
693
. This was followed by the 
retirement of Abd El-Galil Mostafa from the National Association for Change, the law professor 
Gaber Nassar and the Christian thinker Samir Morqous
694
 along with the representative of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court who wanted to stay away from the conflict between political 
actors
695
. Despite all the negotiations made, the defectors argued, they had returned back to 
square one and the composition of the second committee did not differ much from that of the 
first
696
. Instead of forming a representative committee of all societal sectors, it was formed on the 
basis of partisan interests where Islamists insisted on securing the majority of seats
697
. As 
mentioned earlier, the non-documentation of meeting results with the SCAF in June led Islamists 
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to argue that the 50% of the seats had been allocated to FJP and El-Nour, while defectors argued 
that if they included public figures and parties with Islamic inclinations as El-Wasat along with 
institutions as El-Azhar then Islamists’ proportion would exceed 50%698.  
 Only two days after electing the committee, the Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved 
the parliament as shown earlier, threatening the continuity of the constitutional assembly
699xxxvi
. 
In an attempt to deal with a constitutional problem that might arise, the SCAF issued its third 
constitutional deceleration (complementary deceleration) which stated that if any cause 
prevented the current constitutional assembly from writing the constitution, the SCAF would 
form a new representative assembly for all societal sectors which would write the constitution 
within 3 months and then put it to a referendum
700
. Not only that, the SCAF reserved the 
legislative powers for itself until the election of a new parliament along with other articles that 
gave it exceptional powers
701
. This resulted in a duality of power between the SCAF who had the 
real power and Morsi who came to power by the end of June with restricted powers, leading to 
the first breakdown between the military and the MB since Mubarak’s fallxxxvii. Matters got 
worse when many turned to the administrative court to suspend the second constitutional 
assembly arguing that it overlooked the court’s former decision by electing deputies of the 
Shoura Council in the committee arguing that they are only representatives of their parties
702
. As 
a pre-emptive action, Morsi approved decree no. 79 set by the parliament prior to its dissolution 
and used for selecting the assembly to close the door in front of the court to impeach the 
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assembly’s legitimacy703. Nonetheless, the administrative court referred law no. 79 to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court on 23
rd
 of October, 2012 to study its constitutionality
704
 since it 
argues that the law was approved after the assembly’s formation by a month and did not include 
clear standards for electing the committee which implies that the reason behind it was to prevent 
it from disbanding the assembly
705
.  
 The destiny of the second constitutional committee was not only threatened by the 
judiciary but also by the continuous withdrawal of its members till it witnessed a group defection 
in November. It started with the defection of the representatives of the three churches, 
journalists’ syndicate, and actors’ syndicate706 then followed by the withdrawal of 13 secular 
figures such as Ahmed Maher
707
, Amr Moussa, Wahid Abd El-Magid
708
, etc. on 14
th
 of 
November who declared their intention to write a parallel constitution
709
. In total, the number of 
defectors reached 26 members which represents 25% of the committee
710
. Churches argued that 
the constitution sought to establish a religious state and that the framing committee was not 
representative of all societal sectors
711
. Similarly, Abd El-Magid and Moussa argued that they 
were surprised by the disparity between the issues they agreed on during the sessions and the 
drafts written by the 5-member framing committee which was not representative of all societal 
sectors and unfortunately, their requests to include 2 of the defectors to the committee were 
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refused
712. Besides, there was insistence on not widely discussing the constitutions’ articles and 
on rapidly finishing the constitution because the committee’s continuity was threatened by the 
judiciary and it was obliged to finish its task before 12
th
 of December as set by SCAF second 
deceleration
713. Hence, the timing of the secularists’ withdrawal was not only crucial but also 
further undermined the committee’s legitimacy and raised skepticism toward the way of writing 
the constitution and its content
714
.  
 To conclude, the process of writing the constitution is significant since it is supposed to 
set the rules of the game and hence should represent all societal sectors if it is to be perceived as 
legitimate. Even if it is obvious that the path adopted by the SCAF, whether the ad hoc 
committee or the running of parliamentary elections followed by writing the constitution has 
made the process of reaching consensus among political actors more difficult, the behavior of 
Islamists and Secularists further worsened the situation. Returning back to the chapter’s main 
assumption, increasing polarization was not due to the absence of dialogue between Islamists and 
Secularists but to actors’ perception towards the constitution, the way their dialogues were run, 
and their commitment to the dialogues’ results. First, all political parties dealt with the 
constitution as if it was an electoral race rather than a matter of agreement where each must have 
a voice. To be specific, Islamists assumed that it is their right to dominate the constitutional 
assembly since they represented the majority in the parliament, while secular parties were always 
skeptic towards the Islamists’ intentions. Second, most dialogues were close to brainstorming 
and listening sessions than to negotiations because Islamists and Secularists showed inflexibility 
in changing their positions despite the attempts made by moderators. Lastly, the mistrust 
between Islamists and Secularists was intensified by the behavior of Islamists in particular where 
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they showed non-commitment to their promises in most cases. For example, they did not stick to 
the 50-50% of the seats as they agreed with other actors and prepared a list that gained the 
majority in the second committee despite the fact that this was one of the main reasons behind 
the disintegration of the first committee. Worth mentioning, secularist parties usually took the 
easiest solution which is either to defect or to turned to courts rather than using political solutions 
such as compromise.  
 Third: The Peak of Polarization under Morsi:  
  As no one expected the toppling of Mubarak, electing a president in a free election for the 
first time in Egypt’s modern history was astonishing for everyone whether in Egypt or abroad. 
Not only that, it was the first time that Egyptians witnessed such a long multi-candidate election 
that took place for more than 100 days since opening the door for registration on March 10
th
, 
2012 till announcing the election results on June 24
th
, 2012
715
. Officially, 23 candidates 
registered for the race but the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC) later 
disqualified ten candidates making use of the fact that its decisions could not be appealed 
according to the 30
th
 March deceleration
716
. The excluded members included the hard line MB 
member Khairat El-Shater, Salafi figure Salah Abou Ismail, and Mubarak’s vice president Omar 
Suleiman
717
. On May 23
rd
 and 24
th
, the first round of elections took place with a run-off to be 
held on 16
th
 and 17
th
 of June
718
. Despite the high voter turnout, the results of the first round 
were shocking for many since the run-off would be held between Mohamed Morsi (24.9%) and 
Ahmed Shafiq (23.4%)
719
. While Hamdeen Sabahy, Abou El-Fotouh and Amr Moussa came in 
                                                          
715
 Ahmed Abd Rabou, “Egypt after Elections: Towards the Second Republic”, Insight Turkey 14, no. 3 (2012): 16.  
716
 Ibid  
717
 Ibid, 16-17 
718
 “Elections in Egypt: The electoral framework in Egypt’s continuing transition”, 6.  
719
 Abd Rabou, “Egypt after Elections”, 17.  
131 
 
the third, fourth and fifth ranks respectively
720
. By that, people found themselves in front of the 
same equation as during Mubarak’s era which was to choose between either a hardliner with a 
military background and Mubarak’s last Prime Minister, Shafiq, or the MB candidate and 
former head of the FJP, Morsi
721
. The initial response of most political forces was to boycott the 
second round or appeal the results
722
. Logically speaking, state organizations, former NDP 
members and former regime supporters would back Shafiq while Morsi’s chances would be 
minimal if he was backed only by the MB members or supporters. The dissolution of the 
parliament by the administrative court only two days prior to the second round and its ruling 
that the impeachment law which was supposed to exclude Shafiq was unconstitutional raised 
skepticism that there might be attempts by the former regime to fight back
723
. Hence, the 
political forces that formed the committee of 100 which attempted to unite all forces either 
behind Sabahi or Abou El-Fotouh in the first round realized that the only way to protect the 
uprising demands was to support the MB candidate if the movement agreed to offer them some 
guarantees
724
. Accordingly, MB leader El-Baltagi invited all political forces, including 
revolutionary youth, to a meeting at Fairmont Hotel
725
 that continued for 15 continuous hours 
till they reached an agreement
726
. Worth mentioning, political forces announced the meeting 
results on 22
nd
 of June, two days before the election results in a press conference to close the 
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door in front of any attempts to manipulate the results after the SCAF issued its complementary 
deceleration as shown previously and the delay in announcing the results. In other words, they 
were skeptic towards SCAF real intentions of transmitting power
727
. At the Fairmont 
convention, political forces agreed to support Morsi in return for being a representative of all 
Egyptians and to share power with the other main three spectrums: liberal, left and national
728
 if 
he won the elections. This agreement was translated into 6 articles that included: forming a 
national rescue government to be headed by a national independent figure and to be 
representative of different spectrums, opposing the SCAF’s complementary deceleration which 
established military rule and deprived the president of his powers, re-forming the constitutional 
committee to ensure the writing of a representative constitution, etc.
729
  
  Once he comes to power, Morsi gradually broke the commitments he and his movement 
made at the Fairmont agreement. First of all, it took Morsi one month and a half since his 
official inauguration on 30
th
 of June to nominate Hesham Kandil as the prime minister without 
any prior discussion with political forces
730
. In contrast to their agreement over choosing a 
national public figure at Fairmont, Kandil was beyond their expectations. He had worked in the 
water resources and irrigation ministry since his graduation from the faculty of engineering in 
1984 and was appointed minister of water resources and irrigation in the Sharaf and El-
Ganzouri governments since 2011
731
. Not only that, the government included 6 politicians, 3 
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with military backgrounds, 4 businessmen, 9 technocrats, and 14 bureaucrats
732
. Besides, the 
government did not represent different political spectrums as it had 9 Islamist along with 27 
neutral ministers while liberals and leftists were not represented at all
733
. Further, Morsi 
procrastinated with the re-formation of the constitutional assembly
734
 and declared that he 
would only re-form it if it could not finish the constitution on time or if there was a fundamental 
dispute over the constitution’s content735. The aggravation of the assembly’s conflict due to the 
withdrawal of secularists and the closure of 2
nd
 of December when the Supreme Constitutional 
Court was supposed to investigate the constitutionality of decree no. 79 as shown above, led 
Morsi to issue a constitutional deceleration on 21
st
 of November that further intensified the 
ideological polarization instead of containing it
736
. Most importantly, the deceleration 
determined that all the decisions, decrees, and declarations issued by Morsi since 30
th
 of June 
could not be appealed by any institute or any means and hence he extended the work of the 
constitutional assembly for two months and prevented any judicial institution from dissolving 
the constitutional assembly or the Shoura Council
737
.  
  This constitutional declaration was the snowball that widened the rift between Islamists, 
especially the MB, and secular forces leading to a societal division and a military coup by June 
2013. In response to Morsi’s deceleration, most secular parties such as El-Wafd, Masr El-
Horrya, Egyptian Democratic, El-Nasri Socialist, El-Karama, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, Socialist 
                                                          
732
 Mogib, “The Executive Power: From Conflict to Hegemony”, 375.  
733
 Ibid  
734
 “Fairmont Scandal: An Alliance with Devil”. 
735
 “Morsi Stipulates Disagreement to Re-form the Constitutional Assembly”, al-Bayan, 29th October 2012, 
http://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2012-10-29-1.1756352  
736
 Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 143. 
737
 Ibid  
134 
 
Popular Coalition, and El-Tagammu formed ‘National Salvation Front/Gabhat El-Inqaz’738. It 
also included some public figures such as El-Baradei, Ashour, El-Badawi, Sabahy739, Abou El-
Ghar, Moussa, Hamzawy, Ishaq, etc740. It was formed for the purpose of opposing MB attempts 
to have a monopoly over power741 by abolishing Morsi’s statement742. Although Morsi later 
cancelled it, his insistence on keeping its effects as the appointment of a new Deputy General 
escalated the tension between the regime and its opponents743. Hence, their demands expanded 
to include amending the constitution to be more representative of all sectors before the 
constitutional referendum, amending electoral laws, and nominating a neutral government to 
run the elections744. Unfortunately, Morsi did not only show no intention to compromise with 
his opponents, but also called people for a referendum over the constitution on 1
st
 of December 
after the assembly rapidly voted on all of its articles in one session that took place on 29
th
 of 
November and extended till early morning of the next day
745
. Accordingly, three youth called 
Mahmoud Badr, Hassan Shahin and Mahmoud Abd El-Aziz thought of establishing ‘Tamarud 
Movement’ on 26th of April, 2013 that aimed to call people to withdraw confidence from Morsi 
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and demand early presidential elections by signing a statement published by Tamarud746. After 
only ten days of its launch, the movement gathered around two million signatures according to 
Badr while its goal was to gather 15 million signatures by 15
th
 June to be able to withdraw 
confidence from Morsi who gained the presidency by 13 million votes747. If it succeeded, the 
movement would submit those signatures to the Supreme Constitutional Court in order to call 
for early presidential elections748. Tamarud then gained the support of some opposition parties 
and movements such as El-Dostour, the Popular Trend, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, Kefaya, and 6
th
 
April749. Later, El-Inqaz announced that it supports Tamarud and that its participant parties 
opened their offices for the movement750. Since then, Tamarud and El-Inqaz coordinated 
together to gather signatures which reached around 22 million and to prepare for 30
th
 of June 
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demonstrations, the first anniversary of the first elected president post-uprising , where they 
called people to go down to streets to topple Morsi and call for early elections751. After millions 
of people went to streets on 30
th
 of June, El-Inqaz emphasized that Morsi’s regime had lost its 
legitimacy and that he had no alternative except to step down752. Besides, it called people to sit-
in at Tahrir and other squares till a peaceful power transition took place753, while Tamarud 
called people to blockade the presidential palace on 1
st
 of July to force Morsi to step down754. 
On 3
rd
 of July, the SCAF took over power and Badr along with some figures of El-Inqaz gave a 
speech at the SCAF conference to announce a transition road map, which raised skepticism 
towards the role of security in founding of Tamarud and El-Inqaz. 
  Whereas the presidential elections attracted the attention of many since the toppling of 
Mubarak, the results of the first round were extremely shocking as voters found themselves in 
front of the same equation as Mubarak. Hence, they had to choose between a representative of 
the old regime and a candidate of the traditional regime antagonist (i.e. MB). Fortunately, the 
MB and most political actors, including secular parties and uprising ary youth, realized that 
unification was required if the uprising s’ demands were to be achieved. Although the victory of 
Morsi would have been impossible without the backing of other political forces, the MB broke 
its initial promises as usual once they reached power. Instead of being a national president that 
would set the main pillars for a democratic system and seek to achieve social unification, Morsi 
took all the steps that would increase ideological polarization leading to the setback of a 
potential democratic transition. As explained, he did not respond to opposition demands’ 
towards nominating a national figure as a prime minister or re-forming the constitutional 
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committee to be representative of the society but what mostly raised the polarization to its peak 
was his November deceleration. Upon which, he gave himself exclusive powers that opponents 
feared it would be an intention by MB to have monopoly over power especially that their 
precedent actions do not exclude this allegation. Whereas El-Inqaz and Tamarud are clear 
indicators for the exacerbation of ideological polarization, they resorted intentionally or 
accidentally to the easiest way which is calling the military back rather than seeking political 
solutions.  
Conclusion 
 The chapter has started with a glimpse over the roots of the multi-party system in Egypt 
and the political landscape under Mubarak where it consisted of secular parties on one side of 
the spectrum and Islamic movements that lie on the other front. As explained, secular parties 
were given some space in the formal political space by allowing them to criticize regime 
policies or strategies as long as they do not criticize the ruling elite or challenge regime’s core. 
On the other hand, double standards were used toward Islamists where radical groups as 
Gama’a Islamiyah were repressed harshly by the regime while MB were not allowed to act as a 
formal actor but at the same time, it was given some space to perform informally through its 
independent candidates in the parliament and its social networks in state organizations, 
syndicates and NGOs. Whereas there were only 24 parties by the end of Mubarak’s reign, the 
transition period has witnessed an explosion in the number of parties which reached over 70 
parties as shown in section two. Post-uprising parties were composed of liberal, left and mixed 
parties that combined between liberalism and socialism along with Islamists movements that 
were allowed to form their own parties for the first time. In an attempt to test the validity of my 
assumption which returns opposition fragmentation post-uprising  to the failure of Islamists and 
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Secularists to compromise over the rules of the new system due to ideological polarization, 
absence of sustained dialogue and mobilization asymmetry between the two; I have examined 
the pre-electoral alliances of 2011/2012 parliamentary elections and how both forces dealt with 
their disputes whether in the process of writing the constitution or under the rule of Morsi. As 
shown, a massive number of meetings were held between Islamists and secularists whether to 
agree on the main principles of the coming system prior to parliamentary elections or on the 
way of electing the constitutional assembly and voting over the constitutions’ articles. Indeed, 
the problem is not in the absence of sustained dialogue between the two who showed an 
intention to reach consensus but in the way these meetings were run and the reaction of actors to 
the meetings’ results. The cases used in section three illustrate that political forces can reach 
consensus over the main principles but once they start to discuss the details or issues related to 
their interests such as: parties’ representation in the constitutional assembly, disputes arose 
returning us back to square one. To be specific, the MB usually blames non-secularists for not 
accepting election results and claims that the composition of the constitutional assembly must 
reflect power distribution in the parliament
755
. However, what they never understood is that 
majorities were for parliaments not for constitutive processes which reflects their shallow 
perception of democracy
756
. Similarly, secularists usually blame Islamists for using the election 
results to undermine the development of a democratic system and to have monopoly over 
power
757
. Although MB offered very little in the way of guarantees and usually broke its 
promises, secularists rarely resorted to political solutions
758
. In most situations, they pressured 
to withdraw or resorted to courts as was the case with the two assemblies or they bargain with 
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SCAF till they called for military intervention by 2013
759
. As articulated by Brown, the problem 
does not lie in the political rivalries by themselves but in settling them by pressuring, nagging 
and bargaining with generals rather than negotiating, compromising, etc
760
. After decades under 
autocrats who “mouthed democratic promises while withholding its substance” and who 
favored a divide-and-rule approach toward opposition creating an environment of suspicion and 
mistrust between actors, “each went into democratic politics with unrealistic expectations 
regarding what it could achieve and exaggerated suspicions of the motives of all rivals”761. 
Putting this into consideration along with the way SCAF run the transition and the ambiguity, 
suspicion, and confusion that accompanied its decisions and strategies, it successfully made use 
of the already mistrust between Islamists and Secularists impeding any attempts to reach 
national consensus especially that the rules of the game were not fair from the beginning. 
However, this is not to overlook the fact that the willingness of the elite to share power and 
compromise is more likely to occur where there is a balance of power between different 
segments and where no one group is able to impose its will on others
762
. Since 15
th
 of March 
referendum, it became apparent that the electoral capabilities of Islamists exceed that of 
secularists. Although this issue was not discussed in details in previous chapters, it is important 
to point out to Masoud’s explanation as one significant explanation for the excellence of 
Islamists over secularists. He found that the victory of Islamists in the founding elections do not 
return to voters’ desire to implement Shari’a or to protect the second article in the constitution 
but to their perception about Islamists’ economic policies where they believe that Islamic 
parties are more committed to redistribution and the expansion of the welfare state than leftist 
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parties
763
. This can be apparent in Masoud’s findings where 8.7% of recipients of Islamic 
healthcare services had voted for MB in 2010 parliamentary elections while 45% of them 
indicated their intention to vote for MB in the first post-uprising ary election
764
. In contrast to 
the common wisdom in literature, Masoud argue that the “long-duration political and 
development processes have generated a social landscape rich in religious networks and poor in 
social networks that are based on class or occupation”765. Hence, Islamists have better 
opportunities to reach voters and convince them with their agenda than leftists. MB members’ 
embeddedness in religious networks has limited influence on electoral politics under Mubarak 
due to voters’ reluctance and close monitoring by security over religious institutions’ 
activities
766
. But post-uprising with more open environment, Islamists had a “richer fund of 
social ties” through faith-based institutions that “they can draw on than their secularists” in 
general
767
. To conclude, my assumption seemed partially invalid in which the absence of 
dialogues had no impact on the failure of Islamists and Secularists to reach consensus over the 
rules of the new system while ideological polarization and mobilization asymmetry had played 
a significant role along other factors as explained.  
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Conclusion 
 A common wisdom in the literature explains the non-competitiveness and fragmentation 
of opposition under Mubarak with the adoption of a divide-and-rule strategy by the regime that 
played the actors off against each other, making use of their ideological differences and personal 
conflicts. Additional factors include the problems that are associated with parties since the 
foundation of a multi-party system in the mid-1970s such as conflicts over leadership, lack of 
economic resources, democratic deficiency inside parties, etc
768
. Once an opportunity arose in 
January 2011, opposition elites put their conflicts “[r]recognizing that while mutual cooperation 
may succeed, independent actions surely will not”769 as Lust put it. Soon after the toppling of 
Mubarak, however, cleavages started to re-emerge leading to the re-fragmentation of the 
opposition. This raises the following puzzle: Why did opposition fragmentation persist despite 
the fact that “transitions are specific moments that results in a watershed in the political life, 
opening up various trails”770 and notwithstanding the relative decrease in regime repression 
after the fall of Mubarak and the collapse of the regime’s “throbbing heart”771, the security 
apparatus? In terms of Tarrow’s definition for political opportunity structures as the “consistent 
dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”772, the post-Mubarak 
period can be regarded as the best opportunity since the re-building of a new political system 
requires consensus among actors. If this should be the case, it is important to understand the 
causal factors that led to the persistence of opposition fragmentation after Mubarak which this 
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thesis attempted to examine. More specifically, I argued that there are three main factors that 
impeded opposition from unification which are continuing regime manipulation by SCAF, the 
failure of cooperation between youth movements and political parties, and the polarization 
between Islamists and Secularists. 
 The scholarly literature has argued that the military’s position toward mass 
demonstrations is decisive with respect to regime stability or breakdown. The success or failure 
of democratic transition also largely depend on the military’s behavior, especially if the armed 
forces are in charge of the transition as was the case in Egypt. Having been a major component 
of Mubarak’s regime, the military was unlikely to be a neutral force and there was a high 
probability that it would adopt the same strategies as Mubarak to keep the opposition 
fragmented
773
. Accordingly, the second chapter tried to test the validity of this assumption. 
Whereas the military did not intend to take over power, no one can deny that it was an 
opportunity to return to its role as a king maker and to preserve its interests after years of de-
politicization. Trying to balance between its interests and those of political actors where each 
requires a voice along with the “military’s own characteristics that prefers stability and tends 
toward secrecy”774, the SCAF’s strategy during the transitional period was characterized by 
inconsistency, hesitancy and confusion, leading to the prolongation of the transitional period in 
which each step further tore political actors apart. To be more specific, I have focused on three 
significant stages or issues during the transitional period to examine whether the SCAF adopted 
the same strategies as Mubarak to divide political actors. Being aware of Islamists’ strong 
organizational and mobilization capabilities, the SCAF thought of taking them as allies against 
the uprising ary forces, especially since their interests coincided in the short run. By doing this, 
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the SCAF sought to stabilize the situation given its preference for limited change. The Islamists, 
and especially the MB, are well-known for their reformist doctrine and prefer to preserve the 
state especially given the fact that they had a good chance to attain a position of political power. 
Thus, the ad hoc committee appointed by the SCAF was headed by an Islamist thinker, El-
Bashri and a MB parliamentary candidate, Subhi Saleh, along with other six jurists. The lack of 
representation of other political forces raised other actors’ skepticism toward a deal between the 
SCAF and the MB. Things got worse when the committees’ amendments were approved in the 
March referendum after Islamists had campaigned for a yes-vote. Hence, the ad hoc committee 
and the very first balloting opened the first rift between Islamists and other actors, especially 
uprising ary forces. The lateness of the SCAF declaration that was supposed to be the interim 
constitution based on the referendum results opened the door for the rise of a debate between 
Islamists who adopted an ‘election first’ path and uprising ary forces along with secularists who 
argued for a ‘constitution first’ path. But then the deceleration came as a surprise for all because 
it adopted an ‘election first path’ as advocated by the Islamists, but at the same time the SCAF 
secured for itself a role in the process of writing a new constitution. Moving to the 
parliamentary elections which were the second issue that I examined, the SCAF, whether 
intentionally or accidentally, was aware that “incumbents can determine which opposition 
groups exist or disappear and can influence their incentives to unite or split by the rules they 
make and the institutions they establish”775. Indeed, the SCAF adopted a parallel rather than a 
mixed PR system and regional PR blocs instead of a national PR system which made it difficult 
for post-uprising ary, small parties to penetrate the party system for technical reasons that were 
explained in the chapter while making the victory of Islamists inevitable putting their 
capabilities into consideration. The results of the parliamentary elections followed by the debate 
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over writing the constitution –as will be explained below- have further escalated the mistrust 
between Islamists and other political forces. Lastly, I looked at the reaction of the SCAF and 
political parties to the demonstrations that took place against military rule. Due to its nature, the 
military is hostile to dissent but it tolerated frequent protests until it lost its patience once they 
started calling for terminating military rule. With very few exceptions, the Islamists, especially 
the MB, boycotted the protests that were against the SCAF. This attitude cannot be solely 
explained by their incentives. Based on Lust’s argument on structures of contestations, the MB 
may have feared that if they allied with other forces against the SCAF, they would lose the 
privileges they had achieved in the parliament or were likely to obtain in the battle of writing 
the constitution or running for the presidency. Based on all the above, my assumption seemed 
valid. The SCAF succeeded to play political actors off against each other by its strategy during 
the transitional period, by the rules it set and by influencing the incentives of actors such as the 
MB, thus widening the gap between them and other political actors.  
 The third chapter examined another causal factor behind opposition fragmentation which 
is the failure of political parties to form alliances with youth movements. The importance of 
youth movements does not only lie in the fact that youth took the lead on the streets in January 
2011, but also in the significance of their foundation after the toppling of Mubarak. If it is 
understandable that Kefaya, 6 April, the National Association for Change, etc. represented an 
alternative opposition channel to the mistrusted parties for youth prior to the uprising , it is 
surprising that youth organized themselves under informal entities such as cross-ideological 
alliances, rather than political parties post-uprising . Instead of reforming their organizations to 
attract the new generation of activists, parties preferred to join the already established youth 
alliances. Not only did parties fail to include youth, but they also threatened their movements’ 
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sustainability due to their non-commitment to the movements’ goals which urged them to 
withdraw once a better opportunity arose, especially before the elections. Hence, my assumption 
seemed valid. Besides cross-ideological alliances, another form of alliances that I referred to as 
ideological alliances were formed post-uprising. Similar to the movements of the 2000s, 
ideological alliances have “adopted a consensual approach by focusing on what unites Egyptians 
not on what divides them”776. This is because Al-Tayyar El-Masry, the Union of Socialist Youth, 
and Salafyo Costa were formed by defectors from the MB, leftist parties, and Salafi movements 
after they realized that their mother organizations insisted on engaging them in their ideological 
and personal conflicts with their counterparts while the prospects of cooperation between youth 
from different political spectrums proved to be high after they succeeded to cooperate together 
starting from the early 2000s onwards. Accordingly, mother organizations or movements such as 
the MB failed to co-opt youth within their organizations and to reform them in order to cope with 
their high expectations which further supports my assumption. Lastly, the demonstrations that 
youth movements called for throughout the transition were either met by opposition or abstention 
by both Islamist and Secular parties in most cases with very few exceptions which further 
enhanced the mistrust between them. Whereas my assumption seemed valid to a great extent, it 
has overlooked the fact that those alliances have their own problems that further weakened them 
vis-à-vis traditional forces. Just as the movements of the 2000s, their lack of institutionalization 
made it hard for youth alliances to maintain their activity beyond specific events. In addition, the 
cross-ideological nature of prior and post youth alliances was highly important in unifying them 
against Mubarak before his toppling or SCAF post-uprising  but the “lack of programmatic 
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coherence and common interest” among its ideologically diverse members made it difficult to 
keep them together “beyond the very term that united them”777.   
 Lastly, the fourth chapter attempted to examine the last and third factor that explains 
opposition fragmentation with the failure of Islamists and Secularists to reach consensus over the 
rules of the new political system due to ideological polarization, absence of sustained dialogue, 
and mobilization asymmetry. As shown, the foundation of the multi-party system in Egypt in the 
mid-1970s was not created by social pressure, but rather by an initiative from Sadat who 
intended to use parties as an image for a multi-party system to hide a single-party system 
dominated by the NDP since then onwards
778
. Indeed, most secular parties that Albrecht 
described as ‘loyal opposition’ were either politically marginalized or virtually defunct779. On the 
other hand, the Islamist movements, especially the MB, have represented the main threat to the 
regime due to their wide social base and their alternative program that challenges the regime’s 
core. Nonetheless, Mubarak used a double-edged strategy where Jihadists were harshly repressed 
by the security apparatus, while the MB was given some space to maneuver. This does not mean 
that the MB was included in the formal political sphere which was exclusive for secular parties; 
instead, they were allowed to perform from underground whether by running for parliament as 
independent candidates or through their social networks in civil society and the syndicates. 
Hence, Mubarak’s adoption of a divided SoC created an environment of skepticism and mistrust 
between Islamists and Secularists where each was hesitant to form a liaison with the other in 
order not to provoke the incumbents’ anger. In an attempt to test the validity of my assumption 
mentioned above, I have examined the pre-electoral alliances of 2011/2012 parliamentary 
elections and how both forces dealt with their disputes whether in the process of writing the 
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constitution or under the rule of Morsi. In contrast to my assumption, the problem does not lie in 
the absence of sustained dialogue between Islamists and Secularists but in the way these 
dialogues were run and actors’ attitude toward the results. As shown, a massive number of 
meetings were held between Islamists and secularists, implying their intention to reach 
consensus which they usually succeeded to reach if they were discussing general issues.  But 
disputes arose once they discussed the details such as the representation of parties in the 
constitutional committee or the threshold for the adoption of constitutional articles. In most 
cases, the Secularists withdrew from the talks, resorted to the judiciary, or negotiated with the 
SCAF. Hence, they usually took the easiest route instead of relying on political solutions through 
compromises. On the other hand, Islamists were often inflexible in changing their positions 
which was apparent in their insistence that the composition of the constitutional assembly must 
reflect the power distribution in parliament and they tended to break their promises. Moreover, 
the supremacy of hard-liners on both sides over moderates such as Wahid Abd El-Magid, Ayman 
Nour, Sayed El-Badawi, etc. made it difficult to reach a compromise between Islamists and 
Secularists. Another indicator for this point is that the only pre-electoral alliance in the 
2011/2012 parliamentary elections that rejected ideological polarization failed to achieve 
significant representation in the parliament compared to the other two Islamic alliances and the 
secular alliance. Even if this is partially true, it is important not to neglect the fact that elites’ 
willingness to share power and compromise is likely to occur where there is a balance of power 
between different segments and where no one group is able to impose its will on others
780
. Since 
the 15
th
 of March referendum, it became apparent that the electoral capabilities of Islamists 
exceeded that of secularists. In response, secularists blamed Islamists with their attempts to 
monopolize power but at the same time, the Islamists, especially the MB, usually behaved in a 
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way that exacerbated such claims. As explained, Morsi broke all the promises made in the 
Fairmont agreement after he came to power by not nominating a national figure as prime 
minister, calling for a referendum over the new constitution without negotiating with opponents 
to ensure that it was representative of society, and releasing the November declaration that gave 
him extraordinary powers. Instead of being a national president who would set the main pillars 
for a democratic system and seek to achieve social unification, Morsi took all the steps to 
increase ideological polarization, leading to the setback of a potential democratic transition by 
the 2013 coup. Accordingly, my assumption seemed valid with respect to the impact of 
ideological polarization and mobilization asymmetry on impeding Islamists and Secularists from 
reaching a compromise over the rules of the new system while the absence of sustained dialogue 
proved invalid.  
 To conclude, this thesis attempted to examine the causal factors behind the persistence of 
opposition fragmentation even after the absence of the authoritarian incumbent due to the 
importance of opposition unification not only in the toppling of autocrats but also, in the success 
of democratic transition as argued by most transitologists. As mentioned, most of the literature 
written on the post-Mubarak period has mainly focused on the significant events during the 
transitional period such as elections while neglecting the nature of relation between different 
political actors and the shift in their positions toward each other. Hence, this thesis attempted to 
examine the nature of political actors’ interactions and its implications on opposition 
fragmentation in contexts broader than the elections.  For example: the second chapter showed 
how and why SCAF has shifted its position toward uprising ary forces as well as MB throughout 
the transitional period. The fourth chapter also showed that a dialogue between Islamists and 
Secularists can be sustained as long as they were discussing general issues. Further, this thesis 
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pointed to the fact that alliances between opposition forces may not necessarily take place in 
formal spheres and are not exclusive to formal entities such as parties. Rather, it can take place 
between informal youth movements and parties such as the case of cross-ideological alliances in 
chapter three or can be exemplified in the informal political sphere as the case of the 
demonstrations mentioned in the second and third chapter that were organized by multiple actors 
who succeeded to unite behind some demands despite their differences. Whereas most scholars 
tended to focus on the role of youth during the 18 days of the uprising  or in the early days after 
Mubarak, I tried to point to the nature of their relation with political parties and SCAF during the 
transition. This is because opposition behavior in the post-transition period would be influenced 
by the rising role of youth and the success of old elites to restructure their organizations to 
include these youth as argued by Lust
781
. But as shown, her expectations were unfound as 
exemplified in the foundation of informal youth movements such as ideologist alliances and in 
the fact that youth took the lead on the streets post-Mubarak while most demonstrations were 
boycotted by parties. Nonetheless, this thesis has kept some questions open that would require 
further study. These include: who can be an alternate to the military and how can we ensure its 
non-interference in the process of transition putting into consideration its superior position 
compared to political actors, is it possible to overcome the long history of mistrust between 
opposing actors due to authoritarian legacy or not, how to empower soft-liners or new political 
elites in the post-transition period, why youth failed to formally found their own organizations 
post-uprising, etc.   
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i
 This is because elections can function as a forum of struggle between regime and opposition 
where the latter has the right to express their programs and criticize regimes’ policies and even if 
the legislatures have limited power, they became the focus of official media, giving the 
opposition an opportunity to express their views.  
ii
 By adopting exit strategies that can range from election boycott to protests, sit-ins, etc. the 
opposition seeks to discredit the legitimacy of the regime. Whilst, by adopting participation 
strategies that can include electoral alliances, reform alliances or joint election-monitoring teams, 
the opposition aims to achieve political reforms from within regime parameters. 
iii
 The three successful cases refer to the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National 
Opposition Parties (HCCNOP), protests organized by the professional associations (PAs) and 
joint electoral lists in PA elections, whilst the failed coalition refers to the university students' 
attempts to create a general student union (GSU).  
iv
 For instance: Cavatorta and Haugbølle found that repression and co-optation can inhibit 
cooperation in some cases, but can foster it in others
iv
. Kraetzschmar found that multi-issue 
alliances and alliances that include domestic and international actors last longer than single-issue 
alliances and alliances that are composed of domestic actors only. Other scholars realized that 
personal rivalries and distribution of power play a major role in the emergence of alliances in 
Morocco and Jordan, while in Tunisia, ideological differences play the most important role. 
v
 For instance; certain constituencies can be rewarded by the drawing of electoral districts and 
allocation of seats. In other contexts, regimes give limited concessions to certain ideological 
groups such as Islamists to convince them that their opponents are other opposition groups such 
as leftists not the regime and thus they curb any efforts of cross-ideological alliances. Further, 
electoral law can be designed in favor of a certain identity whether a family, tribe or sect in order 
to damp the basis for a common opposition program.  
vi
 There is a theoretical expectation that under authoritarian constraints opposition groups, 
irrespective of their ideological positions and policy preferences, will pool their resources to try 
to pressurize the regime into reforming the political system because they all share the common 
objective of eliminating the authoritarian player to open up the political space. This is to be 
expected because it is only the removal of authoritarian constraints that will allow genuine 
opposition actors to put forth their visions of a new society freely. There is substantial empirical 
evidence from Eastern European and Latin American cases to suggest that such a theoretical 
assumption carries considerable validity.  
vii
 That’s how Charles Dickens started his novel on the French Uprising  then Kandil used the 
same expression to characterize Mubarak’s era as it was the best of times for Mubarak’s ruling 
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elite and security men whilst, it was the worst of times for the army and the people. (Kandil, 
“Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”, 175)  
viii
 The monthly salary of a lieutenant in the armed forces was, by the end of Mubarak’s rule, 
barely LE 2,000 (US $333). (Bou Nassif 2013, 516) 
ix
 Similarly, “officers from the Signal Corps moved into telecommunication and information 
sectors and officers from the air force occupied positions in civil aviation and airports”. (Bou 
Nassif 2013, 519) 
x According to Zeinab Abul-Magd, a historian whose articles on the Egyptian Armed Forces’ 
economic role have circulated widely, 40% of what the Ministry of Military Production 
manufactures is actually nonmilitary products. Furthermore, although the AIO is Egypt’s premier 
weapons manufacturer, 70% of its products are also geared toward nonmilitary merchandise. 
Finally, the NSPO exclusively manufactures nonmilitary equipment. (Bou Nassif 2013, 526) 
xi
 As Hillel Frisch concluded, the ‘package deal of hereditary succession coupled by a free-market 
economy was too much for the military to bear’ (Albrecht 2015, 47). 
xii Endgame scenarios are defined as “situations in which a non-democratic regime is challenged 
by mass-based, sustained, cross-sectoral anti-regime mobilization”. (Koehler 2016, 6) 
xiii
 The case of emergency can only last for six month and cannot be extended except by a public 
referendum 
xiv
 The PA and Shoura Council are obliged to elect a constitutional committee within 6 months 
that will be charged to write the constitution within 6 months then people will be called for 
voting within 15 days after finishing the constitution final draft 
xv
 Despite the weak representation of youth alliances at People’s Assembly, the age of this 
assembly’s candidates are the youngest compared to the five parliaments held since 1995. The 
category of (41-50) is the highest age category where it represents 41.3% followed by the 
categories of (30-40) and (25-29) respectively where the former represents 13.6% of the 
candidates and that latter represents only 1.6% (Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle 
and Returning back to Square One”, 314). 
xvi
 They stated the formation of Council of Defense and National Security that will be headed by 
the president and will be responsible for discussing all issues that concerns the military including 
the discussion of its budget that will be added to the national budget as a total number while its 
details will be exclusive to the council. Further, any legislation concerning the military must be 
approved by the council before being approved by the parliament. 
http://alwafd.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A/117867-
%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-9-%D9%8810-
%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%89    
xvii
 Divided Structures of Contestation takes place when incumbents allow some groups to 
participate legally in the formal political system while excluding others. (Lust 2005, 1-2) 
xviii
 Unified Structures of Contestation takes place when incumbents allow all opposition groups to 
participate in the formal political system. (Lust 2005, 1-2)  
xix
 “In December 2006, the workers at the Misr Textile Factory in the city of El-Mahalla in the Nile Delta 
started a strike that initiated the biggest wave of labor protests since the 1940s. It was quantitatively 
significant, with more than 1.7 million workers estimated to have participated in actions in the 2006-2009 
period. It also marked a qualitative leap from earlier labor action in Egypt. Worker-leaders outside official  
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union committees organized the overwhelming majority of these strikes and actions…” (El-Mahdi 2014, 
59) 
xx
 An important experience in this regard was the national dialogue organized by the Committee 
on the Coordination among Professional Associations in 1994. The experience of the 1994 
conference was by no means the last, however. One of the most productive efforts was a 1996 
informal dialogue that focused on the issue of democracy. (Shorbagy 2007, 183) 
xxi
 As Wael Khalil, a member of Kefaya, articulated in his interview with Abdelrahman: “We 
celebrated Kefaya for its new ‘form’ -horizontal, non-hierarchical, loose, and flexible- because it 
was everything that traditional political parties were not. The problem now, however, is that 
Kefaya does not exist beyond the event. In other words, Kefaya is very successful at organizing a 
rally or a demonstration; it attracts people, emotions rise high. However, once the event is over, 
there is nothing left”xxi (Maha Abdelrahman, “In Praise of Organization: Egypt between activism 
and uprising ”, Development and Change 44, no. 3 (2013): 576, DOI: 10.1111/dech.12028). 
xxii
 Former head of Al-Gad’s youth committee 
xxiii According to one member who became affiliated with the Democratic Front, decision making 
process looked like a closed box, which no one knew about except the close circle of the 
movement’s coordinator. Another said that “the way the movement was being run before the 
uprising  was very individualistic and this made the movements’ loses exceed its gains”.  (El-
Sayed 2014, 48)  
xxiv
 an Egyptian poet and political opponent to Mubarak’s regime 
xxv Labeled ‘He could have been your brother’ the tragedy of Said provided psychological, 
political and personal motives to mobilize the sedentary critical mass against torture. Hence, the 
page scored 300 subscription at the first two minutes and 30,000 on the first day. By March 
2011, the page contents achieved 1,300 billion hits while an average of 500,000 participants visit 
the page at least once every day (El-Banaa 2012, 76). 
xxvi
 The page ran numerous campaigns, e.g., a) publishing contact details of martyrs’ mothers and 
encourage participants to support them, b) launching a ‘Vote for Khaled Said’ campaign to 
nullify electoral votes of participants, c) launching the ‘Friday of Black Silence’  to mourn 
victims of police torture on the anniversary of the Egyptian coup d’état, d) calling upon Muslim 
participants to guard Christian churches on the 7th of January, 2011–to put down the regime 
efforts to raise sectarian conflicts, e) encouraging participants to dialogue with infiltrating police 
officers after publishing a list of their Facebook profiles, and f) drawing parallels the famous 
movie ‘V for Vandetta’ by calling upon participants to wear black outfit on the fifth of November 
and rounding the streets for six hours to ‘show’ grievance. (El-Banaa 2012, 80) 
xxvii
  The Committee of wise men has included Ahmed Kamal Abu El-Magd, Nagib Saweras, Amr 
Hamzawy and Amr Mousa and it was one of the entities that were founded after the uprising to 
speak on behalf of the rebels and represent their demands. (Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th 
January uprising ”, 2011, 34)  
xxviii
 Others include: Gaafar El-Zafarani, Ahmed Osama, and Mohamed Farouq 
xxix
 Others include: Khaled Fouad, A’mar Abd El-Rahman, and Mostafa El-Wahsh 
xxx
 For instance; its founder, Mohamed Yosri Salama, rejected the constitutional amendments at 
March referendum, called for sending the SCAF back to its barracks, and criticized MB 
performance when they reached power. In addition, the movement was always by the side of 
youth movements where it participated in most demonstrations as that of Mohamed Mahmoud, 
despite the opposition of Salafi movements to these demonstrations. 
xxxi
 Head of Presidential Office 
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xxxii
 Head of People’s Assmebly and Shoura Council respectively 
xxxiii
 El-Gamal is the Prime Minister’s Deputy and Mahmoud is the Attorney General 
xxxiv Famous youth figures include: Mohamed El-Qasas, Khaled El-Sayed, Asmaa Mahfouz, 
Somaia Adel, Ahmed El-Tayeb, Abd El-Rahman Faris, Mohamed Gamal (youngest candidate, 
25 yrs.), Abd El-Rahman Haridy, Ghada El-Sherbeni, etc. (“Exclusive Interview with candidates of 
uprising  continues coalition”, YouTube video, posted by “Dreamstvchannel”, November 20, 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4G5wVKqQFo)  
xxxv
 Despite the weak representation of youth alliances at People’s Assembly, the age of this 
assembly’s candidates are the youngest compared to the five parliaments held since 1995. The 
category of (41-50) is the highest age category where it represents 41.3% followed by the 
category 
ies of (30-40) and (25-29) respectively where the former represents 13.6% of the candidates and 
that latter represents only 1.6% (Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle and Returning 
back to Square One”, 314). 
xxxvi
 After coming to power, Morsi issued a decree that returned the dissolved parliament back. 
Then the Supreme Constitutional Deceleration canceled the president’s decree and asserted on its 
previous decision of the dissolution of the parliament. This reflected the political polarization 
that swept the transitional period and for the first time in history, the conflict between the 
presidency and the judiciary reach such level. (Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle and 
Returning back to Square One”, 333)  
xxxvii
 Later, Morsi will issue a constitutional deceleration on 12
th
 of August that will cancel SCAF 3
rd
 deceleration. 
Upon which, the legislative powers were transferred from SCAF to Morsi. (Mai Mogib, “The executive branch: 
From conflict to hegemony”, 355)  
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